Preamble

The House met at half-past Two o'clock

PRAYERS

[Mr. SPEAKER in the Chair]

Oral Answers to Questions — ORAL ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

Mr. Speaker: I remind the House that on Thursday last, when we had a reasonably full House, it was made quite clear to me that the House hoped that any hon. Member called to ask a supplementary question would ask one supplementary question only so that more questions could be answered.

INDUSTRY

Black Country

Mr. Winnick: asked the Secretary of State for Industry whether he will take action concerning further closures and redundancies in the Black Country district of the West Midlands.

The Under-Secretary of State for Industry (Mr. David Mitchell): The Government's policies are designed to encourage industrial expansion and employment throughout the country.

Mr. Winnick: In view of the widespread anxiety over recent closures and redundancies in the Black Country, will the Minister give a firm undertaking today that his Department will consult the authorities in the area to ascertain what can be done to bring jobs to the region?

Mr. Mitchell: We are always prepared to consult those concerned on the ground whenever that sort of problem arises.

Mr. Stokes: Is my hon. Friend aware that the Black Country and its independent people do not wish for any special help? They are against handouts, especially those that have to be paid for by us all, including those living in the Black Country.

Mr. Mitchell: I do not disagree with my hon. Friend. The number of factory closures and redundancies will depend upon the success or otherwise of management and men producing the goods that the customer requires at the price that he is prepared to pay. The customer is king, and the Government do not control the customer.

Mr. Robert Edwards: Is the Minister aware that in Wolverhampton and West Mould in the Black Country 200 factories have been closed during the past decade? The Black Country desperately needs special help. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it would be better to allow capital investments into the Black Country than to permit flight capital to be invested in Switzerland in trustee and bank accounts?

Mr. Mitchell: The change in the regional development grant system has been much called for in that part of the country. It will help to prevent industries that might be attracted to the area from being dragged away to others.

British Steel Corporation

Mr. Hooley: asked the Secretary of State for Industry what progress is being made by the British Steel Corporation towards the financial target of break even by March 1980, and if he will make a statement.

The Minister of State, Department of Industry (Mr. Adam Butler): That is a matter for the Corporation, which will be making a statement at the end of November, when results for the second quarter are published.

Mr. Hooley: That is hardly an answer to my question. Is the Minister aware that the present state of demand within the United Kingdom, the EEC and the world generally makes the target totally impossible, and that it will lead only to the break-up of BSC?

Mr. Butler: The hon. Gentleman is aware that the target—indeed, a slightly tougher one—was set by the previous Labour Administration 18 months ago. It was picked up and renewed by my right hon. Friend. It was a tough target, but we believe that it is still attainable. Disputes such as the one at Hunterston have not helped in the attainment of the target. If there are any further industrial disruptions in the industry, clearly the


target will become even more difficult to achieve. I ask the hon. Gentleman to use his influence to dissuade people from taking any action of that sort.

Mr. Michael Brown: Will my hon. Friend comment on the report yesterday that the Iron and Steel Trades Confederation was recommending the possible sale to private enterprise of Shotton and Corby?

Mr. Butler: I noted that report with considerable interest. I hope that it is supported by hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber. With regard to Shotton and Corby, the Government have made it clear that if a worthwhile private proposal is put forward that will not use public funds, they will not stand in its way. One of the problems in the industry is over-capacity, and that would have to be taken into account.

Mr. Homewood: Does the Minister agree that if BSC is unable to meet the target of breaking even by March next year that will bring into question all its credibility? If that proves to be the outcome, does he agree that there will be a strong need to investigate the management, especially to inquire into its competence, and a need to provide sustenance for the communities that will be destroyed?

Mr. Butler: The hon. Gentleman must await the six-monthly results, which will be available shortly. Ministers have confidence in the management of BSC.

Mr. Rost: Does my hon. Friend's reply mean that he denies the extraordinary press report over the weekend that the Government would try to oppose any sale back to private enterprise of plants likely to be closed?

Mr. Butler: I hope that I made a clear statement of the Government's attitude, to which I shall not add.

Mr. John Silkin: The hon. Gentleman's statement that the Labour Government had laid down a condition of viability by 1980 is totally incorrect. Will he tell us clearly and without evasion what his Government will do if BSC is unable to achieve viability by March 1980?

Mr. Butler: The first part of the right hon. Gentleman's question is a denial of the facts. The words of the then Secretary

of State for Industry were reported clearly in Hansard in May 1978. That statement was repeated in the expenditure White Paper of January 1979. That cannot be in dispute. The target remains for the Corporation to be operating profitably in the next financial year.

Co-operative Development Agency

Mr. Tilley: asked the Secretary of State for Industry whether he will make a statement on his policy towards the Cooperative Development Agency.

Mr. David Mitchell: Like all other nongovernmental public bodies, the Cooperative Development Agency is currently under review.

Mr. Tilley: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that small-scale worker co-operatives have an important part to play in reviving the economies of inner cities, both in providing new small firms and in providing desperately needed jobs in those areas? Bearing in mind the initial success of the CDA during the first few months of its life, will he consider making funds available to it so that it may supply to new worker co-operatives risk capital as well as advice?

Mr. Mitchell: We welcome the prospect of a flourishing producer co-operative sector. Making additional funds available is a different matter, and demands a question of which I require notice.

Mr. Sheerman: Does the hon. Gentlemen agree that the CDA has done a good job and has great potential in a climate of increasing unemployment? In two wards of the constituency of the right hon. Member for Leeds, North-East (Sir K. Joseph), the Secretary of State for Industry, there are unemployment levels of 11 per cent. and 12 per cent. I believe that the right hon. Gentleman would be interested in supporting the CDA.

Mr. Mitchell: Producer co-operatives are a form of free enterprise, and as such we are anxious to encourage them.

Mr. Les Huckfield: Will the hon. Gentleman bear in mind that an increasing number of local authorities feel that the co-operative form of enterprise has a great deal to recommend it and that it can make a successful contribution to


solving unemployment problems, especially in the inner cities? Will he bear in mind that the comments of my hon. Friend the Member for Lambeth, Central (Mr. Tilley) reflect a genuine feeling, and one that is growing? Will he be more encouraging than hitherto?

Mr. Mitchell: I think that I have already been considerably encouraging. I must ask the hon. Gentleman to accept that.

British Leyland

Mr. Adley: asked the Secretary of State for Industry if he will make a statement on future finance for British Leyland.

Mr. Les Huckfield: asked the Secretary of State for Industry whether he will make a statement on his future policy on British Leyland.

The Secretary of State for Industry (Sir Keith Joseph): No proposals are yet before me.

Mr. Adley: In view of what my right hon. Friend has said about State intervention, will he confirm that he recognises and accepts the difference between a taxpayers' subsidy to keep open a plant that otherwise cannot be kept going and a desire by private enterprise to put money into a manufacturing facility, such as MG at Abingdon, where the nationalised corporation cannot or will not make the place work? Is he aware—

Mr. Speaker: Order. Was the hon. Gentleman in the Chamber at the beginning of Question Time when I asked for one supplementary question if possible?

Mr. Adley: rose—

Mr. Speaker: I ask the hon. Gentleman to do his best.

Mr. Adley: Will my right hon. Friend give positive encouragement to those who want to maintain the manufacturing capacity at Abingdon?

Sir K. Joseph: British Leyland has made clear that it is willing to examine any proposals that make commercial sense to it. I understand that the executives of Aston Martin Lagonda and British Leyland have been meeting today in London.

Mr. Huckfield: Will the right hon. Gentleman recognise that he has said little of a positive character about British Leyland? Will he bear in mind that though the ballot has taken place its result proves nothing? Indeed, British Leyland has said that the ballot proves nothing. Will the right hon. Gentleman recognise that the only condition for British Leyland's long-term survival is a long-term investment plan for a new modern strategy, with financial support coming from his Department?

Sir K. Joseph: The successful conclusion of the negotiations on the British Leyland cars, wages and conditions of work package will be more important than the result of the ballot in assessing the case for any more taxpayers' money.

Mr. Hal Miller: Will my right hon. Friend tell the House when he expects to bring before it for consideration the request from the NEB and BL for the payment of the final instalment of the £225 million out of the £1,000 million originally voted?

Sir K. Joseph: I do not control the timing of any such consideration. The British Leyland board has to make its proposals, and then the National Enterprise Board has to put the proposals that it thinks fit to the Government. It is only then that the Government have something to consider.

Mr. Christopher Price: Has the right hon. Gentleman decided whether to allow British Leyland to become directly responsible to his Department and to escape from what has been described as the umbrella of the NEB? If not, when will he make that decision?

Sir K. Joseph: No such decision is asked of me at this moment.

Mr. Emery: Before my right hon. Friend makes any further funds available to British Leyland, will he ensure that the management of British Leyland has considered breaking up the managerial monolith of the company?

Sir K. Joseph: I have confidence in the British Leyland management to consider all the options. However, I shall bear in mind my hon. Friend's thoughts if a proposal comes before the Government.

Mr. Stoddart: Is it not a fact that if we are to maintain a viable British car industry it is necessary for British Leyland to spend a huge amount of capital on the development of new models? Will he ensure that the company is able to obtain that capital?

Sir K. Joseph: The hon. Gentleman is asking the question to which I have already given some replies. There is no plan at present before the Government.

Mr. William Clark: As two of the most successful products of British Leyland are the Range Rover and the Land Rover, does my right hon. Friend agree that there is something radically wrong when men are sleeping on the job, bearing in mind the potential export market for that type of motor vehicle?

Sir K. Joseph: Bearing in mind the proposals that the British Leyland management has put to its work force, the management is well aware of a scope for improved performance.

Public Bodies

Mr. Ioan Evans: asked the Secretary of State for Industry what proposals he has for the long-term future of the National Enterprise Board and the Welsh and Scottish Development Agencies.

Sir Keith Joseph: So far as the National Enterprise Board is concerned, I refer the hon. Gentleman to my statement of 19 July, and to the Industry Bill presently before the House. Responsibility for the Welsh and Scottish Development Agencies rests with my right hon. Friends.

Mr. Evans: Will the right hon. Gentleman make a statement about the relationship between Rolls-Royce, British Leyland and the National Enterprise Board? Is it true that resignations of NEB members are on the table? Will he assure the House that there will be a long-term future for the work of the NEB?

Sir K. Joseph: I have always been chary of predicting the long-term future of anything, including the NEB and the Opposition. When the Government have anything to announce about relations between Rolls-Royce and the NEB, a statement will be made.

Mr. Grylls: Does my right hon. Friend know that there is great support for the firm line that he is taking with the NEB over the return of control of Rolls-Royce to his Department, where it would probably do very much better than in the bureaucratic mess of the NEB? If NEB members threaten to resign en masse, will my right hon. Friend accept their resignations and let them step off this State bureaucratic gravy train, thus saving the taxpayer £2 million a year?

Sir K. Joseph: Without commenting on the answer that the Government will give on the present issue, I confirm that there is a substantial job for the NEB, as spelt out in the Industry Bill now before the House.

Mr. Wigley: In view of the devastating effect on employment in Deeside, and, indeed, further afield in the county of Clwyd and Gwynedd because of the closure of Shotton, can the Secretary of State give any indication of the additional resources that will be made available to the NEB and the Welsh Development Agency to overcome the problem of unemployment in those areas?

Sir K. Joseph: My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Wales is beside me on the Front Bench, and I understand that he will make a statement on that matter tomorrow.

Dr. Bray: Will the Secretary of State discuss the issue with his colleague the Secretary of State for Scotland, who will tell him that the Scottish Development Agency is accepted by industry, commerce and the banks in Scotland as doing a first-class job? Will he take the SDA as a model for regional development agencies in England, rather than dismantle the work of the NEB?

Sir K. Joseph: I do not think that the Industry Bill which is before the House could be thought to be dismantling the work of the NEB, but rather focusing and concentrating it, as well as returning to the taxpayer some of the investment which, in the view of many, was unnecessary in the first place.

Sir Anthony Meyer: Is my right hon. Friend aware that even those of us who deplore excessive Government intervention recognise that in the kind of situation that has arisen at Shotton immediate


pump priming aid, as opposed to sustained intervention, will be necessary by bodies such as the Welsh Development Agency?

Sir K. Joseph: I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. Even people such as I who think that the Government have intervened too much since the war, believe that Government have a function in cushioning change.

Industrial Competitiveness

Mr. Trippier: asked the Secretary of State for Industry whether he is satisfied with the competitiveness of British industry.

Sir Keith Joseph: No, Sir.

Mr. Trippier: Is my right hon. Friend aware that more than 50 per cent. of the work force in my constituency are employed either in textiles or in the footwear industry, both of which are subjected to grossly unfair import competition? In spite of that, neither my right hon. Friend nor his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Trade seem prepared to do very much about it.

Sir K. Joseph: Representing the constituency that he does, I can see that my hon. Friend is bound to feel that at the margin there is always something more to be done. I must emphasise that, in the careful balance that we must keep, the protection that is now provided, through the multi-fibre arrangement on the one hand and the arrangements for the footwear trade on the other, goes a long way towards reconciling the interests of producers and consumers.

Commissioner Davignon

Mr. Michael Brown: asked the Secretary of State for Industry when he intends to meet EEC Commissioner Davignon.

The Under-Secretary of State for Industry (Mr. Michael Marshall): My right hon. Friend met Commissioner Davignon on 21 June this year, and is ready to meet him again when there are matters of mutual interest to discuss.

Mr. Brown: Does my hon. Friend agree that there is a matter of mutual interest to discuss when my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State next meets

the Commissioner with regard to the continuing problem of the coking coal subsidy for Germany's steel industry which results not only in imports of steel—some of us say unfairly—but also of finished products, such as motor cars?

Mr. Marshall: This is a matter which it may be suitable to discuss, but my hon. Friend will recognise that we are speaking here about subsidies to the coal industry, not to the steel industry. He may wish to follow his interest in the matter, which I know he mentioned to the House earlier last month, by putting a question to my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Energy.

Mr. John H. Osborn: Will my hon. Friend be able to convince Commissioner Davignon that there is no unfair competition from the British Steel Corporation, especially from its refractories division, in order to alleviate the dumping of special steel in the private sector, which affects Sheffield?

Mr. Marshall: Again, these are matters which it is appropriate to discuss with Commissioner Davignon. However, I think that they have to be looked at in the wider context of steel aids. I believe that on 23 October the House gave helpful support to the Government's approach.

Mr. Robert C. Brown: Does the Minister agree that it would be a far more practicable proposition, following the question put by the hon. Member for Brigg and Scunthorpe (Mr. Brown), to give subsidies to the industry, to prevent the import of coking coal?

Mr. Marshall: The Government's view is that this is a matter for BSC. We do not think that we should intervene where the Corporation feels that it is in its best interests to import coal. As the hon. Gentleman will be aware, negotiations are proceeding between BSC and the National Coal Board, and I would not wish to say anything that would make those negotiations more difficult.

Wool Textile Industry

Mr. Woolmer: asked the Secretary of State for Industry what assessment of the future of the wool textile industry he has made in the light of the West Yorkshire metropolitan county council report


"Economic Trends" of September 1979, a copy of which has been sent to him, showing an acceleration of job loss in the industry; and if he will make a statement.

Mr. David Mitchell: This report illustrates the concern felt in the area about the future of the wool textile industry which has been raised by representatives of the industry.

Mr. Woolmer: As the wool textile industry has lost 130,000 jobs during the last 20 years, over 60,000 jobs in the last 10 years and this report forecasts that a further 26,000 jobs will be lost in the three years up to 1980, is the Minister aware that employers, unions and local authorities are united in demanding an urgent and thorough review by the Government and the EEC of industrial, regional and trade policies towards the wool textile industry and those communities that are suffering so badly as a result of this decline?

Mr. Mitchell: Some of the jobs lost are accounted for by rationalisation of the industry, which has proceeded with assistance from the Government under section 8 of the Industry Act. I believe that the wider question raised by the hon. Gentleman is to be debated in the House tomorrow.

Mr. Cryer: Is the Minister aware that following rationalisation under the Labour Government there was a slight increase in the number of people employed in the industry? Does he accept that the present increase in the number of unemployed in the industry is due to the inertia of the Government over the application of the MFA and the determination of the EEC to do absolutely nothing and thus defeat the aims and objects of the MFA?

Mr. Mitchell: When the Government are given real evidence of unfair trading practices they are prepared to raise the matter with the EEC, as we have already done in the case of Prato.

Mr. Burden: Is not one of the problems of the wool textile industry that wool textiles are being replaced in many areas by other fabrics?

Mr. Mitchell: There are commercial problems that affect the industry, and my

hon. Friend has put his finger on one of them.

Mr. Les Huckfield: Does the hon. Gentleman realise the seriousness of the situation in the areas represented by my hon. Friends? Those areas have seen about 2,000 redundancies declared by 23 firms in the past six months. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the answer that he gave during the Adjournment debate on 6 November, when he virtually washed his hands of the industry, caused a great deal of concern on both sides of that industry?

Mr. Mitchell: The hon. Gentleman has unfairly misinterpreted the answers that I gave during the Adjournment debate. If he is in the House tomorrow he will hear that matter further embroidered in the course of debate.

National Enterprise Board

Mr. John Evans: asked the Secretary of State for Industry when he next expects to meet the chairman of the National Enterprise Board.

Mr. Whitehead: asked the Secretary of State for Industry when he expects to meet the chairman of the National Enterprise Board.

Sir Keith Joseph: I expect to meet the chairman of the National Enterprise Board shortly.

Mr. Evans: When the Secretary of State meets the chairman of the National Enterprise Board, will he make it clear to him that part of the substantial job that there is for the NEB is control of Rolls-Royce?

Sir K. Joseph: I have undertaken to consider the representations of the NEB on that subject and to make an announcement when the decision has been made.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Can my right hon. Friend assure the House that when he makes his statement on the future of Rolls-Royce he will bear in mind that, from the taxpayer's point of view, there could be a case for what Sir Kenneth Keith described as a "bureaucratic contraceptive", in the light of the record of Rolls-Royce in accumulating orders regardless of any visible prospect of any return in even the distant future?

Sir K. Joseph: My hon. Friend, who is very acute in economic matters, must agree that the assumption made by Rolls-Royce about the exchange rate in its hugely successful drive for orders under the chairmanship of Sir Kenneth Keith was common to many other parts of British industry. However, I fully accept that it is greatly in the interests of the taxpayer that Sir Kenneth Keith, his colleagues and successors should make the very best, in terms of profit and cost, of the huge order book that Rolls-Royce has.

Mr. Urwin: When the Secretary of State meets the chairman of the NEB, will he discuss with him, as a matter of urgency, the siting of the production units of the microchip industry, and will he ensure that the Northern region is favourably considered for the location of one of these units?

Sir K. Joseph: I am sure that the chairman of the NEB will read the right hon. Gentleman's question. Such decisions are entirely for the NEB.

Mr. Wilkinson: Can my right hon. Friend say what benefits he judges to have accrued from the interposition of the NEB between the management of Rolls-Royce and his Department? Can he suggest whether this has in any way improved the financial management of Rolls-Royce?

Sir K. Joseph: I do not wish to enter into questions of judgment on such matters, but the decision to put Rolls-Royce under the NEB was taken by the previous Government.

Nationalised Industries (Pay)

Mr. Rooker: asked the Secretary of State for Industry if he will give the reasons for his letter to the chairmen of nationalised industries on the subject of wage restraint.

Mr. Bruce Gardyne: asked the Secretary of State for Industry if he will place in the Library a copy of his recent letter to the chairmen of nationalised industries, in which he gave guidance regarding the conduct of their wage negotiations in the forthcoming wage round.

Sir Keith Joseph: The letters explain the Government's views on the basis for

setting the industries' cash limits for 1980–81. It is not customary to publish correspondence between Ministers and nationalised industry chairmen.

Mr. Rooker: Will the Secretary of State tell the House why he wrote the letter? How can he reconcile wage restraint, whether or not it is called "incomes policy", in the public sector with none in the private sector?

Sir K. Joseph: I wrote the letter because the Government, in carrying on the practice of their predecessors, are imposing limits on the external financing of the nationalised industries. It was necessary to warn nationalised industries' chairmen that these limits were being set earlier than usual this year in order to give them the maximum opportunity to keep within them.

Mr. Bruce-Gardyne: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the phrase, which the letter apparnetly contained, inviting the chairmen of the nationalised industries to make sure that wage increases did not exceed the growth in, the RPI made nonsense of the whole concept that there might be some State industries, such as the British Gas Corporation, which could justify substantial wage increases, and others, such as British Leyland, the British Steel Corporation and British Shipbuilders, which should not grant any wage increases at all? Whoever put that phrase into the letter ought surely to be moved into a rather less sensitive position as soon as possible.

Sir K. Joseph: That would be I, since I wrote the letter. However, without going so far as to publish the letter, I can disclose that it emphasised that the actions of the various nationalised industries in connection with pay would possibly be very different one from the other, especially taking into account the different supply and demand positions, the market situation, the scope for higher productivity and all the other factors that I am sure my hon. Friend would agree to be essential. There was no reference to earnings as such being below any particular level. There was, however, a recognition that labour costs are an important factor in total costs and that if the cash limits were to adhere it would be essential for real factor costs, including labour costs, to trend downwards.

Mr. Jay: Have the Government an incomes policy?

Sir K. Joseph: No, Sir.

Mr. Kenneth Lewis: Is my right hon. Friend aware that I asked for a copy of this letter simply because I wanted to know whether the Government were inviting the nationalised industries to peg too much? I wanted to know whether there was an incomes policy, which, although not present in the private sector, is, I believe, necessary in the public sector.

Sir K. Joseph: The private sector is constrained by the need of each individual firm to avoid bankruptcy. The nationalised industries are not subject to bankruptcy, and therefore were subjected by my predecessor and the previous Government to what were called "cash limits", which we now call "external finance limits". That is the nearest, although perhaps inadequate, way—but it is the best available—of bringing to bear upon nationalised industries' management something faintly, but only faintly, approaching the constraints that exist in the private sector.

Mr. John Silkin: Since the right hon. Gentleman has told us that he has not the slightest intention of interfering in the management of any industry, nationalised or otherwise, does not a letter which, while discussing cash limits by whatever name, points out that wages should be held down—because that is the effect of the letter—mean total interference in that management?

Sir K. Joseph: Perhaps we are wrong in this one particular to follow the practice of the previous Government of setting some restraint upon the external financing requirements of the nationalised industries. However, I do not think that it is wrong. As for an attempt to hold down wages, the right hon. Gentleman totally misinterprets what the Government seek to do. What we are interested in on this subject is unit factor costs, including unit labour costs. Earnings are welcome to rise, provided that the company concerned in the private sector can afford it and that the company in the public sector keeps within its external finance requirements.

Biddulph, Staffordshire

Mr. Knox: asked the Secretary of State for Industry whether he has plans to give any financial assistance to encourage industry to the town of Biddulph, Staffordshire.

Mr. David Mitchell: None specifically to the town of Biddulph.

Mr. Knox: As unemployment in Biddulph has risen from 130 in February 1974 to 330 last month, and because of the certainty of a further steep rise in unemployment over the next few months, does my hon. Friend agree that there is a strong case for giving some special help to Biddulph in order to encourage new jobs, particularly because of the town's proximity to the Cheshire border, where special help is given?

Mr. Mitchell: It would not be possible to give special help on the basis of the figures quoted by my hon. Friend without wrecking the whole of the policy, on which we have started, of concentrating aid on the areas of greatest need.

Small Businesses

Mr. Bright: asked the Secretary of State for Industry whether he is considering a loan guarantee system, involving the support of the clearing banks, to encourage and aid the creation and expansion of small businesses.

Sir Keith Joseph: The Government are studying possibilities.

Mr. Bright: Does my right hon. Friend agree that small businesses have a vital role to play in our economic recovery, and that the successful loan guarantee scheme which is operated by both the Government and clearing banks in the United States shows how this can be achieved?

Sir K. Joseph: An unsubsidised loan guarantee scheme would be for the banks themselves to organise.

Mr. Cryer: Does the Secretary of State accept that one of the key ways in which to assist small businesses would be to lower interest rates and restore public expenditure cuts, including those in manufacturing industry? Does he not accept


that when the Government cut back on expenditure to organisations such as British Leyland that affects thousands of small firms, which then face bankruptcy?

Sir K. Joseph: Of course it would be desirable, for all sorts of reasons, to have lower interest rates and a more flourishing manufacturing sector. However, we cannot achieve that quickly in the light of the momentum towards excess spending left by the previous Government.

Mr. William Clark: Does my right hon. Friend agree that if public expenditure increases the public sector borrowing requirement automatically increases, with the result that interest rates must rise?

Sir K. Joseph: That may be entirely so, but the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer) does not seem to understand that these matters are interrelated. Public spending, if it gets excessive, as it did under the previous Government, has desperate consequences and destroys as many jobs as it seeks to create.

Dr. John Cunningham: Will the Secretary of State say how he expects the widespread forecast of an increase in MLR to assist small businesses?

Sir K. Joseph: What matters is that the Government should succeed in abating the level of inflation, and that matters more for small businesses than the temporary level of interest rate, even at its present level.

Engineering Industry (Finniston Report)

Mr. Douglas: asked the Secretary of State for Industry when he expects to receive the Finniston report on engineering manpower and when he expects to publish it.

Sir Keith Joseph: Shortly: and soon.

Mr. Douglas: Does the Secretary of State concede that the sooner that is done the better, because we are anxious to have this report on engineering manpower before the Government destroy our manufacturing engineering base?

Sir K. Joseph: Yes. The Government eagerly await the report. Under Sir Monty Finniston the committee must have worked extremely hard to be so near to publishing a report only two years after it was appointed.

Mr. John H. Osborn: Has my right hon. Friend received a copy of the report? Will he bear in mind that learned societies and industrial organisations are planning meetings with the intention of discussing this matter, and that without a more definite date than "soon" this is difficult to arrange?

Sir K. Joseph: Yes. I sympathise with their need, but I am sure that Sir Monty Finniston will do his best to tell them of the likely date. I have not had a copy of the final report.

Mr. Dalyell: As a senior member of the Cabinet, is the Secretary of State concerned with the parlous situation in many engineering departments in universities, given the rise in overseas students' fees and the consequences that flow from that for the engineering departments?

Sir K. Joseph: No. I have formed a high impression of the vitality of those engineering departments in universities that I recently visited.

British Leyland

Mr. Hal Miller: asked the Secretary of State for Industry when he last met the chairman of British Leyland.

Sir Keith Joseph: Recently, but not very recently.

Mr. Miller: In view of the chairman's wish to follow up the result of the ballot on the corporate plan and the ballot currently being organised on pay and productivity arrangements for the work force, if the chairman asked at the last meeting how long the Government would take to consider a request for funds, what reply did my right hon. Friend give?

Sir K. Joseph: I think that the chairman of British Leyland is realistic. He knows that the Government will need some time to consider any request for funds for BL that is made via the NEB. The NEB may have its own comments to make. The Government will need some time in which to consider so important a question.

Mr. Rooker: Does the Secretary of State accept that British Leyland is under the NEB more by accident than by design? That being so, will he give a commitment that if the workers have backed the plan for British Leyland, the Government will do so as well?

Sir K. Joseph: The hon. Gentleman misses the point that was made by a number of hon. Members, including his hon. Friend the Member for Nuneaton (Mr. Huckfield). What the Government will need to consider is the performance, and likely performance, of British Leyland management and workers. The reaction of the work force to the current pay and conditions proposals put to them by British Leyland management will have more significance in the Government's mind than the result of the ballot.

Mr. David Price: Will my right hon. Friend take the occasion to discuss with the chairman of British Leyland, quite apart from any question of hiving off, whether the large factories are not too big? Is not there a great deal of evidence that modern British managers and workers are not very good when the unit sizes are as large as they are in British Leyland, and that all the evidence points to the small being beautiful in manufacturing?

Sir K. Joseph: Yes. I am sure that there is some strength in what my hon. Friend says, but the chairman of British Leyland has to cope with the reality.

Mr. Leighton: Does the Minister agree that British Leyland is under the control of the National Enterprise Board only because private enterprise failed the motor industry, and that it cannot be expected to turn round in 12 months? It could well mean a decade of public investment in this industry. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that we cannot face the prospect of Britain without a viable motor industry, which might mean selective import controls?

Sir K. Joseph: The forced mergers that the Labour Government produced in the motor car industry tended, in the event, to fail, while the forced merger in the electrical power industry, over which the same Labour Government presided, tended to succeed.

Mr. Adley: Will my right hon. Friend please take this opportunity to confirm that it is no part of the philosophy of the Government to allow the management of British Leyland to create a State subsidised monopoly in sports car production if there are private enterprise buyers willing and able to carry on competitive production of other cars in the range that

British Leyland seem unfit or unable to carry on producing?

Sir K. Joseph: As I have said, British Leyland today met one particular private sector potential manufacturer of sports cars to discuss the possibility of a sale.

Titanium

Mr. Dalyell: asked the Secretary of State for Industry if he is satisfied with the capacity of British industry to produce titanium.

Mr. Michael Marshall: Yes, Sir. There are plans to replace and extend the present capacity with a new plant to be commissioned in the early 1980s.

Mr. Dalyell: Can we take it that the Government are firmly committed to a British titanium capacity? What is the time scale involved?

Mr. Marshall: The hon. Gentleman will be aware of the formation of a company—Cleveland Titanium Limited—which will consist of the National Enter-price Board, Rolls-Royce and Imperial Metal Industries Ltd. The Government hope to see further private sector involvement. I have already given the early 1980s as the time scale.

Mr. Budgen: Will my hon. Friend explain to the House why it is necessary for the National Enterprise Board to get involved in this industry at all?

Mr. Marshall: This was felt to be the most convenient way, so as to move in these matters quickly. I make it plain to my hon. Friend that we seek to bring the National Enterprise Board into this, as into other matters, to get private sector involvement as soon as possible.

Dr. John Cunningham: As the market forces which the hon. Member for Wolverhampton, South-West (Mr. Budgen) knows and loves are apparently failing the nation in this respect, will the Minister assure us that the public enterprise involvement through the NEB will be retained and not sold off after the taxpayer has paid for this important national enterprise?

Mr. Marshall: I explained that we want the National Enterprise Board to find private sector involvement to replace its stake as soon as possible. That is part of our continuing philosophy.

Mr. Dalyell: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker. In view of the unsatisfactory nature of certain aspects of the reply, I shall seek to raise the matter on the Adjournment.

South Yorkshire

Mr. Edwin Wainwright: asked the Secretary of State for Industry what measures he is now taking to assist the development of new industries in the South Yorkshire area.

Mr. David Mitchell: The Government's taxation and other policies are designed to encourage industry to expand. South Yorkshire, with the exception of the Sheffield travel-to-work area, is to remain an assisted area, while we have raised the Mexborough and Rotherham travel-to-work areas to development area status.

Mr. Wainwright: Does the Minister realise that in South Yorkshire there are still these large pockets of unemployment, which will be aggravated by the Government's policy of making vicious cuts in public expenditure? Will he look again at this problem and take into account the fact that local authorities are doing their best to build factories and plants, and that even the South Yorkshire county council became involved? Will he give further encouragement to them?

Mr. Mitchell: Public expenditure cuts are necessary to enable us to live within our means. The central point of the hon. Gentleman's question is answered by the fact that our policies are designed on the basis of providing incentives, of removing the burdens that afflict industry, and of encouraging the creation and expansion of jobs and the economy generally.

Mr. John H. Osborn: Will my hon. Friend bear in mind that Sheffield has an industrial infrastructure and supplies nearly half the jobs available in South Yorkshire?

Mr. Mitchell: My hon. Friend is correct. I recently met a deputation of Members of Parliament and representatives of local authorities, at which he was present, which brought home the point that he is now raising.

Engineering Industry

Mr. Cadbury: asked the Secretary of State for Industry what the effect of the

recent engineering industrial dispute will be upon the competitiveness of the engineering industry.

Mr. Lee: asked the Secretary of State for Industry what the effect of the recent engineering industrial dispute will be upon profitability and job prospects.

Mr. Michael Marshall: The costs of the engineering dispute and the settlement are without doubt serious. The effects will be felt—in both the short and the long term—through the further erosion of already meagre profit margins, through price increases, through the impact on relative costs, and through the loss of confidence overseas in this country's ability to deliver on time. Job prospects in the industry can only be worsened.

Mr. Cadbury: Does my hon. Friend agree that a shorter working week, unless accompanied by an increase in productivity, is bound to lead to more rather than less unemployment?

Mr. Marshall: I agree with my hon. Friend. It is one of the sad parts of the settlement of this dispute that job prospects have been so clearly affected.

Mr. Lee: Will my hon. Friend continue to draw the attention of those employed in the engineering industry to the disastrous effects of the strike, typified by firms such as Tube Investments Ltd., which estimates that the loss of profits that it will incur as a result of the engineering strike will be about £20 million, leading to less net revenue for capital investment, research and development, and the job security of the 60,000 employees in the group?

Mr. Marshall: I accept what my hon. Friend says. He will have seen the estimate of the fall in output by the engineering industries in August, which was about 10 per cent.

Mr. Conlan: Will the hon. Gentleman concede that if he and his hon. Friends had not covertly encouraged the Engineering Employers Federation to resist the legitimate claims of these trade unions the matter would have been settled long before it was, and that therefore responsibility for the damage that was done to this industry rests very largely with the Government?

Mr. Marshall: I do not accept the premise on which the first part of the hon. Gentleman's question was posed. Therefore, the second part does not arise.

LEGAL SERVICES

Mr. Archer: asked the Attorney-General which recommendations of the Royal Commission on legal services he proposes to implement; and if he will make a statement.

The Attorney-General (Sir Michael Havers): There is little that I can add to the statements made by my noble Friend the Lord Chancellor and myself on 30 October. The report is substantial, and time for consideration, consultation and reflection is required before decisions can be taken. This process has already begun, but it is too soon to say when it will be complete.

Mr. Archer: While the Attorney-General will appreciate that I set down the question before I knew that he proposed to make a statement, and before last week's Adjournment debate, may I ask him whether he has directed his mind to the implications of the Royal Commission's concern for the future of law centres? While we appreciate that the right hon. and learned Gentleman and his noble Friend will require time to consider the recommendation for central funding, may I ask whether he appreciates that some law centres will not exist by then unless they receive some help in the meantime? Has he any proposals to give them some help in the meantime?

The Attorney-General: The Commission's report threw light on a number of important and immediate problems in the legal service field, which included criminal legal aid criteria, remuneration, inflation-proofing of legal aid limits, funding the CABs and law centres and, in general, how to make the best use of the limited amount of money available, and those consultations are going on.

Mr. Fletcher-Cooke: As a matter of urgency, will my right hon. and learned Friend consider what the right hon. and learned Member for Warley, West (Mr. Archer) has just said—namely, that if law centres are to continue a statement of principle as to their central funding, or not as the case may be, is urgently

required? Is he aware that I think that the recommendation for central funding is correct?

The Attorney-General: I am pleased to see my hon. and learned Friend back in the House again. The matter raised by him is high on the Government's list of priorities.

Mr. Robert C. Brown: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the Government's attitude to closed shops appears to be nothing short of hypocrisy when one compares it with their attitude to the legal services, which have one of the tightest of closed shops?

The Attorney-General: No, Sir.

COURT RECORDS AND TRANSCRIPTS

Mr. John H. Osborn: asked the Attorney-General if, in the light of the case of Miss Tibbits, details of which have been supplied to him, he will bring forward legislation to provide for the correction of court records where the record is erroneous or disputed, or for the acceptance of subsequent affidavits in lieu of such correction.

The Attorney-General: If my hon. Friend is referring to a transcript of proceedings, as I believe, and not to court records properly so-called, the answer is that there is every opportunity to challenge the accuracy of transcripts on appeal from the lower court; and if there is no appeal there is no occasion to challenge them. If the transcript itself accurately records what was said in court, any remedy must lie elsewhere.

Mr. Osborn: Will my right hon. and learned Friend bear in mind that my constituent's nephew was a litigant in a case and that she had attributed to her an intervention that was made by another person in the court? For reasons of other proceedings she wants that intervention corrected. She has been trying for four years and has been unable to have it corrected. Is my right hon. and learned Friend satisfied with the procedures?

The Attorney-General: There is really little that can be done so far as the courts are concerned. If the case is concluded and there is no appeal, unless the maker of the disputed statement is willing to


acknowledge its inaccuracy and withdraw it, I do not know what else can be done.

LAW OF CONTEMPT

Mr. Ryman: asked the Attorney-General which of the recommendations of the Phillimore report, relating to the law of contempt, he intends to implement in forthcoming legislation.

The Attorney-General: I must ask the hon. Member to wait for that information until the Bill is published.

Mr. Ryman: I am grateful to the Attorney-General for that short and rather imprecise reply. Bearing in mind that it is now a long time indeed since the Phillimore report was published, and that it is even a long time since the previous Government, as their excuse for taking no action whatever, published a discussion paper, will the right hon. and learned Gentleman confirm what was set out in the Gracious Speech at the beginning of the parliamentary Session, namely, that there will be legislation to clarify this difficult branch of the law by removing many of the anomalies in it? Will he kindly confirm that there will definitely be legislation this Session to implement the principal recommendations of the report? Does he, like his predecessors—

Mr. Speaker: Order. I fear that the hon. Gentleman was not present earlier, when I said that it was the will of the House that we should have one supplementary question rather than three.

The Attorney-General: The shortness of my reply reflected that, Mr. Speaker, but it also reflected the precision in which it was termed. I give the undertaking to the hon. Gentleman. The Bill will be introduced, but not before the new year.

Mr. Jeffrey Thomas: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the present state of the law amounts to a real containment of the right to free expression? Is he aware that television companies and newspapers are muzzled and intimidated by the vagaries of the law of contempt, the chief evil of which is its uncertainty? Finally, does he agree that the spirit of the European Court's judgment in The Sunday Times case calls for root and branch reform?

The Attorney-General: One cannot, of course, say that every recommendation in the Phillimore report will be accepted by the Government, but many will be. I agree with the hon. and learned Gentleman that it is the uncertainty that has been the difficulty up to now. I hope that the Bill will resolve the uncertainties.

Mr. Christopher Price: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that where no jury is involved but simply a judge, and as all our judges are completely incorruptible and unaffected by any public comment, it is right that reasonable comment should be able to be made in those circumstances and that that situation should also apply to the sub judice rule in this House?

The Attorney-General: It is difficult to be sure about where one draws the line. I think that it is clear now—it has been accepted, perhaps, ever since The Tunes "butterfly on the wheel" leader after the Rolling Stones case—that it is not accepted that judges in, for example, the Court of Appeal will be influenced by anything that they read in a newspaper. But so many of these cases end up before a jury. That is where the problem lies. A decision will have to be taken on the point at which contempt will start. That will be set out clearly in the Bill.

JURY VETTING

Mr. Winnick: asked the Attorney-General what representations he has received over jury vetting.

The Attorney-General: I have received some correspondence from the National Council for Civil Liberties and a few letters from constituents passed on to me by right hon. and hon. Members.

Mr. Winnick: Will the right hon. and learned Gentleman accept that the manner in which jury vetting has taken place in a number of cases has caused considerable concern? Will he also accept that if the type of jury vetting that we have seen recently continues it will undermine the very basis of the jury system itself, which would be, to say the least, extremely unfortunate?

The Attorney-General: Jury vetting would not undermine the whole system of jury service. I think perhaps that the


anxieties that have arisen followed the disclosure in The Guardian of some of the inquiries or results that were thrown up at local police station level. Anyway, the whole matter is under consideration between myself and my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary, and we have already started discussions on it.

Mr. Rooker: asked the Attorney-General if he has any proposals to alter the existing guidelines on jury vetting.

The Attorney-General: In consultation with my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for the Home Department I am considering these guidelines.

Mr. Rooker: Can the Attorney-General tell the House the results of the consultations that the Leader of the House initiated two weeks ago, when several of us pressed him for a debate? We do not really have to wait for the Government to come to their decision following the discussions referred to in the previous question by my hon. Friend the Member for Blyth (Mr. Ryman) before the House can have a debate on this matter.

The Attorney-General: So far as I am concerned, the position is that I have started discussions with the Home Secretary. They will obviously take time. A certain amount of consultation will be necessary. As soon as those consultations are completed either my right hon. Friend or I will make a statement to the House.

Mr. Cryer: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman agree that it is unfortunate that the whole business of jury vetting and the secret guidelines drawn up by former Ministers came to public notice only as a result of a court case? Should not the guidelines about which he is talking be clear and open to ensure that there is no possible basis for the public to feel that something funny is going on behind closed doors?

The Attorney-General: The decision not to publish and subsequently to pub-

lish the guidelines was nothing to do with me or with this Administration. I undertake that when my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary and I reach our conclusions either he or I will make a statement and that what we have decided will be published for all to see and to act upon.

Mr. John Morris: Does the Attorney-General accept that there is grave disquiet, which I share, about jury vetting and the position we have now reached, and that for 30 years defence lawyers did not know what was going on? Therefore, will he consider this matter urgently and ensure that there is an early debate in the House so that we can consider a grave matter of the utmost constitutional importance affecting the rights and liberties of the subject?

The Attorney-General: I am sure that the right hon. and learned Gentleman spent part of yesterday reading what my predecessor said in a well argued article in The Observer.
I have told the House that art urgent review is under way. I shall, at the very least, ensure that a statement is made on the conclusions that we reach.

STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS, &amp;c.

Mr. Speaker: By leave of the House, I shall put together the Questions on the three motions relating to statutory instruments.

Ordered,

That the draft Milk (Extension of Period of Control of Maximum Prices) Order 1979 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the Legal Aid (Scotland) (Financial Conditions) (No. 2) Regulations 1979 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.

That the Legal Advice and Assistance (Scot land) (Financial Conditions) (No. 4) Regulations 1979 be referred to a Standing Committee on Statutory Instruments, &c.—[Mr. St. John-Stems.]

Orders of the Day — SOUTHERN RHODESIA BILL

Considered in Committee [Progress 8 November].

[Mr. BERNARD WEATHERILL in the Chair]

Clause 1

POWER TO PROVIDE CONSTITUTION FOR ZIMBABWE

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I beg to move amendment No. 2, in page 1, line 5, after '(1)', insert
'After agreement has been reached by all parties represented at the Constitutional Conference'.

The Chairman: Order. With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments:

No. 4, in page 1, line 6, after 'Zimbabwe', insert
accepted by all parties to the Lancaster House talks'.

No. 11, in page 1, line 14, after 'provision', insert
agreed by representatives of the Muzorewa regime and the Patriotic Front'.

No. 17, in page 1, line 18, at end insert—
'(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1) above, no constitution provided by Order in Council thereby shall take effect unless a referendum has first been held in Southern Rhodesia upon a question as to whether such constitution is approved or not approved by the electorate of Southern Rhodesia; and such constitution shall be taken to be not approved unless a majority of persons voting in such referendum have expressed their approval thereof and it appears to the Secretary of State that not less than 40 per cent, of the persons entitled to vote in the referendum have expressed their approval.
(5) Her Majesty may by Order in Council make all such provision as may be necessary for the holding of such a referendum (including, but without prejudice to any other matter, the definition of the persons entitled to vote therein); and the provisions of subsection (3) of the next following section shall apply to any such Order in Council.'.
No. 51, in Clause 3, page 2, line 30, at end insert
'save that no act shall be taken under these powers until a ceasefire has been accepted by the Muzorewa régime and the Patriotic Front'.

Mr. Lyon: This amendment is crucial to the consideration of the whole Bill. It may be that some Conservative Members think that it is designed to make a false assumption of the intentions of the Bill and the bona fides of the Government, and that it is so different from the attitude that has emerged through the press regarding what has been going on at Lancaster House that it is totally unnecessary.
In an exchange at Question Time the Lord Privy Seal, with a somewhat patrician disdain, rejected any suggestion that the matter could go ahead if there were a breakdown. That was the initial attitude, but in due course there were conflicting statements by the Foreign Secretary and the Lord Privy Seal which would leave the Government open to go ahead and use the powers in the Bill even if there were no agreement with all the parties at the Lancaster House conference. The amendment is designed to prevent that situation.
I want hon. Members to consider the position if they were asked to approve Second Reading after the constitutional conference had broken down. That is what is behind the amendment. In the circumstances, is it not conceivable that many Conservative Members, apart from Labour Members, would have withdrawn their assent to Second Reading if it meant that we were taking power to install a Governor in Southern Rhodesia when the war was continuing and the Patriotic Front was still fighting? I suspect that no one of common sense would want that to continue. Yet the powers within the Bill allow that to happen.
It is true that certain of the powers are conditional upon assent by the House to an Order in Council, but that Order in Council would not be capable of amendment. It would be presented to the House on the basis that we had committed ourselves by sending out a Governor and that to leave him there without the necessary powers, which would be taken under the Order in Council, would make his position intolerable. Therefore, once the Bill is enacted, I stress that we could face a situation that most hon. Members would find intolerable.
Whatever hon. Members' views may be about the principle of the Second Reading and what should happen in Southern Rhodesia in future, I do not think that any of us would want the Bill


without this qualifying condition. I hope, therefore, that there will be a fair amount of all-party agreement on this issue.
In order to present the case, I have to argue against the enormous weight of publicity that has come out through the BBC in particular, but the press in general, which has led us all to believe that the Lancaster House conference is on the brink of agreement among all parties. If so, the argument against the amendment is the stronger.
I do not take that view, because I am conscious of the attitude of the Patriotic Front. When I raised this matter last week, one Conservative Member pointed out that I was being the spokesman for the Patriotic Front. Of course, the BBC in its usual way chose to put that, rather than any other part, into the "Week in Westminster" programme. I should like to make the position plain for Conservative Members in particular and for others outside.
In our discussions before the Muzorewa-Smith deal and before the election, we had always said that a settlement in Southern Rhodesia had to be acceptable to the whole country, particularly the 6 million Africans. If they were prepared to settle for an agreement between Smith and Muzorewa in the constitution that they then had, I said that that would be acceptable to me. I have always maintained that position. I changed my view about the acceptability of that statement only when I went to Southern Rhodesia and saw what was going on, and felt the enormous impact of opinion against the deal.
I should be prepared to accept an election victory for Muzorewa in a free election if that were the genuine view of the majority of people in Southern Rhodesia. Equally, if the genuine view of the majority of people in Southern Rhodesia is that they want a Mugabe Government, a Nkomo Government or a Patriotic Front Government, they should have the right to have the arguments put forward in depth and to make their free choice in a free election.
That is what I want and I think that is what the Patriotic Front wants. From the beginning of the conference the Patriotic Front has argued that its major concern is that in the interim before the

election it should have the right to put its case properly to the people in Southern Rhodesia. It did not want a settlement that simply gave Muzorewa the legitimacy of acceptance by Britain of what had happened in the past. I do not want that either. Frankly, if Conservative Members smile at the suggestion that we should pay any attention to what the Patriotic Front wants, I suggest that they misconceive what is happening in Rhodesia.
The truth is that there can be no end to the war unless the Patriotic Front is brought into an agreement. The position is not, as the Lord Privy Seal constantly says, that the Patriotic Front has a veto; the reality is that if it is not satisfied with the settlement it will go on fighting. It has the capacity to do so.
The Committee does not have to take this from me. I refer to the speech of the hon. Member for Stretford (Mr. Churchill), who is not exactly sympathetic to the views of the Patriotic Front. Only last Thursday he said that he had just returned post-haste from Salisbury and that the Patriotic Front was expecting to have 20,000 guerillas in the field inside Rhodesia by Christmas.
In those circumstances, it is no use saying that we wish that the Patriotic Front did not exist and that we ought not to pay any attention to what it feels or thinks. The fact is that the war cannot end unless an agreement is acceptable to the Patriotic Front as well. That is not to say that it has a veto, any more than the British Government and Bishop Muzorewa have a veto. The British Government are constantly arguing that we cannot do this or that because it would not be acceptable to Muzorewa. Surely that is to give Muzorewa a veto. But Muzorewa cannot end the war; the Patriotic Front can.
In those circumstances, if we are to settle the problem by the ballot rather than by the bullet, we need the agreement of all parties—the British Government, the Muzorewa regime and the Patriotic Front. That will not be forthcoming until we have a settlement with which all parties are in agreement.
We shall come in due course, in the other amendments, to some parts of the so-called agreements made hitherto, which are conditional—

Sir Raymond Gower: Does the hon. Gentleman go so far as to say that if, in the ultimate, the Patriotic Front, however unreasonably, will not consent to any settlement, there can never be a settlement?

Mr. Lyon: Yes, that is exactly what I am saying. This was said by the Minister to be a truism only a fortnight ago at Question Time. There cannot be an agreement if there is not an agreement. An agreement is an agreement of all sides; it is not simply an agreement between the British Government and Muzorewa. If there is not an agreement of all sides, the war will continue. It is right, therefore, to say that if there is not an agreement with the Patriotic Front, there will not be an agreement. In that event, the war would go on.
What we have to remember is that the war would go on with a British Governor in Salisbury and British troops committed as observers. They would be there in the middle of the fighting. What attitude would they be expected to take? If a bomb were to go off in Government House, what would the British Government then do? How would they react to public opinion in Britain? We would have the possibility of being involved in the war. Hitherto we have not been. It would be the worst of all possible worlds.
I cannot see any good reason why the Government should have produced the Bill, as they did, before the agreement, when they knew that they could get the Bill through Parliament in a couple of hours after an agreement. I cannot see any reason for it unless the kind of possibility to which I have referred is felt to be open. I do not say that the Lord Privy Seal or the Foreign Secretary wants to go down that road, but I believe that they are seriously contemplating going down that road as an alternative to getting an agreement with the Patriotic Front.
3.45 pm
There are the major issues still at stake. It is not true to say that the Patriotic Front agreed to the constitution simpliciter. What it said was that there were several outstanding issues, of which the land question was absolutely crucial, but that it would agree to go on with further discussions about the interim arrangements and that perhaps it would not have

to come back to discuss the constitution if it felt satisfied about the interim arrangements.
The Patriotic Front has always maintained that if it is possible to have a free and fair election the likelihood is that in any event it would win. That is perhaps not surprising. There are moments at which parties in this House believe that they will win. Sometimes they are wrong about that. The Patriotic Front believes that it would win in a free election. It is conscious that if there were deficiencies in the constitution that could be put right later by the Government in power it could look forward to that situation pragmatically. But it is essential that the transitional provisions should be right. It was prepared to go forward, therefore, even though it had reservations about the constitution, but there are still major issues of difference concerning the interim arrangements.
The essential condition is that in the election campaign the Patriotic Front should have as full a time as possible in which to make its appeal to the country. After all, the Patriotic Front has not been in control of the means whereby parties might make an appeal to the country in the period before the settlement, whereas the Muzorewa Government have been in control of those means. The Muzorewa Government control the newspapers, the television, the radio and the postal services. The Patriotic Front does not have any offices in the country. It does not have telephones. Those services would have to be put in before it could start on an election campaign. It is absurd to argue that all this could be done within two months of an agreement being reached at Lancaster House.
No party in this country would want to launch a campaign within two months without all the necessary prerequisites. It is true that we can have an election in this country within three weeks, but that is because the total organisation of the parties is already in existence. It is not in existence in Southern Rhodesia. There is no electoral machinery in existence on the basis of votes within constituencies. That is why, in the end, it is likely that there will have to be a popular roll and that the issues will be decided upon the basis of a national list. Nevertheless, it is clear that it will take time to mount a fair appeal to the country, and that is


one of the major issues at stake at Lancaster House.
The second major issue—it will be discussed in relation to later amendments—is the control of the security forces in that period. None of us blinks at the difficulty of arranging an election that immediately follows the end of a civil war. There will be people going about with guns and there will be hostility, and emotions arising during the campaign may lead to bloodshed. This has to be controlled by somebody.
The Government initially were considering that that control should come from the existing security forces. That might seem a reasonable proposition to Conservative Members, but let us suppose that some of us had been fighting for 10 years against those very same security forces and regarded them as the enemy—and, furthermore, that they regarded us as their enemy. What would be the position if hostilities were to break out during the election campaign? Those security forces would release their venom on us and we would release our venom on them. That would be an impossible situation.
Originally, the Patriotic Front wanted to have a fusion of the forces. It has abandoned that idea and has now accepted that there ought to be an independent force in the country in order to provide security during that period. That is a perfectly reasonable suggestion to make. Indeed, my understanding is that the Commonwealth as a whole is prepared to back such a force. It is prepared to provide enough troops to undertake the total security of the country. At the moment the British Government are resisting that idea, on the basis that any military commitment should be restricted to a limited number of observers, who would observe the activities of the existing security forces and the existing guerrilla forces, who would retain their weapons.
In my submission, the suggestion of the Patriotic Front and the Commonwealth is far more likely to ensure a peaceful and a completely fair election campaign than is the suggestion of the Government. This is a very considerable difference, which has not yet been settled. It may be that it will not be settled. Can hon. Members seriously say that they would allow the Bill to go through with issues such as that

still outstanding? That is the case for the amendment.

Mr. Christopher Brocklebank-Fowler: Would the hon. Gentleman care to explain why he thinks that a formal force of Commonwealth troops, however expert, would be more effective in the field in dealing with guerrilla forces than troops native to Rhodesia, who know not only the terrain but the languages of those involved in the fighting inside Rhodesia? How does he feel Canadians, Nigerians or, for that matter, British troops might be able to cope in those circumstances? Does he not recall how ineffective, by and large, were British troops when employed on similar operations in Kenya 20 years ago?

Mr. Lyon: I do not accept that. It is true that local troops, whether guerrilla or security forces, will know the country better. They will know the local customs, the language, and so on. But it is precisely because they know the country in the climate of a 10-year war in which the opposition is the enemy, on whichever side they are fighting that the likelihood arises of some heated demonstration getting out of hand and resulting in bloodshed, which will exacerbate the intense feelings of emnity between the two forces, if they are the people charged with trying to put and end to it.
An independent force would no doubt have to rely upon some local expertise in communicating between the two sides but it would be regarded by both sides as being independent. If there were a dispute at Umtali and the dispute was alleged by the Patriotic Front to be due to some activity by the security forces that the Patriotic Front disliked, it would be open to the Commonwealth force to say that it intended to put the matter right. The Commonwealth force could say that it had listened to both sides and it would then decide. In that event there would be a possibility of acceptance by both sides. But if the argument were to be resolved only by the security forces, already considered by the Patriotic Front to be the cause of the disturbance, it is inconceivable that the Patriotic Front would accept the adjudication of the security forces on the issue.

Mr. Brocklebank-Fowler: Is it not precisely in that role of intermediary, as


someone to supervise the military operations in the field without being involved, that the Commonwealth observers can fulfil their most useful role? Is that not a role which, by its very nature, cannot be carried out any better by yet another armed force?

Mr. Lyon: No. The observer will come along as the wise man and give a ruling on what he says is a complicated situation. That is a different matter from effective forces being able to police the situation and able to tell the Muzorewa forces that they must move back and drop their arms, or to tell the Patriotic Front that it must keep out of the matter. What is the point of one man coming along and saying "You must keep out of it" when everyone around has guns and is willing to go on fighting?
We have seen the difficulties experienced by observers in Israel trying to police the partition line there. The PLO and Israeli forces decided, on occasion, to go ahead and do what they wished. If there were sufficient forces in the country to police the operation of the election, the possibility of fracas between two sides would not arise.
A considerable number would be required. I understand that the Commonwealth is willing to provide 20,000 men towards the security force. That seems to me a far better way of policing the election than the Government's suggestion. But the Government are sticking to their suggestion. I do not need to argue the merits of the security forces against the observers. That is a matter for a later amendment. I am saying, however, that there are serious issues between the two sides at this time.
If the Government were to announce that they intend to go on arguing the case for a little longer to see how it goes, that would be one thing. That is not what they are doing. Muzorewa has sent his delegation back home to get ready for the election. Why have they gone? Can it be true, as The Guardian says in a front-page story this morning, that the Government have already decided that they are going to do a deal with Muzorewa and that the delegation has gone back because Muzorewa knows that the issue is in the bag? If there were still an issue about the Patriotic Front's demands to be decided and that had still

to be compromised, Muzorewa would not be sending back his people in order to start the election because he might not be willing to agree.
Muzorewa has said that he will not agree to Commonwealth forces taking over the role of the security forces. If that is on offer and still a subject for discussion, and if Muzorewa says he will not agree and yet has sent his people back to Salisbury to start on an election, he must know more than we know. He must know what the Lord Privy Seal meant by those elliptical words
If we fail in our endeavours, which I very much hope will not happen, we shall certainly have to consider how we should proceed."—[Official Report, 7 November 1979; Vol. 973, c. 419.]
Muzorewa must know what the Lord Privy Seal has considered and decided. He must know that The Guardian was right in its front-page story and that this deal has already been set up.

Mr. Ioan Evans: Would it not be better if this issue of the report in The Guardian could be cleared up by the Government? The report has apparently come from Whitehall sources. It states that the Patriotic Front will be told to give an answer today and that if this does not happen negotiations will break down and a deal will be done with the Muzorewa section. Is it not important to have a statement from the Government early in the Committee stage of this Bill? It would have a bearing on the deliberations of hon. Members.

Mr. Lyon: I agree entirely with my hon. Friend. It is one of the reasons why I have tabled the amendment. If the Government can reject that report and say that they would not do what The Guardian suggests they are going to do, I see no reason why the Government should not accept the amendment and reassure everyone. If that is the position, I cannot see why Conservative Members should not support us in asking for that requirement.
Such a requirement would allay anxiety. It would mean that the Bill had been introduced only because of the difficulties of the Government party over sanctions. I would be prepared to accept that the Government had their own domestic difficulties and wanted to deal with the matter through the Bill. But if the


Government have a more nefarious intention in mind, it is right that they should come clean or that Conservative Members should vote with us in order to ensure that this provision is in the Bill.

Sir Raymond Gower: I agree with the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) that it is desirable to achieve maximum agreement among all the parties. Like him, I feel that it behoves Ministers—I feel sure Ministers have this in mind—to spare no effort to try to achieve general agreement. I would go almost as far as the hon. Member for York in saying that we cannot hope for a real, lasting settlement unless there is this sort of agreement. To that extent, I have sympathy with his desire for the wording proposed. On the other hand, I am not sure that it is essential to have this wording after agreement is reached by all parties. One has to consider to what extent any disagreement, in the long term, may be reasonable.
I am sure that there are many points on which the Patriotic Front has cause for anxiety and that it wants these anxieties removed. The hon. Gentleman has referred to some of them. He will appreciate that some of those problems are due to the fact that the Patriotic Front did not take part in the elections at which the Muzorewa Government were elected. Had the Patriotic Front participated in those elections, its position today would be stronger from the point of view of organisation. It is a problem for the Patriotic Front and one with which many of us have a good deal of sympathy. But surely the hon. Gentleman's anxieties in this respect are covered partially by his later amendment, which might seem more appropriate were he to suggest that we should include a provision requiring the affirmative resolution procedure in respect of the order. It would then be seen as only enabling, because it would need that kind of sanction from this House.
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I do not know whether the hon. Gentleman accepts that, but if he wants some additional safeguard it could be incorporated in that way in perhaps a less ham-fisted manner. I do not want to be unkind, but I should prefer that to the rather blunt terminology
agreement has been reached by all parties".

I do not know whether that sort of agreement is possible. I hope that it is and that public opinion within the country will lead to that sort of agreement.
The hon. Gentleman must not forget, when he says that the Muzorewa representatives have gone back, that there is another background. They have literally agreed to matters that it was inconceivable that they would agree to a short time ago. They have made concessions which might be seen to be unpalatable by some of their supporters, and they have a powerful need to explain to some of their supporters what they have done. So their presence is needed for other reasons, too.
I hope that the other formula will be deemed preferable and that we shall not put it in the form proposed in the amendment. My right hon. Friend may think differently. However, that is my view, and I am stating merely my own view on this.

Mr. Frank Hooley: The argument for having this clause does not depend simply on one's opinion about the merits of the views of the Patriotic Front or those of Bishop Muzorewa. The fact is that the current discussions were set in train as a result of a series of recommendations of the whole Commonwealth. The whole Commonwealth will expect the current negotiations to be conducted in the spirit of the Lusaka communiqué, which recognised clearly that a lasting settlement must involve all the parties to the conference. It is clear that if the negotiations are carried out in such a way that one party regards itself as shut out or presented with an ultimatum which it cannot accept or in some way forced into an agreement which basically it objects to, the spirit of the Lusaka agreement will not have been observed and there will be a reaction from the Commonwealth countries.
Quite apart from that, the Organisation of African Unity has already committed itself to support for the Patriotic Front, and whether or not we agree with that commitment it is of great importance for the future of stability and peace in Central Africa to take account of what the OAU thinks and the conclusions that it may come to about the kind of agreement that is arrived at eventually at the Lancaster House conference.
Therefore, those of us who support the amendment are not doing so out of some blind commitment to the views of the Patriotic Front or to its demands, though I think that many of them are eminently reasonable in practical terms, apart from anything else.

Mr. F. A. Burden: Is not one of the difficulties the fact that for a very long time the leaders of the Patriotic Front have made it clear in their statements that they are hell-bent on a military result? [Hon. Members: "No".] That is what they have said. They have said as much from time to time. That would appear to be one of the problems that they face in coming to an agreement. They will have to cast aside what they have said often in the past and reach an agreement. If they still maintain that they can win by military conquest, it is right that the Government should take the line that they have taken.

Mr. Hooley: If the Patriotic Front were hell-bent on fighting the war to a conclusion, there is no reason why its delegation should have come to Lancaster House. The fact that the Patriotic Front has come to Lancaster House means that it is as anxious as the other parties to see, if humanly possible, whether a peaceful transition to legality and constitutional government in Zimbabwe can be achieved. I am sure that that is common ground to both sides of the Committee. The Patriotic Front is a party to the negotiations. It has argued its case for nine weeks, and I must say that its arguments do not appear to have received much sympathy from Her Majesty's Government, who have rejected point after point which it has made.
One of the reasons for the amendment is to make it clear that the arguments of the Patriotic Front, as well as those of the Muzorewa Government, must be taken seriously and that the points which it is making about the transition and about the constitution must be taken into account if we are to have a settlement which will stick.
These matters have been put forward very well by my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon). My point is that it is no use supposing that the British Government can conclude an agreement which is acceptable to Bishop Muzorewa and presumably to Ian Smih but which

is totally unacceptable to the Patriotic Front. Such an agreement, so called, will not be acceptable to the international community. It will be contrary to the spirit of the Lusaka communiqué, which is the foundation of the whole exercise. It will be received with hostility by the OAU. On top of all that, it will not be acceptable to the United Nations.
The British Government must be aware that in terms of both sanctions and of achieving an enduring settlement, an agreement, so called, which is not acceptable to the United Nations will not stick, will not bring peace to Central Africa and will not resolve this problem for us. We have been beholden to the United Nations for the policy of sanctions, and we shall come to that argument on a later amendment, but it is abundantly clear from the resolution passed by the Security Council as recently as 30 April this year that any agreement that is pushed through in such a way that it is wholly unacceptable to the leaders of the Patriotic Front will not command a majority within the United Nations. That means that, even if in our terms there is a form of constitutional and lawful government which can be accepted by a majority in this House, if the majority of member States of the United Nations does not accept it, the new Zimbabwe will remain outside the international community. I am sure that that is an end which the Lord Privy Seal does not wish to see.
It is said that if we are to go along with the line that an agreement must include the Patriotic Front, in some way it gives the Patriotic Front a veto. There are two answers to that. First, the various matters about which the Patriotic Front has expressed concern—the length of the transition, the freedom of elections and the supervision—seem eminently practical and sensible, and I do not think that the Patriotic Front is asking for anything which is at all outrageous or improbable. But, over and above that, if the Patriotic Front withheld agreement week after week and held out for what appeared to be impossible or unreasonable demands, I am sure that the frontline States—its supporters and allies in Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana, Mozambique and other parts of Africa—would not back demands which were wholly and completely unreasonable.
The Patriotic Front depends on support from the front-line States and on African opinion. I am sure that the leaders of the Patriotic Front know that they would be very unwise to press demands which seemed quite unreasonable in the sense that they would alienate the support of other African States. Therefore, this argument about a so-called veto is an academic and an unreal one.
In my view, the Patriotic Front is asking for reasonable, practical arrangements to ensure that the elections, when held, and the transition period, when it comes about, will be arranged in such a way that the international community, the Commonwealth States, the United Nations, the OAU and others can look upon this exercise and say "Yes. That was fair and reasonable. We accept the result and the resulting regime or Government is welcome into the Commonwealth and the OAU and as a member State of the United Nations". That is the fundamental reason for the amendment. We are not seeking to make a case for the Patriotic Front; it can do that for itself.
It will be quite pointless to achieve an agreement that is acceptable to the Muzorewa faction but totally unacceptable to the other side in the argument. If that happens, the international community will say that Britain may have fixed it by legislation within the House of Commons and by agreement with Bishop Muzorewa and Ian Smith but it is not a genuine agreement made in the spirit of Lusaka. Nor does the international community expect such an agreement to emerge from the Lancaster House talks.

Mr. Iain Mills: It is difficult to accept some of the arguments of Opposition Members. The Lancaster House talks have continued for nine weeks, and one can scarcely say that they have been steamrollered or rushed. Surely the wind of change in Africa should after nine weeks stop, become fixed and transform itself into action.
It is a difficult job facing any Minister to achieve the sets of delicate balances required in such sophisticated negotiations. To achieve those balances requires an element of flexibility that might not be used but is essential for negotiating pur-

poses. Flexibility is required to achieve any satisfactory balance. Many of the amendments to be taken later today will become pointless if this amendment is accepted. The amendment will tip that delicate balance that the Government are trying to achieve with all parties to the conference, by giving one party a positive force that the other has not got—an effective veto—

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Can the hon Gentleman tell the House to which of the three parties this amendment gives an effective veto? Surely it is being given only to the one that is being squeezed out by the other two.

Mr. Mills: If the Patriotic Front has to agree to the proposals, it can in theory continue the talks indefinitely. I am not suggesting that Ministers will say that if the Patriotic Front does not agree they will go ahead anyway. The Opposition are often sophisticated in their arguments. Can they not appreciate the subtlety and need for sophistication in this argument? For the Patriotic Front to have the power to be able to continue the talks indefinitely puts the balance in question.
After nine weeks the terms have been accepted by an elected Government who are effectively a democracy in sympathy with Western ideals and ideas. However, the Patriotic Front is not elected and uses the tools of terrorism to achieve its ends.
What is so frightening about the Bill in its original form? Is it proposing to put an axe to the neck of any of the Patriotic Front? Is it a Bill suggested by a dictator from Whitehall? It is a Bill suggested by a legally elected democratic Government—our Government—that proposes a real and lasting solution. Therefore, any party to the conference that does not accept these terms must have other factors in mind.

Mr. Nigel Spearing: Does the hon. Gentleman agree with the reports, which are more or less correct, that although there have been nine weeks of talks, most of that time has been devoted to a future constitution, now outlined in the White Paper? That constitution has become an island of aspiration, but the bridge providing the transitional stages of ceasefire, reintegration and election have not been discussed at great length Therefore, do not the hon. Gentleman's words need modification?

Mr. Mills: I am not sure, as I was not party to the daily discussions, what proportion of the nine weeks has been spent on each issue. However, judging from the available information, it may be that the latter subject has received less discussion than the others. I accept the hon. Gentleman's point to some extent, but is this amendment relevant? One is not saying that the discussions will stop. The Foreign Secretary is saying, not that this is an axe to be waved, but that he will have to reconsider and look at the existing situation. To say the opposite, that the Bill is an axe—providing an effective cessation of discussion—is not correct.

Mr. Spearing: It is an axe in the hand.

Mr. Mills: It is difficult to achieve a balance in such delicate affairs. I do not wish the balance to be placed in favour of Bishop Muzorewa. I want only that the present balance should not be upset. The Foreign Secretary should be allowed to tackle the situation as he thinks fit.
I urge hon. Members to oppose the amendment because in its heart the Patriotic Front must find it difficult to guarantee the delivery of goods that it has promised, namely, a ceasefire. Will all those men who are armed, some inside Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and some outside, lay down their arms? Perhaps the two leaders and their delegations will find it difficult to obtain a ceasefire because of the disparate and diverse views of politicians even within the same party. The Opposition will be particularly aware of those problems. If there is a diversity of opinion amongst the Patriotic Front, it is essential to allow the Foreign Secretary the ability to tackle such problems when they occur.
It is conceivable that in the midst of the final stages, or in the midst of the election, there will be an armed coup or uprising by the many thousands of armed Patriotic Front guerrillas at present in Rhodesia. I am sure there will be discussion on the amendments concerning that.

Mr. Ioan Evans: Does not the hon. Gentleman's point strengthen the argument put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) when he said that there should be a Commonwealth peacekeeping force in the area? If

the hon. Gentleman envisages that possibility, an independent military force to keep the peace is essential.

The Chairman: Order. Before the hon. Member answers that point, I must remind the Committee that this is not a security debate and that we are dealing with a different subject.

Mr. Mills: I am grateful to the hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. Evans) for his comments. Perhaps we shall have an opportunity later to discuss them.
This is one of the factors which could change. If something is not guaranteed, we must leave it to the negotiators to effect the best balance and the best compromise for all the people of Zimbabwe.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: I am quite certain that no one in this debate would want to say anything that even began to prejudice the possibility of reaching an agreement with all the parties to the Lancaster House negotiations. Certainly I have no intention of doing so. Equally, I do not wish to suggest that everything that the Patriotic Front proposes is right and that everything put forward by Bishop Muzorewa, the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, Mr. Smith or anyone else on the side of or in the delegation of the bishop is wrong. I am not concerned with that. I am concerned with the position into which the Government have got themselves by bringing the Bill forward—a position which I believe is impossible, and with which our amendments are designed to deal.
I start from the basic premise that we are still acting under the six principles, and in particular the principle that it is essential for any settlement to have the agreement of the people of Rhodesia as a whole. I do not think that the matter has ever been put better than it was put in the mandatory resolution of the Security Council which said
that the United Kingdom as the administering Power should ensure that no settlement is reached without taking into account the views of the people of Southern Rhodesia, and in particular the political parties favouring majority rule,
—those are the parties that I have mentioned—
and that it is acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole".
That, surely, is what we have to try to ensure—that those aspects are satisfied.


It is apparent at the moment that we have not reached that stage, and if there were any doubt of that I would take the point from the Lord Privy Seal himself who said, in answering questions:
I certainly confirm—I have said it many times; it hardly needs confirmation—that the Patriotic Front's agreement to the constitution is contingent on agreement to the rest of the package, just as the agreement, which I hope will soon be forthcoming, to the interim arrangements will be contingent on agreement to a ceasefire."—[Official Report, 7 November 1979; Vol. 973, c. 419.]
There is, therefore, no agreement about anything. There is certainly no agreement on a settlement which is acceptable to the political parties favouring majority rule and acceptable to the people of Southern Rhodesia as a whole. When this is put to the Lord Privy Seal he says that no party can exercise a veto. I do not understand that answer in the context of the need to obtain the agreement of all the political parties favouring majority rule and of the people of Rhodesia as a whole. What does he mean by a veto? Does he mean one of the political parties not accepting the views of the other one and the British Government? If he does, he is plainly saying that there is no such agreement as is required by the six principles and the mandatory United Nations resolution.
If his answer to the question of what happens if they do not agree in the end is that they cannot be allowed to have a veto, he is saying that the principle is being jettisoned. The Government are saying "Never mind that there is no agreement acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole. We are none the less going ahead." If he does not mean that, he must tell us what he does mean. The only answer that we have had from the right hon. Gentleman is that if that situation arose the Government would have to consider what to do next. When we do not have an agreement that is acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole, what does he mean, in the context of seeking an agreement which is so acceptable and rejecting one which is not, by "We will have to consider what we shall do next"?

Sir Raymond Gower: Does the right hon. and learned Gentleman appreciate that a difficulty might be created if a very small but vociferous minority should

persist in its opposition even after the vast majority of the people of Rhodesia were in favour of a settlement and of peace? Surely if that were the case that would be reflected in the returns in the subsequent election.

Mr. Silkin: If the hon. Member for Barry (Sir R. Gower) takes the words
acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole
as meaning acceptable to every member of the electorate of Rhodesia, of course, the kind of paradox he is suggesting might be appropriate. But that is not how any sensible person would look at the matter. We are considering the views of the people as a whole, which means the majority of the people of Rhodesia.
In the amendment which I and my hon. Friends have tabled we took the referendum test that was accepted by the Conservatives in relation to Scotland. I accept that we had our tongue a little in our cheek when we specified a figure of 40 per cent. of the people entitled to vote, but at least what we have proposed would provide some sort of working idea of what we mean by
acceptable to the people … as a whole".
Unless we know that a settlement is acceptable to the people as a whole, we have not met the conditions upon which the Security Council resolution and the six principles are founded.

Mr. Norman Buchan: Does my right hon. and learned Friend agree that the earlier amendments refer to all parties, not to every individual involved in the conference, and that the minority argument therefore would not arise?

Mr. Silkin: Of course, I agree with the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrewshire, West (Mr. Buchan) has put to me. Matters are not made easier by the fact that even within the Muzorewa delegation the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole, for example, took the view that the election was phoney and wanted to take proceedings in court to have it annulled. Subsequently he joined the Muzorewa delegation. However, there must be at least a very considerable doubt about the effect of the election that has been held, and of course that doubt is made very much greater by the fact that the supporters of the


Patriotic Front did not participate in it. The whole point of all this negotiation is that they should be able to take part in it in an atmosphere of peace. That will not be possible unless and until an agreement has been made which is acceptable to all parties and to the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

Mr. R. C. Mitchell: We all have sympathy with the Amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon), but I am worried at the wording. I therefore ask my right hon. and learned Friend for legal advice. The amendment reads:
accepted by all parties to the Lancaster House talks".
I agree that the intention is to make sure that there is an agreement involving the Patriotic Front, without whom an agreement means nothing. However, do not these words also give a power of veto to Mr. Smith should he once again change his mind and walk out?

Mr. Silkin: One must recognise that the Government face a very great difficulty here. Clearly the only true and effective way of deciding whether a settlement has the support of the people of Rhodesia as a whole would be by conducting a referendum such as that to which we have referred in amendment No. 17. Of course, I accept that in practice if one got the agreement of all the parties at Lancaster House, even though it might be possible for Mr. Smith to opt out in the end, one could assume from that that the agreement would have the support of the overwhelming mass of the people of Rhodesia generally.
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The agreement might not have the support of some white people but it will certainly have the support of black people. If we leave out of the equation the views of the Patriotic Front, whether its support is inside or outside Rhodesia, we leave out of account an unknown but considerable number of people. I am talking not about the possible effects of a civil war but about whether we succeed in achieving a settlement which has the support of the people of Rhodesia as a whole.
It is quite clear that, unless all the people are involved in this—we might need a referendum or at least the agreement of all the parties—we cannot be

sure that the conditions for a settlement will be satisfied. If we cannot be sure, I ask the Lord Privy Seal to give a clearer reply than heretofore about the Government's intentions. It is not sufficient to say that the Government will then have to consider what should be done because the right hon. Gentleman should know now what can and should be done.
Will the Government say that if they do not have the sine qua non—the conditions which are absolutely essential for a settlement in accordance with the principles of the Security Council mandatory resolution—therefore nothing further can be done? Will the Government test the matter through a referendum, as is suggested in amendment No. 17? If it is not so tested, what will be done? Will there be an imposed solution notwithstanding that there is no clear evidence of the agreement of the people of Rhodesia as a whole? That would flout not only the mandatory resolution but the six principles and thus run into the enormous danger of civil war, the advent of which has been painted, and not over-painted, in such striking terms.
I therefore ask the right hon. Gentleman to be perfectly honest, as I know he wants to be, and to tell us exactly what the Government have in mind if those unhappy circumstances, which we all hope will not occur, do occur.

Mr. Burden: I make only one comment on the speech of the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin). He said that it would be wrong if the views of the Patriotic Front were not carefully considered. During the nine weeks of discussions at Lancaster House its views must have been given careful consideration.
I am concerned about the impression—and this amendment conveys it—that the problems in Rhodesia have arisen only recently. They have continued for 14 years and this is the first time in that period that any Government have been successful in bringing together all the parties in the dispute. The Opposition should recognise that that is a great move forward. The effect of this amendment would be to postpone still further peace in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. There is no doubt that in recent months the situation has deteriorated. The number of people who have been killed in military action on both sides has escalated considerably. Many people who have


no connection at all with the fighting, including children and innocent civilians, have also been massacred.
We do not want to prolong such a situation, but if the Lancaster House conference breaks up without agreement the fighting will continue. Whatever some Opposition Members may say, there is no doubt that the Patriotic Front has stated that it wants a miliary conclusion to the war. That is on the record. Any delay in bringing about an end to this unfortunate conflagration will undoubtedly mean that more and more innocent people will be killed. Time is running out and it would be wrong for anyone, on either side of this Committee, whether by this amendment or by anything he might say elsewhere, to prolong the struggle or encourage the Patriotic Front not to come to an agreement at Lancaster House.

Mr. Bruce Douglas-Mann: Does the hon. Gentleman accept that to assert that something is on the record without giving details of the information is likely to make it much more difficult for us to arrive at a conclusion? Innocent people are being killed. Does he accept that if we approach negotiations for an agreement on the basis of legislation that will make it much more difficult for one side to accept an agreement, it is more, not less, dijcult to solve the problem?

Mr. Burden: It is almost always difficult in any negotiations for one side to accept everything. These negotiations will undoubtedly create difficulties for the Patriotic Front. We must remember that, whatever is said in this Committee, the Bill makes it possible for everyone in Rhodesia to have a vote. That is what it is all about. We must also accept that, although the Patriotic Front did not take part in the elections, there is an elected Government in Rhodesia who are prepared to give way to ensure future elections which are free and conducted in a manner which will be seen to be fair.
I find it difficult to understand how the Patriotic Front can come here and adopt an intransigent line when every possible step will be taken to ensure that the elections are fair. If my right hon. Friend comes to agree with the Opposition that two months between the arrival of the

British representative in Salisbury and the election is too short, and if sound arguments are advanced by the Patriotic Front for an extension, I would support him. Above all I want to see an end to the carnage in Southern Rhodesia. Not only are lives being lost but the economies of Rhodesia and surrounding countries are being brought down by the prolonged conflict.

Mr. David Winnick: The desire to see an end to the bloodshed makes it all the more important for an agreement to be reached with the Patriotic Front. This amendment has been tabled precisely because we want to see an end to the massacres and bloodshed.
The hon. Member for Barry (Sir R. Gower) said that the amendment was somewhat ham-fisted. However, it represents the essence of the disagreement between the two sides. We believe that it is wrong for the Bill to become an Act on the basis of no agreement with the Patriotic Front. We believe that agreement is vital, and that is reflected in the amendment.
For 14 years there has been pressure in the House for UDI to be legalised. Some Conservative Members have pressed for the UDI declared by the Rhodesian Front to be legalised. They have argued that we should take no responsibility and accept the facts of life. I see one or two Conservative Members in the Committee who were associated to a large extent with that view.
I always opposed that view. In the 1966 Parliament I opposed my own Government when they were trying to reach agreement on "Fearless" and "Tiger" because I believed that any agreement with Smith was pointless. Fortunately, no agreement was reached. If there had been an agreement I should have voted against it, like many of my right hon. and hon. Friends, because I would have had no trust in an agreement signed by the leader of the Rhodesian Front. It is interesting that the UDI bell did not ring yesterday.
Having reached the present state, it would be a great tragedy if agreement were reached with only one side—the Salisbury regime. Several Conservative Members argued that the talks have continued for nine weeks and that that seems


to be a long time. We are talking of nine weeks after 14 years of UDI and many more years of white supremacy. If we want a lasting agreement, what difference does it make if it takes nine weeks, 12 weeks, or 14 weeks? The essence is a lasting and binding agreement. It is not a question of whether the negotiations should continue for a few more days or weeks.

Mr. Burden: Does the hon. Member suggest a limit of 14 weeks?

Mr. Winnick: There is no wisdom in setting a limit. I believe that the Patriotic Front is negotiating in good faith. It has made a number of substantial concessions. Both wings of the Patriotic Front want to reach agreement. They want to see an end to the bloodshed and a legalised Government in the new State. That is my view and that of my hon. Friends. Perhaps some Conservative Members agree.
What will happen if we do not reach agreement with the Patriotic Front? Apart from anything else, once the Bill becomes an Act, the fighting will continue. If the Patriotic Front cannot reach agreement with the British Government, it is hardly likely to discontinue the fighting.

Sir Raymond Gower: The hon. Member argues that much has been achieved in a matter of weeks after years of white supremacy. Does the hon. Member believe, as I do, that in the long term the people of Rhodesia will not forgive any grouping which is responsible for destroying that which has been achieved?

Mr. Winnick: We want to reach agreement with the Patriotic Front. If there is a legal British presence in Salisbury, and if British troops have to fight the Patriotic Front, we shall have a mini-Vietnam on our hands. That is the danger of reaching agreement only with the Salisbury regime. I hope that the Lord Privy Seal and his colleagues have learnt the lessons of Vietnam. The Lord Privy Seal is one of the few Conservative Members who learnt the true lessons of Vietnam. I hope that he recognises that there is a lesson to learn from the Lancaster House talks.
There is a suspicion, voiced in an article in The Guardian today, that the British Government are not overkeen on

reaching agreements with the Patriotic Front. The Patriotic Front suspects that the British Government are worried about there being a too radical or Marxist-type Government in the new State. The type of political Government which emerges in the new State is not our business. That is for the 6 million people of Rhodesia to decide.
A further danger arises out of reaching agreement only with the Salisbury regime. Britain would be placed in the dock. Those people who are never friends of Britain would be only too keen to say that Britain had betrayed the people of Rhodesia. There would also be justification in the comments of many others who are not enemies of Britain. They would accuse us of betraying the six principles and of doing a dirty deal—there is no other way to describe it—with the present Salisbury regime.
We are already in international difficulties over Northern Ireland. Time and again other countries criticise our policy in Northern Ireland. Would it be wise for the Government to go ahead and reach an extremely one-sided agreement without the unanimous consent of the House of Commons? Such an agreement would lead to another Vietnam. There would be a British presence and British troops would have to fight the Patriotic Front. Once again we would be placed in the dock at the United Nations. We would be placed in the dock by the African countries and by many European States.
That is why the amendment is crucial. It is the essence of the argument between the two sides and it is important that it should be carried.

Mr. Buchan: I wish to comment on some of the points raised over the past few days and especially today.
The term "veto" has been misused and overused. We are talking of the necessity to achieve an agreement before proceeding. There must be agreement between the parties at Lancaster House or there can be no peace in Rhodesia. The fear is that the Government may seek to impose legality before the conditions for that legality have been accepted.
I mention the use of the term "veto" in relation to the accepted position of the mandatory resolution and the six principles. Without the agreement of the three


parties at Lancaster House the six principles have not been fulfilled. We should not nit-pick at this stage and say that the agreement of every last person who might possibly be represented at Lancaster House is necessary. What is necessary is the agreement of the parties at the conference, and there are three of them—our Government, the Muzorewa-Smith regime, whatever disagreements there may be between them at present, and the Patriotic Front.
It is a misuse of language, for which the Lord Privy Seal is partly responsible, to say that not to proceed before agreement is imposing a veto. It is nothing of the kind. It is a recognition of reality and an attempt to prevent a declaration of legality before the proper conditions have been achieved. It even appears to be suggested that the Patriotic Front may not be seeking agreement.
I understand that the hon. Member for Meriden (Mr. Mills) is a new Member. When he has been here a little longer he will realise that the House of Commons takes time over the most minuscule of Bills. I was involved not in the future of a nation or the establishment of a constitution and the hope of resulting peace but with a little two-page Bill that took four months in Committee, week in and week out. We are dealing with the future of a State and the creation of peace in a very short time. We are concerned with the future not only of Zimbabwe or Southern Rhodesia but of Africa. Nine weeks is a short time. The rebellion has gone on since 1965. We may excuse a new hon. Member for arguing that nine weeks is a long time, but there is little excuse for the hon. Member for Barry (Sir R. Gower).

Mr. Iain Mills: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, whilst in his view nine weeks is a short time, the whole question of Rhodesia and legality has been an endless subject for the last 10 years? It is therefore a little difficult even for a new Member to understand why the hon. Gentleman has not recognised that it is not merely a nine-week question but a very old one.

Mr. Buchan: That was the point I was making.
The argument and discussion have been going on for 14 or 15 years and the fighting for eight or nine years. This is

the first time that real progress has been made, and I give credit to the Tory Party for that. Massive progress has been made because the parties have been brought together during these nine weeks. We are now seeking assurances that the conference will complete its task without being jolted into disaster by trying to achieve legality before the necessary conditions have been agreed.
There is no basis for saying that the Patriotic Front does not want a settlement. When people talk of a veto they are referring to the Patriotic Front and not the British Government or the Muzorewa-Smith regime. We should use language more carefully. It is also asserted that the Patriotic Front wants a military victory, but there is no basis for saying that. It has two simple objectives. The first is that more time should be given for the election, and I cannot deal with that because it is contained in another amendment. We were concerned in March when the Government fell and we realised that we had only three or four weeks to get our penny-farthing electoral machine into existence. We find it difficult to organise an election properly in three or fours weeks with our political system, and it is ridiculous to think that in Rhodesia it can be done in two months.
The Patriotic Front also wants security during the transitional period. The Patriotic Front has been an instrument in the achievement of legality. The members of the Patriotic Front were not the rebels but were fighting actively against the rebels. The illegal regime was the Salisbury regime. The Patriotic Front is on our side, although we may not have chosen its methods to achieve legality for Rhodesia.
The loose use of language or inaccuracy of concept does not help our understanding of these matters. The situation is unprecedented. It is the first time that I recall the House being able to discuss aspects of a constitution which was being discussed elsewhere, and I am glad that that has been recognised in the choice of amendments.
It is equally important to recognise that during the nine weeks the Patriotic Front has played a major part in the achievement of conditional agreement on the constitution. That agreement would be more conclusive if there were reassurance


on the timing of the election and the supervision of the transitional period. Agreement must be reached and the inaccurate use of language is not contributing to that agreement.
Those taking part in the discussions and hon. Members on these Benches believe that the Government are wielding an axe, ready for use. That axe is not encouraging agreement and could even hinder it.
We believe that the Government have brought forward the Bill too rapidly and certainly wrongly, but as we are forced into discussion these points should be mentioned. We must not come to any decision that may damage agreement at Lancaster House. If one of the main parties at Lancaster House fears that the Government may be trying to impose a settlement that does not include the necessity first to reach agreement, that could ruin the hopes for a settlement and would be disastrous for the peace of Southern Rhodesia and Africa as a whole.

Mr. Spearing: We are glad that the Government accepted the sensible suggestion of my right hon. Friend the Member for Stepney and Poplar (Mr. Shore) and that we did not take the Bill in Committee at midnight last Thursday.
Agreement is the obverse of armed conflict and war, and the amendment gets to the root of the Bill and of the issues which confront the Government, although succeeding amendments are perhaps procedurally very much the responsibility of the House of Commons.
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I am glad that so many hon. Members have accepted that this is a negotiation in the progress of what amounts to a war. For the first time for many years the words of hon. Members could have some effect on agreement being reached. I remembered yesterday the fate of another small country between two zones of influence some years ago, when large forces went into action as a result of a failure to agree.
The Bill is unusual. The Government's proposals are coming not at the end of negotiations, not with an agreement, but before an agreement has been reached. The Lord Privy Seal has openly admitted that it may be necessary to take action if agreement is not reached. The right

hon. Gentleman is coming to the House carte blanche and involving the House in de jure, if not in de facto, responsibility for what subsequently occurs. He said that he is willing to take action and that if agreement is not reached he will consider using the provisions of the Bill. It is right that the Committee should carefully examine the Bill.
There may be ingredients in the agreement to which the Lord Privy Seal has not paid sufficient attention. In future negotiations he should, in seeking an agreement, pay attention to certain ingredients that he, unlike others, may consider insignificant.
I said to the hon. Member for Meriden (Mr. Mills) that the island of aspiration, the new State of Zimbabwe under an agreed constitution, has been largely agreed. What has not been agreed is the bridge of agreement to that island. I suggest to the Lord Privy Seal—and I wish that I could suggest it to his right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary, who is unable to sit in the Chamber—that the bridge is composed of faith which has to be erected in order to reach the island. Unless he pays attention to some of the matters that other parties will see in this hoped-for journey, he will not get an agreement.
First, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia has never had a Commonwealth, colonial or Foreign Office administration. It is possible that those helping and advising the Lord Privy Seal have gone through this process so often before in Africa, India and the West Indies that they forget we are dealing with something very different. Rhodesia has never had a Commonwealth administration, not even of the sort that Britain had in India. As I understand it, the Order in Council in 1923 handed over the administration of the British South Africa Company to a virtual self-governing colony. It is important that we note that the 1923 settlement was by Order in Council, authorising letters patent under the Crown. There was no debate on that occasion. The infrastructure of the country for the elections that we all wish to see take place is not that which we saw in Kenya or was present in Tanzania, Zambia and all the other territories in Africa of which we have had relatively recent experience.
The second difference is that, whereas in those countries people had been in


prison—there was "terrorist activity" in Kenya, and Jomo Kenyatta was called names far worse than Mr. Mugabe is being called today—there was at the same time in those territories reasonable co-ordination among the independence parties. In all those territories there was only one large party representing the aspirations of the majority of the population. The difference in this territory does not need to be emphasised. The Lord Privy Seal must take account of the legitimate aspirations of those who seek to represent that authority. I do not believe that he has done that. In negotiation the aspiration and motivation of those who play a legitimate part must be taken into account.
The third difference is perfectly obvious, but perhaps not so obvious when it concerns the administrative arrangements that the Lord Privy Seal wishes to make. There has been a war with armed forces trained and drilled, with backers on both sides providing equipment and advice from outside the country. That has not been true of the other countries in Africa. We hope and pray that the ceasefire will come. When it does, there will be a need for those who have been engaged to assist to desist. That may be one of the important sticking points in the interim negotiations and cannot be overlooked at this stage.
Despite the resources of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Lord Privy Seal's detailed knowledge of what people are likely to find acceptable may not be as marked as on previous occasions. Nobody in the Committee could say that the bulk of those in the areas currently dominated by no side in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia would find one group of proposals more acceptable than another. They probably do not know. They wish the war to end and that is that. The local population may be far more unstable and unexpected than anything that he and his advisers have previously met.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: That might be authenticated as a result of the Pearce Commission.

Mr. Spearing: I am grateful to my right hon. and learned Friend for drawing that to my attention.
I wish to put on record that the territory being discussed was conquered by war. The first and second Matabeleland wars are not altogether absent from the minds of some taking part in the discussions, nor the way in which they were resolved. If Cecil Rhodes did nothing else, he was a brave man when he resolved a previous difficulty in that area. I know that he was retrieving a tarnished reputation at the time, but he certainly did something that was bold. His interests, the interests that he represented and the interests of Chief Lobengula in the ownership of the land by the Matabele and Mashona are also present. So is the third element represented by the Livingstone tradition in terms of education and the missionary tradition.
When the Lord Privy Seal looks at those round the table at Lancaster House, he will see the former historical elements. Lack of any one of those elements in the next agreement in Southern Rhodesia, or Zimbabwe—call it what we will—will make it incomplete and will not resolve the issue that he seeks to resolve. What we mean by an agreement is an agreement between all those historical elements in their entirety. Those representing the Patriotic Front represent a part at least of some of those historic elements. The influence of the Christian churches has not been unmarked in Tanzania or in the leadership of more than one delegation that has sat arount the conference, table.

Mr. Iain Mills: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that the history of conflict in Rhodesia goes back long before Cecil John Rhodes? Is he aware that the very term "Bulawayo" means "the place of killing"? It was the place from which Lobengula would throw his unfortunate enemies. Unfortunately, conflict has been the due of that land. Conquering by war went on well before any white influence.

Mr. Spearing: The hon. Gentleman—

Mr. Burden: On a point of order, Mr. Weatherill. These are interesting arguments, but are they not completely out of order while we are discussing the amendment?

The Chairman: The hon. Gentleman must leave that to me.

Mr. Spearing: I am only too well aware of the history of disagreement and


the results of earlier wars. That is why I am suggesting that it is for the Committee, not only the Government, to ensure that we achieve a lasting agreement so that all the elements of Southern Rhodesia's history—I take the point of the hon. Member for Meriden, and we all know what he means—are present in the agreement.
The best means of getting rid of that history, perhaps for good, is by making the Bill operate within an all-round agreement. If it does not do that, it will be letting loose all the disagreements, parties and forces that historically are in the soil and in the people of the country. I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for intervening, because I believe that he has emphasised the argument that is being advanced by my right hon. and hon. Friends. As I have said, if it is not a proper agreement all the disagreements of the past may recur in hideous and modern form.
The type of agreement that we are all after could be undergirded by the Commonwealth. We would not be having the Lancaster House talks but for the agreement that was found at the Lusaka conference. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) has mentioned a Commonwealth force. I do not believe that that would necessarily be acceptable to the Patriotic Front. I do not speak for that organisation. I am trying to be entirely objective.
I suggest that the Government have a legal responsibility to the House of Commons and a moral responsibility to those who were at the Lusaka conference. If it is possible to resolve the problems of time, of government and in obtaining agreement by virtue of Commonwealth assistance—not necessarily Commonwealth observers, and perhaps going beyond that—such as using Commonwealth good offices and Commonwealth forces as a catalyst, the opportunity should be grabbed.
We want an agreement and we want all possible components tested. I do not say that the method of obtaining an agreement that I have set out will work. However, I say to the Lord Privy Seal, and through him to the Foreign Secretary, that if the Government do not investigate that possibility those who were present at Lusaka, and Commonwealth colleagues throughout the world, will ask why they

did not. The various members of the Commonwealth have achieved their freedom from Britain. In most instances, they have achieved independence without bloodshed. I am sure that they would be willing to discharge a moral responsibility to a budding member of the Commonwealth, namely, Zimbabwe, by contributing through peaceful means their assistance in finding the agreement that we are all seeking.
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In the right hon. Gentleman's search for a bridge, and in his search for a final reconciliation of the forces found in the unhappy land of Zimbabwe, I suggest that he proceeds through the Commonwealth, or uses some other means to assist all those living in and born within that country to come together in faith, and over a period to work together for the good of the country to which they ell have loyalty and which they all want to see prosper in peace.

Mr. Bowen Wells: If I may bring the Committee back to the nub of the amendment, it seems that both sides of the Chamber are close together if they will only analyse what is being said. If any earnest of faith were needed, surely that is provided by nine weeks of constant and continuous negotiation on behalf of the Lord Privy Seal and the whole of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
There needed to be a conference of the type now taking place at Lancaster House because of the Patriotic Front's fundamental disagreement with the constitution and the arrangements made earlier this year. The objective and thrust of the Government's policy is to bring the Patriotic Front into a legal framework that it will accept.
The Opposition are suggesting an amendment to the first clause so that there may be no end to the negotiations taking place at Lancaster House unless the Patriotic Front agrees. I agree that no agreement will be arrived at unless the Patriotic Front agrees. The Opposition have gone out of their way to point out that the Patriotic Front has a veto regardless of whether there is an agreement at Lancaster House. That is the veto of carrying on the war. The Opposition argue that that is the final veto. They say that it is the ultimate veto of


force. It is clear that if an agreement is not reached the war will continue. It seems that the Opposition's arguments are self-defeating.

Mr. Douglas-Mann: I accept what the hon. Gentleman is saying, namely, that the Bill is a few weeks too early. Instead of approaching the negotiations on the basis of trying to agree, and if the Lord Privy Seal and the Foreign Secretary are unable to reach agreement with the other parties to introduce legislation, the Government are saying "We shall legislate so that if there is no agreement we shall be in a position to override your opposition." Does the hon. Gentleman say that that is the right way to attempt to reach agreement?

Mr. Wells: I agree that that is the hon. Gentleman's interpretation of what is intended, but I do not think that it is the correct one. If no agreement emerges from the negotiations, we shall have to consider what to do next. As I understand it, that is what the Government are saying. They are not saying that they will implement the full powers provided in the Bill if there is no agreement. The Government are saying that they will have to consider the position if there is no agreement.

Mr. S. C. Silkin: Surely, the hon. Gentleman was present when the Lord Privy Seal was pressed again and again by many of my right hon. and hon. Friends, including myself, to give an assurance that the powers in the Bill would not be exercised in the event of there being no agreement. The right hon. Gentleman refused to give that assurance.

Mr. Wells: We shall come to another clause that enables the Government to implement parts of the Bill. Should the talks fail, the Government may think it right to implement only parts of the Bill.
Surely, the need for the Bill is manifest, given the state of negotiations. We need the powers in the Bill to implement what we have said we could do. It is a matter of faith. We must have those powers. Nobody will believe us if the Government do not possess the necessary powers.
It seems that we are close to agreement.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Does the hon. Gentleman recognise the difference

between the situation that obtained before the Lancaster House talks and what would obtain if there were no agreement and the powers contained in the Bill were in the hands of the Government? If that were the position, the war would continue and the Patriotic Front would be fighting the British Government as well as the Muzorewa regime. From the point of view of the House of Commons, that would be an entirely different kettle of fish. Does the hon. Gentleman want us to be involved in a war in Southern Rhodesia?

Mr. Wells: All that the Government have said is that they would need to consider the position that would present itself if there were no agreement. That does not mean that the British Government would be involved in fighting a war in Rhodesia. If there is no agreement at the conference, it will not mean that we have to send a Governor. The Bill does not make that mandatory. It merely means that we shall have to consider the best way to proceed.
It is a great pity that there seems to be a division between the Patriotic Front and the other parties to the agreement. What we should all be concerned with is providing a framework within which there can be an agreement. One of the most unfortunate aspects of this debate, and one of the things that the Committee should consider very carefully, is whether we, by debating this issue and dividing, as we did last Thursday and will do today, are helping the cause of peace in Rhodesia. In my view, we are not. This is one of the major problems that we are creating right now. I ask all hon. Members to consider how close we are to an agreement. We must try to find a way to bring independence to Rhodesia.

Mr. James Johnson: In view of what has just been said, you will be glad to know, Mr. Weatherill, that in view of the time factor I have no intention of developing a long dialectical, constitutional argument about Southern Rhodesia.
My hon. Friend the Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) was perfectly correct. The nub of our difficulties is that Rhodesia never was a colony as was Kenya or Tanganyika. Southern Rhodesia, with its 250,000 white settlers, has been such a queer place that as far back


as 1922 a quirk of history might have meant that it joined with South Africa. There was an election at that time and the number voting was not the size of a fourth division football league gate today. Of the white settler population, 6,000 voted to remain outside South Africa and 4,000 voted to join with that country. But I do not want to talk about that aspect.
The speech of my hon. Friend the Member for York, (Mr. Lyon) was, as usual, very cogent. For that reason, I felt impelled to make a contribution. My hon. Friend the Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) said that the essence of the argument is couched in the statement:
After agreement has been reached by all parties represented at the Constitutional Conference".
I agree with him. That is crucial. Without all-party agreement, we shall get nowhere.
For that reason, the Lord Privy Seal is under a duty to the Committee to say what he knows will happen. If he finds that after nine weeks or nine months—it is nine weeks at present—he cannot get what he wants, it will not be good enough for him to make a settlement on behalf of Her Majesty's Government with one section of the conference and have elections under the supervision of international forces, whether they are Commonwealth forces or not. That is just not good enough.
Briefly, I will tell the Lord Privy Seal what the consequences of such action would be. If the Patriotic Front does not come to an agreement, it will not put up candidates, and if there is no candidate for whom the people can vote it will continue to fight. It is no good hon. Members bleating about the whole Committee being united. This is the world in which we live. Hon. Members must accept that these black men and their families in Southern Rhodesia have a point, and that they will continue to fight.
The hon. Member for Shoreham (Mr. Luce), who is not here at present but who is a close colleague of the Lord Privy Seal, will understand what I am about to say because he has been to the Horn of Africa with me. If there is no settlement in Southern Rhodesia, the war will escalate. My blood was chilled—I mean that—when I saw in The Observer or The

Guardian—I am not sure which—that Mr. Mugabe had gone to Addis Ababa.
There are those of us who, in the last few months, have been to such places as Mogadishu and Jijiga, although we have not been very near Salisbury. One only has to look at the purgatory in Eritrea. There was a war in the Sudan for 18 years between African peoples. I do not want to see an 18-year civil war in this territory, never mind the beastly conditions that have been mainly engineered by people such as Mengistu in Ethiopia. There are far bigger issues than just saying whether we get three or four parties, such as are now at Lancaster House, assenting to elections next month or in six months, as the case may be, as the Lord Privy Seal and his noble Friend the Foreign Secretary well know.
Will the Government make up their mind, given that conditions continue as at present, to do what some people unkindly call a deal with Muzorewa? I warn the right hon. Gentleman that that would only lead to double disaster. He has seen what has happened in other parts of Africa, so I beg him to look beyond the end of his nose and into the future.
For the sake of unborn youngsters in Umtali, Salisbury, Wankie or anywhere else, he should shoulder his obligations and not shuffle off to do a deal and then put in soldiers to keep order. That is no answer to a tragedy of this nature.

Mr. John Farr: I oppose this amendment, but before doing so I should declare an interest. For many years I have owned land in Rhodesia near Wankie, to which the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. Johnson) referred a moment ago. I have had that property for 20 or 30 years. Years ago it used to be farm land and I retained it in the hope that one day in the not too distant future I would be able to develop it again as agricultural land for the benefit, in a humble way, of the new country of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West said that in his view the black man in Rhodesia would go on fighting. In the particular part of the country that I mentioned, I probably know the people as well as the hon. Gentleman does. My view is that the black man in Rhodesia is of a unique calibre. He is not a militant person, but a man who is living in fairly


humble circumstances. He is anxious to improve himself, and rightly so, but is not prepared to do so through force. The Bill holds out great hope for the future for all people in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia—and by "all people" I do not mean the black or the white people but Rhodesians of all colours.

Mr. James Johnson: Does the hon. Member accept that this is not a matter of black men and their families being allowed to do what they would like to do? There are Cubans and East Europeans there. I do not love or hate Marxists any more than I love or hate my own people here, but as in other places, once Cubans and Russians are present, as they are in the Horn of Africa, the issue is much bigger altogether than simply stating that black men should be allowed to work out their own destiny and future.

Mr. Farr: I agree. The hon. Gentleman has great knowledge of peoples throughout the whole continent of Africa. However, I think that he will agree that the African in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, and indeed in Zambia, is probably the least militant of all the African races. He wants to live in peace and co-operation as much as possible. I accept that there are those who will try to stir him up, as indeed they are now doing, but they will have a harder task to turn him into a militant in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia than anywhere else in the continent of Africa.
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I do not regard it as realistic to accept these amendments, because all they will do is to give a veto to every party in the current negotiations unless their particular points are accepted. That will mean that there is no agreement at all. As we have seen so far, there must be reasonable give and take in order to achieve an agreement. It may be in the interests of the Patriotic Front to have no agreement and perhaps to continue with methods of force, but such a course is not in the interests of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia as a whole. Agreement must be good for both sides, and if necessary major concessions must be made for progress to continue.
The inclusion of these amendments in the Bill would do great harm to the whole

prospect of peaceful coexistence in the whole area of Southern Africa. At the time of the old Capricorn Society, which the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West will remember, the ideals were good. For the whole of Southern Africa there is now a wonderful chance—if the Bill is enacted and the new Zimbabwe-Rhodesia established in peace—of setting a pattern for not only the continuing peaceful development of countries in Southern Africa but also for pointing the way towards a much larger target which the Committee must have in mind, namely, how to bring about a democratic situation and solution to the problems that undoubtedly lie in the Republic of South Africa.

Mr. Spearing: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that that sort of sentiment, albeit well meant, was exactly the sort of sentiment that underlined the creation of the former Federation of Central Africa, which foundered because it did not have sufficiently wide agreement to provide success for it? Are not the Government in danger of following a parallel but even more disastrous path on this occasion?

Mr. Farr: I do not think so, because the Capricorn Society was established about 25 years ago and flickered into life for a few years. It failed because there was not universal suffrage in the Federation of Rhodesia, as it was then, and there was generally an absymal lack of knowledge among all Africans about the outside world.
The situation has changed, and I believe for the better. The peaceful African in Southern Rhodesia wants to live in coexistence. He now understands what it is all about. For example, the first European Member of Parliament was elected in the general election in Kenya only last week, and that is widely regarded as a hopeful prospect for that part of South-East Africa. We now have a chance of getting that same sort of target achieved in Southern Africa as a whole. I believe that the Bill should point the way that South Africa should follow as soon as possible. I reject the amendments because I do not believe that they will help very much in that respect.

Mr. Stanley Newens: Those of us who support the amendments are not opposed to the Bill in principle. However, we believe that it is untimely at this


juncture. Many of the arguments advanced by the hon. Member for Harborough (Mr. Farr) did not address themselves to the point that we are now making. I also disagree with some of his other views, and I ask him and his hon. Friends to concentrate on why we believe that these amendments should be accepted.
As the Bill stands, we are concerned that the Government may be tempted to impose a constitution for Zimbabwe before agreement has been reached. From what has been said so far, I gather that every hon. Member at least pays lip service to the idea of agreement being reached. When the Lord Privy Seal spoke last week, he suggested that agree-man was nigh. Many of us who follow these matters quite carefully believe that he was somewhat optimistic in taking that view. Although progress has been made, important differences have yet to be resolved. If the constitution in the Bill were promulgated, it could lead to the foundering of the talks, which I hope all hon. Members would very much regret.
In those circumstances, it is important to have the matter clarified, and I hope that the Lord Privy Seal will clarify it. Frankly, some of us fear that the Bill has been introduced at this stage not because agreement is immediately at hand but in order to allow the constitution to be put into effect on the basis of agreement with one side. If that is not the position—and my hon. Friends have already referred to today's article in The Guardian—it is up to the right hon. Gentleman to refute that point of view. Many Labour Members will be greatly reassured if the right hon. Gentleman goes further today than he did last week and states quite clearly that the constitution will not be introduced until an agreement has been made with all the parties at the Lancaster House talks.
What is wrong with that? It must surely be as plain as a pikestaff to everyone that unless agreement is reached with all parties it will be no agreement at all. If Conservative Members do not want a one-sided agreement, they should support the amendments. I know the realities of the situation, what with Whips and so on, but if they are interested in an agreement they should listen carefully to what the Lord Privy Seal has to say and try to get an undertaking that the constitution

will not be introduced until agreement has been reached with everyone. If Conservative Members are saying that a constitution should be introduced on the basis of agreement with the Muzorewa regime alone, unless the Patriotic Front gives way, they are realising the very fears that I am expressing. It is incumbent on every Conservative Member to make clear where he stands on this issue.
If the Government try to proceed without an agreement with all parties, there will be no peace. I take it that all hon. Members want peace. We all want an end to the fighting, the bloodshed and the destruction of property. If the constitution that we are discussing is promulgated, without an agreement, there will be no peace. We are arguing not about whether peace should be achieved immediately but about the means to achieve it. I say seriously to Government supporters, who want peace, that it cannot be achieved on the basis of an agreement with the Patriotic Front remaining aloof. Not only will there be no peace but the settlement will not be stable, because as the war continues the settlement will continue to be undermined.

Sir Raymond Gower: Has it not occurred to the hon. Gentleman that if the Government desired only an agreement with what he described as the Muzorewa Government they need not have had the conference at all? If they had wanted an agreement only with the present Government in Salisbury, they need not have brought all these people to London. Obviously the Government have been most anxious to get agreement. It has been a long period of difficult negotiation.

Mr. Newens: If the hon. Gentleman is correct in his contention that the Government still want an agreement with all parties, the Government should accept the amendments. The only reason why they reject the amendments is that they may wish to go ahead without that full agreement of which we are speaking. There can be no other reason.
If the Government went ahead in that respect, they would secure a Pyrrhic victory. In those circumstances, the Opposition say that the Government must think again carefully. Britain might find herself involved not only in what some of my hon. Friends have called a pocket


Vietnam but in breach of our international obligations. That could lead to reprisals being taken against us in trading terms by African States, with which me must, especially in the present economic circumstances, remain on the best possible terms.
Many Government supporters have spoken as though the Patriotic Front constituted the unreasonable party. In fact, one hon. Gentleman said that it was the unreasonable party. The people who flouted the House of Commons were not the members of the Patriotic Front but people represented on the Muzorewa delegation. Not only did they flout the will of the House for a brief period but by UDI they flouted it for longer than a decade.

Mr. Bowen Wells: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the only reason why the Patriotic Front is in its position today is that its members are the only people in the current round of negotiations who have not agreed? The proposals put by the British Government have been accepted by all parties except the Patriotic Front. That is the only reason why the Patriotic Front is an exception. However, it is not the enemy in the situation. We are not against it. It happens to be the only dissenting party at the moment.

Mr. Newens: If it is the only dissenting party, we should be a little patient with it and listen to some of its arguments. After all, if we were prepared to wait for 15 years for certain other people to agree to negotiate on a reasonable basis, it is unreasonable if we are not prepared to wait longer than nine weeks for the Patriotic Front, which opposed the illegal steps that were taken. If Members of Parliament were looking at the situation in a reasonable frame of mind, we would say that as those people always supported the point of view of the majority in Parliament, at least we should be a little patient with them at this time. We should not fall over ourselves to come to an agreement with another group that includes those who stood out longest against any agreement and who, in standing out, caused much of the bloodshed in Southern Rhodesia.
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It is not merely a question of ensuring that justice is done. We cannot possibly wash our hands of Rhodesia merely by promulgating this constitution. Britain's position in the world will continue to be at stake. The Government may be able to win applause from some of their Back Benchers who have been sympathetic to the white minority since UDI. I ask the Committee to consider seriously where we would have been if we had taken the advice of that minority in the past. We should certainly have been in great difficulties today. In the interests of the black majority of the population, and of the white minority who are outnumbered, it is vital that at this stage we should ensure that no precipitate step is taken that may lead to the continuation of the war.
I understand the pressures on the right hon. Gentleman. Government Back Benchers said that they would not vote for the renewal of sanctions. I understand that there are many other pressures on him at this stage. However, we must ask him to speak clearly in the long-term interests of Rhodesia, not of short-term party advantage. That is important. If the Government allow themselves to be pushed into taking a position because of the Back-Bench pressure to which the Minister is now subjected, many people may pay in blood over a long time. Members of Parliament have a right to say that that should not occur.
The Government could be on the verge of making a terrible error that could lead to a new bout of violence. In those circumstances the Opposition say that to secure support from both sides we should include some words indicating that the constitution will not be put into effect until agreement is reached with all parties. That is all we are asking. The Government must make clear that they will not go ahead on a one-sided agreement. If they said that, the Bill would have far more support from hon. Members on both sides. Although many of us consider that it is premature and should have waited, at least let us hear something that will allay our fears that steps are afoot leading to a one-sided decision and eventually the perpetuation of strife in Southern Africa.
We have an opportunity to stop that trend of events, which hon. Members on both sides deplore. I hope that the Minister, if he is not prepared to accept the amendments, will make a clear statement indicating that there is no possibility—as some of us fear—of putting the constitution into force without the full agreement of all parties at Lancaster House.

Mr. Stephen Hastings: I apologise to the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) because I missed his speech when he moved the amendment. I hope that he and the Committee will forgive me if I make a short intervention. I think that I have heard all the other speeches.
I listened with great care to the hon. Member for Harlow (Mr. Newens), as I always do. As always, it distresses me to have to disagree with him. However ill-advised his arguments strike me as being from time to time, there can be no doubt at all about his sincerity. Nevertheless, it seems to me that when he explains these hideously complex matters he does so as though we were concerned with a new constitution for Harlow new town, or something of the sort, where all men are reasonable. He used the word again and again. Alas, in Central Africa things are far from being like Harlow new town, in every sense. I only wish that one day we could join together in a journey around the parts that we are concerned with in Central Africa. I do not know whether I should succeed in converting the hon. Gentleman to the view that things are very different, but I should certainly enjoy the trip.
There is no doubt that the effect of the amendments would be to give the Patriotic Front control over the timing of the conference and over events, from then on; indeed, it could drag it out for as long as it suited it. This would really be to reproduce the conditions which we all saw with such suffering during the Geneva conference—the most shameful episode in the whole of this wretched and unhappy story.
The only reason why the Government have made the progress that they have in this conference—to my way of thinking, anyway—has been that my right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary has insisted, first of all, upon an agenda and, secondly, upon a timetable.
It has worried me very much from time to time that this timeable appeared, from what one could gather from newspapers, to be slipping. Every time it seemed to slip I began to question whether he would ever achieve his objective—and of course we still do not know whether he will. But as it slips, and as the agenda is allowed to become overlaid with new considerations, so the risk increases.
The right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin) said, quite rightly and properly, that he did not wish by anything that he said to risk or in any way delay the possibility of success in these negotiations. I am surprised at him. He must surely realise that the effect of these amendments would be precisely that.
Why does the Patriotic Front, at this stage in the game, wish to delay? Why would it welcome the acceptance by the House of Commons of these amendments? According to my information over the last 10 days, the terrorists, the guerrillas—call them what one will—have been steadily infiltrating over the Zambesi from Zambia into Rhodesia. Some elements have been captured on the way and, not unnaturally, asked what their orders were. Their orders are to get into the villages with no delay and to begin the intimidation necessary to permit the Patriotic Front to win the election. That is the reason for the Patriotic Front's wish to delay. That is the reason why these amendments would be immediately supported and welcomed by the Patriotic Front.
Opposition Members must ask themselves this question. Although it is not yet certain, we all hope that the election will be held. Whether or not it was necessary is another argument, which I do not intend to develop now. We hope that we shall have the election. When it comes, do Opposition Members want it to be fair? Do they want it to be, in so far as it can be, an election which we in this Committee could accept as a practice and a decision that we would accept, or do we want the decision to be affected by all the cruelty and ruthlessness of African intimidation? And if anyone who has spoken in the debate or is interested in this matter does not know what that constitutes, he should do by this time.

Mr. Buchan: The hon. Gentleman will accept that it is a little bit of impertinence to ask whether Opposition Members wish a fair election. However, in his desire for a fair election, would he agree with, say, the Patriotic Front, which says "Let us have an international force to control the transitional period and the election"?

Mr. Hastings: I think that that is a highly contentious suggestion. I am perfectly content to leave it to my right hon. and noble Friend and his team to ensure that whatever force and observers—

Mr. Buchan: Not observers.

Mr. Hastings: —he sends out there will be the best possible in the circumstances. But there can be several views as to what constitutes a fair selection there.
What I am concerned with, however, is the effect of the amendments if they were adopted. However reasonable the arguments may sound, the effect would be to favour the interests of those who wish to fix this election when it comes by the method of intimidation—and that we must avoid at all costs. Therefore, it is my profound hope that these amendments will be rejected.

Mr. Douglas-Mann: The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) compares scornfully the setting up of the constitution of a new town with the resolution of the problems of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. There is no fundamental difference. A settlement of any dispute, whether it be the Treaty of Versailles or the setting up of Harlow new town, must be on a basis that is accepted as being fair and which all the parties to a dispute can accept. What is proposed at present is a constitution that is being presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.
The major part of my life has been spent in negotiation, in trying to resolve the differences between parties in dispute. There are two ways in which one can approach negotiations. It very much depends on the outcome with which one is concerned. One can approach negotiations on the basis that one will achieve the best possible results and to hell with what the other parties are concerned about because one is strong enough to force one's wishes on one's opponents

and one will thereby get one's own way. That is one way of resolving a dispute.
Sometimes that is the approach that one has to adopt, and it is acceptable, perhaps, if one is seeking simply a monetary settlement of some kind: but if one is trying to achieve a settlement that will enable people to work together, it is essential that in the negotiation of the settlement there is compromise, an acceptance of the other person's point of view and a recognition that the result that one may achieve by the exertion of maximum force will not be conducive to the long-term settlement and the long-term peace of the society or organisation that will exist when the dispute is over.
The hon. Member for Hertford and Stevenage (Mr. Wells) spoke as though we on the Labour Benches were the advocates of the Patriotic Front and that on the Conservative Benches there was a reluctant acceptance of the Muzorewa regime. Perhaps, to be fair to Conservative hon. Members, I should omit the word "reluctant"—but their support for the bishop came late.
Between Bishop Muzorewa and the Patriotic Front I have no preference. During my visit to Rhodesia some years ago I was able to spend two and a half hours talking to Bishop Muzorewa, and I was very much impressed by him. I was not able to speak to Mr. Mugabe because at that time he was in detention. That is, perhaps, a significant difference. It is certainly a significant difference so far as the approach to the election period is concerned and the opportunity for each to mount an effective election campaign.
My hon. Friend the Member for Renfrewshire, West (Mr. Buchan) mentioned the dismay which many of us felt suddenly in early April at having to get our electoral machines into gear for an election four weeks later. We must bear in mind the apprehension that must be felt by someone who is contemplating fighting an election and who is at this stage fighting a war, possibly at the other end of the country, who must get himself to the place in which he resides, to register on the electoral roll and to try to organise the electoral system there. We must remember that those fighting with the Patriotic Front need the assurance that if things go wrong, proper security


forces will be there to ensure that guerrillas laying down their arms and going to their villages to register for voting are not placing themselves at the mercy of their opponents, in what is still a civil war. One side, one party in this election, is being asked to put itself totally at the mercy of the other. It can be expected to do that only if effective peacekeeping forces ate present.
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I accept that the amendments are second best and that they are supportable only on the basis that, if we must have a Bill at this time, it must be amended. I should prefer that the Bill were coming before us in a few weeks' time. If I were then convinced, in consequence of the continued negotiations, that the Patriotic Front was filibustering, as has been alleged by Conservative Members and has been suggested in the press, and was not seeking a satisfactory conclusion, it would be reasonable to pass the Bill without amendment. But we are presented with the Bill now.
The overwhelming part of the Lancaster House talks has been devoted to hammering out a constitution. We are now involved in the transitional provisions and the security arrangements. The Government deserve great commendation for what they have done so far, but it is irresponsible now to prejudice the negotiations, to destroy that element of good will that they have deservedly achieved, by bringing in a blunderbuss and saying to the Patriotic Front "Unless you accept what we are proposing we shall carry it through, like it or not." In the absence of the provisions which we seek to put into the Bill, the Government are arming themselves with the power to do just that. Therefore, I hope that the Committee will accept these amendments, which require the agreement of all parties before the Bill is implemented.
Amendment No. 17 relates to proposals for a referendum. It is no coincidence that that amendment, tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin) and myself, is similar to amendments which were tabled to the Scotland and Wales Bills. It will be within the memory of hon. Members that we were then told that there was an overwhelming desire on the part of the people of Scotland and Wales for certain constitutional changes.

Many people who were represented in the House, and even more who were not, contended that, in the absence of such constitutional changes, chaos would ensue. Some of my hon. Friends and I helped to insist that, before the Bills were carried into effect, there should be referendums to find out whether the proposes changes had the support of the people. Amendment No. 17 would provide that test in this instance.
The amendment would also perform another important function. It would provide additional time in which, if an election is to be fairly fought, preparations could be carried out effectively. It is ludicrous to suggest that such an election could be carried out as quickly as has been suggested. The amendments would give time for a proper electoral organisation to be set up for all concerned, and would also ensure that the constitution was acceptable to the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Therefore, I urge the Committee to accept the amendments.

Viscount Cranborne: I do not wish to detain the Committee for too long. I declare my interest in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, as I have whenever I have spoken on this subject.
In considering these amendments the Committee must ask itself a fundamental question: is agreement possible? It is a truism to say that to achieve an agreement of any kind there must be a certain amount of good will by all parties.
If we examine the performance of the Muzorewa Government during these negotiations, what do we see? We see a Government vilified, as they often have been not only by Labour Members but by some Conservative Members. But what have that Government done? They have accepted every suggestion put to them by my right hon. and hon. Friends. They have accepted the constitution. They have accepted many other suggestions put to them since. Surely, that is clear evidence that we are dealing with men of good will in these negotiations. Perhaps some hon. Members would have preferred them to drag their feet in an attempt to obtain more in exchange, but that is neither here nor there.
Let us consider the Patriotic Front. What evidence have we that its representatives are people of good will? If I remember aright, they accepted the


constitution, but only with great relucance and reservation. They accepted the constitution because of the skill and patience, so often demonstrated during the talks, of my right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary. Some of us would perhaps beg leave to wonder whether these gentlemen would have shown the good will in the first place of coming to the conference had it not been for the force of circumstances ruling among some of the host countries which they were patronising before the conference began and which they patronise still. Would that good will have been shown had Mozambique and Zambia been the well fed and economically successful countries that we all hope they will become?
If both sides show clear evidence of good will, there might be some reason to consider these amendments carefully. But, in view of the Patriotic Front's performance so far—the fact that it has had to be dragged kicking and screaming through every phase of the conference—accepting the amendment would amount to giving the Patriotic Front the power of veto to drag out the negotiations until it suited it to accept them when the terrifying scenario postulated by my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) comes to pass.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The hon. Gentleman talks about the Patriotic Front being dragged kicking and screaming, and so on. Does he realise that the constitutional document put to the Patriotic Front for a "Yes-No" answer at the end of seven weeks of discussion was the same document, without any change, that had been put to it at the beginning of the negotiations? The Government have been negotiating on the basis "You take our view or you leave it." That is not the way to negotiate. If Muzorewa was willing to do that, the Patriotic Front was not.

Viscount Cranborne: ; I am sure that the hon. Gentleman's memory is better than mine on these matters. However, I seem to recall that many years ago the Patriotic Front accepted the six principles that were established and accepted by both sides of the House during previous discussions on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. I do not hear much question as to whether those six principles have

been fulfilled or not. The Patriotic Front seems to have shifted its position and retreated in the face of the concessions made not only by Bishop Muzorewa and his regime, but by the British Foreign Office. That is my point.
It is absurd that these amendments envisage a veto for people who have not proved themselves to be men of good will. There conies a point when even the skill and patience shown by my right hon. Friend and the Government must reach a limit. That point, we understand, has not been reached. The first clause of the Bill surely must give the Government the power to say "Enough is enough". We cannot prolong these negotiations for ever when the horrors of the war in Rhodesia—which some hon. Members know all too well—continue unabated and in many cases are getting worse.

Mr. Clive Soley: I find it difficult to understand why the amendment is not acceptable. It seeks to ensure that any constitution approved by the United Kingdom is acceptable to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. I thank speakers from the Government Benches for bringing me to my senses and for making me realise why it is so difficult for Conservative Members to accept it. They put forward an extreme and distorted view. How can they regard themselves as neutral? Their view must bring a great deal of harm to any attempt at impartiality.
I should like to think that all right hon. and hon. Members have an interest in the successful outcome of the Lancaster House talks. If it is passed unamended, the Bill will raise three fears. I shall weigh my words carefully, not because I think that anything I say will affect matters materially, but because the tone of discussion in the House may do so.
First, the Bill appears as an attempt to pressurise the Patriotic Front. Even if we believed that we could force the leaders of the Patriotic Front to give way on the issues on which the British Government or the Government of Bishop Muzorewa would like them to give way, if they did so they would lose the support of their commanders in the field, which would be disastrous for Zimbabwe in both the short and long term.
Secondly, the Bill provides the possibility of a constitution being imposed


without majority support. If there is not majority support, the constitution will break down in the short or long term. Any constitution imposed without the support of at least a large proportion of the population is guaranteed to be disastrous.
I turn to the third fear with a sense of sadness, and in saying so I do not seek any political gain. One of the main reasons why we cannot pass the amendment with the support of the Government is that they are trying to preserve unity in the Conservative Party. Ultimately, in so doing, they are sacrificing principle on the high altar of political expediency. No hon. Member can take pride in that.
If that is not so, why did the Government not accept the suggestion of the Leader of the Opposition that the sanctions be renewed for short periods of a month or less? Why is the tone of the debate from the Government Benches massively in support of the rebel Government? Why are Conservative Members constantly wittering away and nagging at the Patriotic Front? This must be one of the few examples in history where a Government have given such support to a party that is in rebellion against them.
One can go a long way in leaning over backwards, but after a while something disastrous happens. That is the position now. We have heard speech after speech in favour of the rebel Government. I am not against the Government of Bishop Muzorewa. He represents a significant number of people in Rhodesia, but it is essential that we have the agreement of the other groups, including the Patriotic Front. Right hon. and hon. Members on each side of the Committee should have the wit and wisdom and, above all, the political status to be able to recognise the advantages of all groups rather than to pick out the advantages of one group at the expense of another.

Mr. Newens: My hon. Friend said that perhaps never in history had a Government done so much to accommodate people who were in rebellion against them. A previous Government gave way to the Curragh mutiny in Northern Ireland. As a result, the problem was perpetuated for many years. Is it not possible that the same thing could occur now?

Mr. Soley: It is. There is a great deal to be gained from flexibility, but there comes a point at which flexibility becomes dangerous. About 18 or 20 years ago I was travelling in a train with a black Rhodesian who worked for the Rhodesia Broadcasting Authority, as it was called then. I had a long discussion with him about events there. He told me that, in the long run, he had confidence because he knew that the British Government and the British people would do the right thing. I was then naive enough to feel a sense of pride in that statement. Since then we have had a history of appeasement of a minority Government in Rhodesia because of British domestic political events. We must accept some condemnation for that. Few things damage a nation's reputation more than to be seen to be giving undue support to a minority racial group. We are supposed to put democracy first, and kith and kin second.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton: The hon. Gentleman talked about a minority group. Is he not aware that Bishop Muzorewa's Government were elected on a turnout of 64·8 per cent. of all adult Rhodesians, which was rather more than those in this country who turned out for the European Assembly elections? How can it be a minority Government if it has been elected by a substantial proportion of the adult population? Bishop Muzorewa comes from a tribe which represents 80 per cent. of the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Mr. Soley: I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. It enables me to point out—as my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) pointed out—that if there is to be an election that is in any way meaningful time must be given to the other side not only to gain access to the media but to organise itself from the point of view of offices, telephones and all the aids that would normally be expected in a general election campaign anywhere. It is dangerous to expect the other side to organise itself in two months.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I remind my hon. Friend that in the free and fair election in May in some areas 105 per cent. of the electorate turned out to vote in their district. Some hon. Members would


be grateful for that sort of electoral turnout.

Mr. Soley: I shall continue into a little more background. We tend to forget the effects of colonisation. The effects are not entirely bad, but in some crucial respects colonisation undermines the moral integrity and the self-respect not only of the colonised but of the colonisers. Colonisation is not unique to the British Empire. It has happened throughout history, and it is one of the reasons for the breakdown of empires. The power of the Government is no longer accepted.
I should like hon. Members to consider the possible effects of pushing through a constitution which does not have the support of the major parties. If we do that, we shall be trying, as the right hon. Member for Down, South (Mr. Powell) pointed out on Thursday, to get responsibility without power. I do not usually agree with his arguments, but I accept that to have responsibility without power is a dangerous occupation. The danger of trying to push through a constitution that does not have majority support is that inevitably it will break down.
I have never heard of or seen such a big red herring as the so-called veto. It is not a matter of the veto being right. It is not a matter of the veto being wrong. It is purely and simply irrelevant. What we have to remember is that it has been necessary for the Government to bring forward the Bill, and not to have it amended, in order to avoid another vote on sanctions.
If the constitution that the Government are trying to impose were to break down, the worst thing that could happen would be a position similar to that which existed in Vietnam. It would result in endangering the future good government of Zimbabwe. It would also bring about the rightful criticism of Britain.
If we act one-sidedly, it may also result in sanctions being imposed upon this country. I remind the Committee of what happened on the last occasion when he Prime Minister started to say what he would do about Rhodesia. Nigeria started to flex its economic muscles. We must also remember that the OAU recognises the Patriotic Front. That fact might not bring pleasure to Conservative Mem-

bers, or, indeed, to Members in other parts of the House, but it is important to realise that the OAU recognises the Patriotic Front. The OAU is a powerful force in its own right. Nigeria and other Commonwealth countries which are actively involved, and have a rightful concern in this problem, will have the right to make their views known to Britain. They will also have the right to put pressure on Britain if we act in a way which they regard as not being in the interests of Africa as a whole. That needs to be borne in mind.

Mr. John Townend: Is the theme of the hon. Gentleman's argument that if some other country does not do what we want we are entitled to put pressure on it by threatening sanctions and economic boycott? Surely that is a dangerous theory.

Mr. Soley: The countries that I have mentioned would have the right to impose sanctions, in the same way as we had the right to impose sanctions on the rebel regime in Rhodesia.
There is an acute danger here of our sacrificing our principles on the high altar of political expediency.
There is nothing wrong with the amendment. It is a simple, straightforward, honest and open amendment, which ought to be easily acceptable, unless the Government believe that it is necessary to pressurise one side. If such pressure results in making the leaders back down, the agreement will be unlikely to stick in Zimbabwe. There would inevitably be consequences for Britain. I put it to the Government that they do not need to bow to their own Back Benchers, who are still in the backwoods on this issue. There is another way forward, and it is a much more hopeful way for peace and prosperity in Zimbabwe.

Mr. Ian Lloyd: The House has a great deal to learn from the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Soley) about the sacrifice of political principles on the high altar of expediency. Doubtless we shall learn more as he teaches us in seminar after seminar on this matter. We may not learn much about his wit and wisdom, although we shall give him a ready ear. But when he asks us to weigh our words,


of course we listen to him. Hon. Members on each side will be weighing their words very carefully on a subject of such great sensitivity.
When the hon. Gentleman asks us to weigh our words carefully because we must not pressurise the so-called Patriotic Front, the question that I ask is this. Who are we to teach the Patriotic Front lessons in pressurisation? If any organisation in recent years and months has taught Southern Africa, if not the world, the most vivid and savage lessons in pressurisation, it is the Patriotic Front. Let us have no more about pressurising or not pressurising the Patriotic Front.
I turn now to a point that I regard as important. The hon. Member for Harlow (Mr. Newens) fears—and asks the Committee to share his fears—the imposition of a constitution. He believes that by accepting the amendment we would in some way be tying the Government's hands, so that they were unable to impose a constitution. I shall not put myself in danger of being ruled out of order by discussing the constitution in any detail, but, quite frankly, if the House of Commons were asked to accept this constitution for the United Kingdom, I know what would be said on each side of the House. It would be described within the first five minutes as a coach-and-horses constitution. The Patriotic Front, whether legally elected or acquiring power in any other way, would find it very easy to drive a coach and horses through this constitution. It could achieve whatever objective it wanted.
I should like to deal with a point made by the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing), who entertained the House with some interesting history about Rhodesia. I am sorry that he is not present. He told us that the Southern Rhodesia of 1923 was different. He implied that there was a qualitative difference between the position which developed, and was encouraged to develop, in that country from 1923 onwards, and the position in the neighbouring British colonies in Africa.
I have some knowledge of this part of the world at that time, although nothing like as detailed a knowledge as I might have had. The one message that I can give the House is that the Rhodesia that I knew between 1923 and 1960 was one of the happiest, the most

prosperous and the most successful countries in the developing world. Let no one contradict that. If the hon. Member is seriously suggesting that the devotion and dedication shown by the administrators of Southern Rhodesia before the Second World War was one whit inferior to that shown in Kenya, Uganda or anywhere else in British Africa, he is talking arrant nonsense, and it is time that that was said here.
I turn now to the agreement between what have been described as the historic elements. There were historic elements round the table in the veldt in 1890 when those concerned sat down with Lobengula and others. I argue that those historic elements were also very largely present round the table in Salisbury a year or two ago when there were negotiations which led to the establishment of a Government which I do not think can legitimately be described now as a regime, despite what some Labour Members may feel about it.
The historic element that was not present in the early 1890s was the Marxist, Kalashnikov-supported, Russian and Cuban terror, and the East German-dominated organisations, all of which we know lend support, advice, and a great deal more to the Patriotic Front. That is a completely new element.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. Johnston) said that we should look to Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa. Indeed we should, for if there is a new element that has totally destabilised the Horn of Africa it is the same element that lies behind the Patriotic Front. Let us never forget it.
I come now to the most crucial point of all. The hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) said that we should accept the amendment because in so doing we would gain the respect of the United Nations and place Her Majesty's Government in a position where the United Nations would say "Fine, that is what you ought to have done." But when we look at the United Nations today, what are we looking at? What is the United Nations? What can the Eastern bloc—accounting for a large number of members of the United Nations—teach Great Britain or Her Majesty's Government about parliamentary democracy? What can the totalitarian African States, members of the


United Nations, teach Her Majesty's Government or this country about parliamentary democracy? What can some, although not all, Right-wing totalitarian countries of South America teach this country about parliamentary democracy? What can some of the Central American so-called republics teach us about parliamentary democracy?
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Those are the countries whose opinions we must now respect. We must seek their support. We must seek their approbation. I do not consider that such approbation counts. There are about 30 countries throughout the developed world, and others, which are members of the United Nations, whose approbation is important, even if, in some cases their approbation is misinformed on Southern Africa. I would seek to argue strongly with them, although not with the majority of members of the United Nations, that we must not allow our policy to be determined entirely on the ground whether this extraordinary organisation—that is, regrettably, what it is today—gives it approval.
Flowing from that is the argument that if we get the matter wrong we shall involve the United Kingdom in a Vietnam-type situation. I have heard the phrase "a mini-Vietnam" used. It is put forward as a powerful argument. No one in his right mind wants to get his country involved in a Vietnam-type situation. The alternatives put forward are that whenever the threat is posed—it is possibly being posed in Tehran as well as in Southern Rhodesia—we give in and agree, or else the other side threatens that we become involved in a mini-Vietnam. This is the new blackmail, the new international diplomacy with which we have to deal.

Mr. Soley: There are a number of alternatives in between. Not the least of these would be to pay more attention to the needs of the Patriotic Front, to recognise that it is involved in a war in the same way as Bishop Muzorewa's forces, and that it is possible to reach agreement between all parties.

Mr. Lloyd: There are always intermediate ways. It is always desirable to reach agreement between all parties. I would argue strenuously that if the

Patriotic Front is as keen to reach agreement as has been suggested, and if it is as keen to enter the democratic process as has been suggested, why, in heaven's name, did it not stop shooting nine weeks ago? I should like to hear the answer.

Mr. Soley: I should have thought that the reason was obvious. Both sides have been fighting a bitter civil war. Both sides are afraid of losing ground if they give up shooting.

Mr. Lloyd: The hon. Gentleman is entitled to his judgment. I do not believe that the question of giving up ground arises. The problem is different. The question is whether we are to devise and implement a sane, sensible and realistic policy which will preserve some of the immense achievements of Southern Rhodesia as an alternative to seeing that country totally destroyed.
Most wars, even the worst in Europe, try to avoid unnecessary and total destruction. The winning side knows that it will have to reconstruct. There has been no attempt whatever in Southern Rhodesia to avoid total destruction. One can show example after example where these people have deliberately destroyed their own people, their own cattle, their own veterinary services and everything else. I do not accept that this is normal war. It is terrorism.

Mr. Soley: Dresden.

Mr. Lloyd: The hon. Member says "Dresden". Does he expect me to believe that bombing in the Second World War, when there was a major declared war between two parts of Europe, is similar to what has happened in Rhodesia? If he asks me to believe that, he asks me to believe something that is totally incredible.

Mr. Buchan: The hon. Gentleman said that all countries in the West—he was not referring solely to Britain's bombing in the Second World War—took care of neutrals and children. Is he not aware that during the Second World War 6 million Jews were crucified in concentration camps by people who are part of his grouping? Is he not aware that we launched the atomic bomb, rightly or wrongly, regardless of the effect, that we bombed Dresden, and that 20 million, 30 million or 40 million neutrals as well


as innocents were slaughtered as a result of war initiated in Western countries, which the hon. Gentleman holds up as an example?

Mr. Lloyd: I do not intend to pursue this matter. It is incredible that hon. Members should seek to remind me of what happened in the Second World War. I fought in the Second World War.

Mr. Buchan: So did I.

Mr. Lloyd: The hon. Member for Renfrewshire, West (Mr. Buchan) argues that the Patriotic Front has brought Rhodesia to legality. He says that the Patriotic Front is on our side. That is an incredible sentiment. I would argue totally the contrary view. It is not the Patriotic Front that has brought the Muzorewa delegation and the Europeans in Rhodesia to the conference table. It is the total lack of moral support from the West. I shall give a clear demonstration of why this has happened. Several terrorists were interviewed by someone I know. They were asked why they continued their actions when there was nothing to gain but destruction. Their answer was to ask the interviewer what was expected of them when they were supported with arms by the Russians, Cubans and East Germans and their opponents were totally opposed by the West. That is the situation that has brought the Rhodesian delegation to the conference table.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton: My hon. Friend has touched on a valid point to counter the views expressed by hon. Members on the Labour Benches. Does he agree that unless we go some way towards lifting sanctions against Bishop Muzorewa's Government in Salisbury we are practising bias against the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Government and acting in favour of the Patriotic Front? There are sanctions against the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Government, but no sanctions against the Patriotic Front, which is receiving weapons from all over the world—

The Second Deputy Chairman (Mr. Richard Crawshaw): Order. A special section of amendments deals with sanctions. Hon. Members should return to the amendment.

Mr. Lloyd: I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Macclesfield (Mr.

Winterton) knows my reply without my having to state it in the House. I welcome the new realism and reality displayed in the Government's policy that we are discussing. I ask my right hon. Friend to realise that a substantial African community of moderate people in Southern Rhodesia have not gone over to the Patriotic Front. Those people—black and white—have shown immense character. They are the people who need the moral support of the House of Commons and this country. I hope that Her Majesty's Government will demonstrate that support increasingly and convincingly.

Mr. Ioan Evans: It is necessary to answer the points made by the hon. Member for Havant and Waterloo (Mr. Lloyd). We know his position on Rhodesia. He is a whole-hearted supporter of the South African Government. I think he would admit that if the Conservative Government had been in power in previous years and had sought agreement with Ian Smith in Rhodesia he would have supported power being handed over to Mr. Smith.

Mr. Ian Lloyd: indicated dissent.

Mr. Evans: The hon. Gentleman says "No" now, but on previous occasions Conservative Members have said that they disagreed with sanctions and wanted to recognise the Ian Smith regime. Although the Conservative Party now decries the Patriotic Front, we have to recognise that talks are taking place in London on the constitution due to resistance, particularly by the Patriotic Front. Muzorewa disagreed with the Ian Smith regime but obtained certain powers in Rhodesia, while the Patriotic Front, outside the country, said that it could not participate in the elections because the constitution was undemocratic and racialist.
Although I do not say that the new constitution is perfect, because it contains certain racialist undertones, it is one that the Patriotic Front is prepared to consider round the table with the Muzorewa forces from Salisbury, but, like my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon), I believe that it should come into being only if it is accepted by all the parties at the constitutional conference, and that we should hold the Government to that.
This Committee must recognise that if, tomorrow or the day after, we have an


announcement from the Government that they intend to go ahead with this constitution and are turning down the strong representations made by the Patriotic Front, these talks will have failed. The parties to the Lusaka communiqué expected an agreement with the forces in Salisbury and the Patriotic Front. If there is not that agreement, the Commonwealth, the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations will say that these talks have failed.
When the Lord Privy Seal replies to this debate, I hope that he will relate his remarks to the report appearing in The Guardian today which suggests that the Government will seek from the Patriotic Front today a final decision on the transitional period.
I believed that there has been progress in these talks. They have not been negotiations. They have virtually been discussions, because the Government have put forward proposals and said "Either accept them or reject them." The Patriotic Front has gone a long way to meeting the desires of the Government. It has insisted on a Commonwealth peace force going into Rhodesia, and that is a legitimate demand which the Government should accept. But I believe, secondly, that the talks should not fail because of the arguments about the ceasefire and the transitional arrangements for elections.
I hope that the Lord Privy Seal will make it clear that the report in The Guardian is not accurate and that the talks will not fail in the next day or so after this Bill has been rushed through Parliament.

The Lord Privy Seal (Sir Ian Gilmour): I hope that it will be convenient if, before coming to the central issue of this debate, I try to deal with the amendment and the arguments advanced by the right hon. and learned Member for Dulwich (Mr. Silkin) and the hon. Member for Mitcham and Morden (Mr. Douglas-Mann) in favour of holding a referendum in Rhodesia.
The constitution has been agreed by all the parties to the Lancaster House conference contingent upon agreement on the interim arrangements. The right hon. and learned Gentleman said that we had not got agreement on anything. How-

ever, I prefer the view of the hon. Member for Renfrewshire, West (Mr. Buchan), who said that massive progress had been made. I think that that is a fairer summary. Of course, it has been admitted freely that the agreement is contingent on the interim arrangements and a ceasefire, but the constitution is a compromise between the views of parties which were deeply opposed hitherto, and I think that the Committee will agree that the Commonwealth has accepted it almost without reservation. It has the great advantage of being acceptable internationally as well.
At Lusaka, the Commonwealth Heads of Government agreed that there should be a new constitution with majority rule but with guarantees and safeguards for minorities, and new elections to implement it. That is precisely what this Government have proposed, and both sides at the conference have agreed. No party at the Lancaster House conference has at any stage suggested a referendum. I do not think that it would be practical.
6.45 pm
My right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary, my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State and I have made clear over the days where the Government stand about an all-party agreement. I think that our good faith in this matter is accepted by the Committee as a whole, although the hon. Member for Walsall, North (Mr. Winnick) had some suspicions about us and I am not sure that the hon. Member for Harlow (Mr. Newens) did not as well, and perhaps also the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North (Mr. Soley). But in general it is accepted that we have been going flat out to achieve an all-party agreement. That has been our objective throughout. It is also fairly widely accepted that we have got further in that than anyone has managed to do in the past, although I accept that we have not yet got the agreement.
The main difference between the two sides of the Committee is that the Opposition in general seem to forget that the Government are negotiating with two sides. All that Opposition Members have said would be true if we were negotiating with just one side. I think that the realisation of the facts of life at Lancaster House has been far more clear among Government supporters. We have


made detailed proposals both on the constitution, which has been accepted, and on the interim arrangements. But those proposals are themselves a compromise. Anyone who negotiates with two different sets of people knows that that is the only possible way to proceed.
The hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) said that we had not made any alterations in the constitution. That is not true. However, it is true that the general shape of the document at the end is fairly similar to what it was at the beginning. That is inevitable. When negotiating with two sides, there is a limit to the concessions which can be made to one side. If concessions are made to one side, almost by definition one gets further away from the other side and therefore an all-party agreement becomes impossible. It would be no good meeting the demands of the Patriotic Front if in the process we lost the agreement of the Salisbury delegation—

Mr. Buchan: And vice versa.

Sir I. Gilmour: Yes, and vice versa.
In the debate, some hon. Members have come very close, if they have not actually got there, to arguing that if the Patriotic Front do not agree to our proposals, those proposals must be amended until they get the agreement of the Patriotic Front.
I remind the Committee that interim proposals which have now been on the table for some time provide for all parties to campaign with equal status, with both sides and their commanders being equally responsible to the Governor for the maintenance of the ceasefire, and, to the extent that existing civil servants and members of the Armed Forces are used, they will be under the control of the Governor. The Salisbury delegation has agreed to hand over ministerial powers to the Governor during the pre-independence period.
In a series of statements and clarifications of the Government's position to the conference, we have shown great understanding of the concerns of the Patriotic Front with respect, for example, to the security of the parties while campaigning and the monitoring of the ceasefire, although the latter has to be discussed formally in the conference and awaits the agreement of the Patriotic Front to the interim arrangements.
It is quite wrong for the hon. Member for York to say, admittedly sotto voce, that the Government have been very intransigent and to say, non-sotto voce that we have squeezed out the Patriotic Front. That is untrue. It bears no relation to what has been happening over the past nine weeks.
I hope that the Opposition will not encourage the Patriotic Front to prevaricate. That would be very damaging to the chances of a settlement. The Patriotic Front must be prepared to put its claimed electoral support to the test.
It will not be possible for us to persuade the Salisbury delegation to remain in London indefinitely while the leaders of the Patriotic Front make up their minds. The hon. Member for York said that the members of the Salisbury delegation had gone home already. That is not quite true. Some of them have, but the majority have not.
The hon. Member for Harlow asked for some patience to be shown; but we have been patient. It is all very well for the hon. Member for Hammersmith, North to talk about the rebel Government, who have been mentioned several times at the conference, but he must realise that the overwhelming majority of the Salisbury delegation had nothing to do with UDI. Indeed, the vast majority opposed UDI and therefore to talk about rebel Governments has little validity now. The Opposition must move forward because we are no longer living in 1965. The situation has changed substantially.
Agreement has been reached about genuine majority rule and an end to the rebellion against Britain's authority. Therefore, it would be difficult for us to turn back. There have been no suggestions from Labour Members about what should be done in the absence of an agreement. Do the Opposition suggest that we should leave Rhodesia in a state of limbo and just go away and let things continue as before? Perhaps that is possible, but it is not desirable.

Mr. Buchan: An argument in relation to agreement is an argument in relation to this Bill, not the whole future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

Sir I. Gilmour: I do not follow the relevance of that point. We are talking


about the whole context of our discussions and have been attempting to get an agreement by all parties about the future of Rhodesia.
The hon. Member for Hammersmith, North was incorrect in his remarks about the ceasefire. The Salisbury delegation agreed at the beginning of the talks to a ceasefire on the condition that the Patriotic Front also agreed to one. There will be no resolution of the conflict if any party refuses to put electoral support to the test during the elections held under our Government, if under these conditions it is able to decide unilaterally that Rhodesia should remain in a state of illegality.
Our proposals for the interim period place the utmost emphasis on enabling all parties to compete peacefully for power on a fair and equal basis. There are plentiful safeguards for all parties in the detailed arrangements which we have put forward. I hope that the Patriotic Front will accept that and so enable us to move forward soon to the next stage of negotiations. However, we have a responsibility to the people of Rhodesia to bring that country to legal independence with the widest possible international acceptance. That is a responsibility we intend to carry out.

Mr. Newens: Is the right hon. Gentleman saying that the Government will be prepared to put the constitution into effect without agreement being reached with all parties? If the Patriotic Front does not accept the agreement, will the Government go ahead along the lines indicated in The Guardian article today?

Sir I. Gilmour: I had finished my speech, and have answered the debate to the best of my ability. The Government have no responsibility for anything reported in The Guardian today.

Mr. Peter Shore: As a number of my right hon. and hon. Friends have already spoken forcefully and explained the reasons for this package of amendments—led by amendment No. 2—I shall make only a brief speech. Although this debate is important, later debates will cover other important aspects concerning the whole negotiations and the future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.
We have put forward the amendments in order to highlight the folly of the Bill. It has been presented to Parliament before the completion of negotiations at Lancaster House. Our amendments are designed not only to reveal that folly but to overcome it through our votes tonight. By pushing the Bill through at this time, and in this peremptory fashion, the Government have—as we warned them—provoked two main questions raised by virtually everyone, not just among the Opposition.
Those questions have not just been put by Labour Members of Parliament but arose simultaneously with the Government's announcement of an enabling Bill. All over the world, and at the conference, the same questions are being asked. Faced with such a Bill at extraordinarily short notice, it is first asked whether the Government will abandon the quest for agreement and call an end to the nine-week effort that many of us have strongly applauded. The conference has brought the parties involved nearer together than ever before.
The second question that arises is whether the Government intend to activate the Bill with the agreement of only one of those parties concerned, and to do so without a ceasefire. That last question is of fundamental importance. If a Governor is appointed and goes to Salisbury, he will take charge of the armed forces. I made that point on Thursday and repeat it now with no embarrassment. Therefore, in the absence of a ceasefire, the Governor will be conducting a war with forces over which he has only minimal control.
During last Thursday's debate the hon. Members drew from two historical analogies. One of those analogies referred to General Gordon going to Khartoum and illustrated the problem of having responsibility without power. The other analogy was that of the American involvement in Vietnam, to which the hon. Member for Havant and Waterloo (Mr. Lloyd) has again referred today. The analogy of Vietnam is more likely to hold true as there is a danger that Britain may be sucked into a civil war. That civil war might become a wider conflict, as my hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull, West (Mr. Johnson) realistically pointed out. He described those areas of Africa where conflicts have


escalated and other forces have intervened to the peril and misfortune of the areas and their inhabitants.
That particular question has increased in urgency since last Thursday's debate. Press reports have informed us over the weekend that the Government propose to establish a Commonwealth force to supervise and monitor the ceasefire. It is said that some 700 British troops—mainly Signals—would be involved, plus smaller contingents from six or so Commonwealth countries. Presumably they would be armed, if only for the purpose of their own self-defence. So the danger of being sucked in is not hypothetical and remote. In terms of activating this Bill without a ceasefire and without agreement, it could be real and imminent.
7 pm
It is amazing that the Lord Privy Seal failed to make a statement to the House today about the new proposals. I attempted earlier to obtain a statement, and I would have thought that the right hon. Gentleman would have wished to inform the House of this quite major development. It greatly affects the ceasefire and our thinking about the whole complex of issues, and was announced to the press and, presumably, to the participants to the conference, on Friday or even earlier. He failed to make a statement and did not even allude to the subject in the speech he has just finished.
That is extraordinary because it affects more than just the context within which we are trying to judge the different aspects of the Lancaster House conference and the provisions of the Bill relating to it. It has also almost certainly a quite direct effect on the provisions in the Bill, which was given a Second Reading against the wish and vote of the Opposition only last Thursday.
It is almost incredible that the financial memorandum at the front of the Bill refers to a sum not exceeding £3·5 million. Is it suggested that that would be sufficient to cover the cost of the quite substantially larger number of people who will be involved in the monitoring of the ceasefire? The presence of these people and the invitations to the other Commonwealth countries was made known only after we had debated the Bill. The right hon. Gentleman there-

fore owes it to the Committee to explain what is going on. Was the proposal made on Friday after we gave the Bill a Second Reading? If it was made before, why was it not covered in the financial memorandum, and why was it not mentioned, even if only in outline form, during the Second Reading debate? The House has been treated disgracefully over the whole presentation of the Bill.
Let me turn now to the Government's answer to the major question. The Foreign Secretary was absolutely clear that there would have to be a ceasefire before the Bill was activated by the Governor being sent to exercise executive and legislative powers in Salisbury. If that is understood to constitute a veto, it is a veto that the Foreign Secretary most clearly identified in addressing the other place.
The Lord Privy Seal was equivocal. He could not say what the Foreign Secretary had said because that might, indeed, constitute a veto. Then we heard the unhappy Under-Secretary in quite a good winding-up speech, attempting to reconcile the differences between his two right hon. Friends. I suppose that there is some connection between the Lord Privy Seal and the Under-Secretary, but the latter concluded by saying that the Government would have to think about the new situation and decide what to do.
That is not, of course, a commitment to act in the event of failure at Lancaster House. However, it is not a commitment not to send in a Governor, and it falls short of repeating the very precise words and the context in which the Foreign Secretary delivered them in the other place. It is wrong for the Lord Privy Seal not to make perfectly plain whether what was said in the other place is the Government's position.
The other two questions which the Government's handling of the Bill has provoked is whether the Government are running out of their belief in their own capacity sensibly to continue the negotiations, and are about to bring them to an end. I heard on the BBC news at 6 o'clock that the Foreign Secretary at Lancaster House—and I hope that this is an inaccurate report—had delivered an ultimatum this afternoon and was demanding a firm acceptance of the proposals within the next day or two.
This raises the question of one's whole attitude and approach to negotiations. I take it that we are united in at least one thing—in wanting a successful outcome to the negotiations. A number of right hon. and hon. Members have spoken about the length of the negotiations. There are those who feel that they have gone on for far too long, but I remind them of the great advances that have been made in the nine weeks of negotiation. When I consider the starting point of the two sides on the question of the constitution, with one side wanting a presidential form of government, which is common in Africa, and the other seeking a traditional Westminster style of democracy with prime ministerial government, I am not at all surprised that the talks on that aspect occupied the first six weeks.
I believe that the first paper was put forward on this important and difficult interim period—it was but a single page—on 22 October. The serious paper containing the Government's proposals was tabled on 2 November. These proposals have not been long debated or been so long on the table that there was no prospect of people being persuaded to move one way or the other. I am not in favour of endlessly protracted negotiations, but I do not think that it is sensible to slap the proposals down on the table and demand a signature today or tomorrow. That is not the way to get an agreement.
Right hon. and hon. Members on both sides of the Committee will have heard the press conference by President Kaunda just before he left London. I think that his visit was designed to help in reaching an agreement. He called for a little more patience. If tonight's news is correct and an ultimatum has been delivered, that is a bad mistake in terms of a negotiating tactic. In a sense it is a

wrong dismissal of the advice of a President who seriously wishes to assist in solving problems and in reaching an agreement.

For those reasons, I believe that the Opposition cannot simply give the Government a blank cheque to go ahead with this Bill without the assurances sought by my right hon. and hon. Friends. It is entirely consistent with the view that we took in the reasoned amendment which we moved last Thursday that we should not merely give our support to the principle and the spirit of amendment No. 2 but that we should also vote for it tonight.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The Lord Privy Seal failed to answer the crucial question which we have asked several times. What will the Government do with the proposed powers if there is a disagreement at Lancaster House and the position has to be reconsidered? The right hon. Gentleman made it plain that there would be no going back to the situation which obtained before the talks. It seems therefore that some of these powers will be used in the event of a disagreement.
Hon. Members on the Government Benches should carefully consider how they vote when they may be committing us to the use of troops to fight the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia. That would mean a continuation of the war in circumstances that we could not totally control. It would be the worst possible outcome of these talks and it will be made possible by the votes which hon. Members are about to cast. I hope that some hon. Members will seriously consider whether it is right to support the Government tonight.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 242, Noes 299.

Division No. 99]
AYES
[7.12 pm


Adams, Allen
Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Campbell, Ian


Allaun, Frank
Bidwell, Sydney
Campbell-Savours, Dale


Alton, David
Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Canavan, Dennis


Anderson, Donald
Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Cant, R. B.


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur (M'brough)
Carmichael, Neil


Armstrong, Rt Hon Ernest
Bradley, Tom
Carter-Jones, Lewis


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Bray, Dr Jeremy
Cartwright, John


Ashton, Joe
Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Clark, David (South Shields)


Atkinson, Norman (H'gey, Tott'ham)
Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)
Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Brown, Ron (Edinburgh, Leith)
Cohen, Stanley


Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (Heywood)
Buchan, Norman
Coleman, Donald


Beith, A. J.
Callaghan, Rt Hon J. (Cardiff SE)
Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.


Benn, Rt Hon Anthony Wedgwood
Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Conlan, Bernard




Cook, Robin F.
Howell, Rt Hon Denis (B'ham, Sm H)
Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)


Cowans, Harry
Howells, Geraint
Prescott, John


Cox, Tom (Wandsworth, Tooting)
Huckfield, Les
Price, Christopher (Lewisham West)


Crowther, J. S.
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Race, Reg


Cryer, Bob
Janner, Hon Greville
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds South)


Cunliffe, Lawrence
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
Richardson, Miss Jo


Cunningham, George (Islington S)
John, Brynmor
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Cunningham, Dr John (Whitehaven)
Johnson, James (Hull West)
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Dalyell, Tam
Johnson, Walter (Derby South)
Roberts, Ernest (Hackney North)


Davidson, Arthur
Johnston, Russell (Inverness)
Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)


Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)
Jones, Rt Hon Alec (Rhondda)
Robertson, George


Davies, E. Hudson (Caerphilly)
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Robinson, Geoffrey (Coventry NW)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Rooker, J. W.


Davis, Clinton (Hackney Central)
Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Roper, John


Davis, Terry (B'rm'ham, Stechford)
Kerr, Russell
Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)


Deakins, Eric
Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Kinnock, Neil
Rowlands, Ted


Cempsey, James
Lambie, David
Ryman, John


Dewar, Donald
Lamborn, Harry
Sever, John


Dixon, Donald
Lamond, James
Sheerman, Barry


Dobson, Frank
Leadbitter, Ted
Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert (A'ton-u-L)


Dormand, Jack
Leighton, Ronald
Shore, Rt Hon Peter (Step and Pop)


Douglas, Dick
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Short, Mrs Renée


Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)


Dubs, Alfred
Litherland, Robert
Silkin, Rt Hon S.C. (Dulwich)


Duffy, A. E. P.
Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Silverman, Julius


Dunn, James A. (Liverpool, Kirkdale)
Lyon, Alexander (York)
Skinner, Dennis


Dunnett, Jack
McCartney, Hugh
Soley, Clive


Dunwoody, Mrs Gwyneth
McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Spearing, Nigel


Eadie, Alex
McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Spriggs, Leslie


Eastham, Ken
McKelvey, William
Stallard, A. W.


Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Stewart, Rt Hon Donald (W Isles)


Ellis, Raymond (NE Derbyshire)
Maclennan, Robert
Stoddart, David


Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, Central)
Stott, Roger


English, Michael
McNally, Thomas
Strang, Gavin


Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
McNamara, Kevin
Straw, Jack


Evans, John (Newton)
McWilliam, John
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Field, Frank
Magee, Bryan
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton West)


Fitch, Alan
Marks, Kenneth
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Flannery, Martin
Marshall, David (Gl'sgow, Shettles'n)
Thomas, Mike (Newcastle East)


Fletcher, L. R. (Ilkeston)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
Thomas, Dr Roger (Carmarthen)


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Marshall, Jim (Leicester South)
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)


Ford, Ben
Martin, Michael (Gl'gow, Springb'rn)
Tilley, John


Forrester, John
Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Tinn, James


Foster, Derek
Maxton, John
Torney, Tom


Fraser, John (Lambeth, Norwood)
Maynard, Miss Joan
Varley, Rt Hon Eric G.


Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald
Meacher, Michael
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)


Freud, Clement
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert
Walker, Rt Hon Harold (Doncaster)


Garrett, John (Norwich S)
Mikardo, Ian
Watkins, David


George, Bruce
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Weetch, Ken


Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John
Miller, Dr M. S. (East Kilbride)
Wellbeloved, James


Ginsburg, David
Mitchell, Austin (Grimsby)
Welsh, Michael


Golding, John
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)
White, Frank R. (Bury &amp; Radcliffe)


Grant, George (Morpeth)
Morris, Rt Hon Charles (Openshaw)
White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)


Grant, John (Islington C)
Morris, Rt Hon John (Aberavon)
Whitlock, William


Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Moyle, Rt Hon Roland
Wigley, Dafydd


Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)
Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Hardy, Peter
Newens, Stanley
Williams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon
Wilson, Rt Hon Sir Harold (Huyton)


Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith
O'Halloran, Michael
Wilson, William (Coventry SE)


Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy
O'Neill, Martin
Winnick, David


Haynes, Frank
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Woolmer, Kenneth


Heffer, Eric S.
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Hogg, Norman (E Dunbartonshire)
Palmer, Arthur
Wright, Sheila


Holland, Stuart (L'beth, Vauxhall)
Park, George
Young, David (Bolton East)


Home Robertson, John
Parker, John



Homewood, William
Parry, Robert
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Hooley, Frank
Pendry, Tom
Mr. Ted Graham and


Horam, John
Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch (S Down)
Mr. George Morton.




NOES


Adley, Robert
Bendall, Vivian
Bottomley, Peter (Woolwich West)


Aitken, Jonathan
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Bowden, Andrew


Alexander, Richard
Benyon, Thomas (Abingdon)
Boyson, Dr Rhodes


Alison, Michael
Benyon, W. (Buckingham)
Braine, Sir Bernard


Ancram, Michael
Best, Keith
Bright, Graham


Arnold, Tom
Bevan, David Gilroy
Brinton, Tim


Aspinwall, Jack
Biffen, Rt Hon John
Brittan, Leon


Atkins, Robert (Preston North)
Biggs-Davison, John
Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher


Atkinson, David (Bournemouth, East)
Blackburn, John
Brooke, Hon Peter


Banks, Robert
Blaker, Peter
Brotherton, Michael


Baker, Nicholas (North Dorset)
Body, Richard
Brown, Michael (Brigg &amp; Sc'thorpe)


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Browne, John (Winchester)


Bell, Ronald
Boscawen, Hon Robert
Bruce-Gardyne, John







Bryan, Sir Paul
Heddle, John
Page, John (Harrow, West)


Buck, Antony
Henderson, Barry
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)


Budgen, Nick
Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael
Paisley, Rev Ian


Bulmer, Esmond
Hicks, Robert
Parkinson, Cecil


Burden, F. A.
Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Parris, Matthew


Butcher, John
Hill, James
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Butler, Hon Adam
Holland, Philip (Carlton)
Patten, John (Oxford)


Cadbury, Jocelyn
Hooson, Tom
Pattie, Geoffrey


Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Howell, Rt Hon David (Guildford)
Pawsey, James


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Howell, Ralph (North Norfolk)
Percival, Sir Ian


Chalker, Mrs Lynda
Hunt, David (Wirral)
Pink, R. Bonner


Channon, Paul
Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Pollock, Alexander


Chapman, Sydney
Hurd, Hon Douglas
Porter, George


Churchill, W. S.
Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg


Clark, Dr William (Croydon South)
Jessel, Toby
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcllffe)
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Prior, Rt Hon James


Cockeram, Eric
Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Proctor, K. Harvey


Colvin, Michael
Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Raison, Timothy


Cope, John
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Rathbone, Tim


Cormack, Patrick
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)


Corrie, John
Kilfedder, James A.
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Costain, A. P.
Kimball, Marcus
Rhodes James, Robert


Cranborne, Viscount
King, Rt Hon Tom
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Critchley, Julian
Kitson, Sir Timothy
Ridley, Hon Nicholas


Crouch, David
Knox, David
Rifkind, Malcolm


Dickens, Geoffrey
Lamont, Norman
Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey


Dorrell, Stephen
Lang, Ian
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Langford-Holt, Sir John
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)


Dover, Denshore
Latham, Michael
Robinson, Peter (Belfast East)


du Cann, Ri Hon Edward
Lawrence Ivan
Rost, Peter


Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Lawson, Nigel
Royle, Sir Anthony


Durant, Tony
Lee, John
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy


Dykes, Hugh
Lester, Jim (Beeston)
St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon Norman


Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutand)
Scott, Nicholas


Edwards, Rt Hon N. (Pembroke)
Lloyd, Ian (Havant &amp; Waterloo)
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Eggar, Timothy
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Elliott, Sir William
Loveridge, John
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Emery, Peter
Luce, Richard
Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge-Br'hills)


Eyre, Reginald
Lyell, Nicholas
Shersby, Michael


Fairbairn, Nicholas
McAdden, Sir Stephen
Silvester, Fred


Fairgrieve, Russell
McCrindle, Robert
Sims, Roger


Faith, Mrs Sheila
Macfarlane, Neil
Skeet, T. H. H.


Farr, John
MacGregor, John
Speed, Keith


Fell, Anthony
MacKay, John (Argyll)
Speller, Tony


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
McNair-Wilson, Michael (Newbury)
Spence, John


Finsberg, Geoffrey
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Sproat, Iain


Fisher, Sir Nigel
McQuarrie, Albert
Squire, Robin


Fletcher, Alexander (Edinburgh N)
Madel, David
Stainton, Keith


Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
Major, John
Stanbrook, Ivor


Fookes, Miss Janet
Marland, Paul
Stanley, John


Forman, Nigel
Marlow, Tony
Steen, Anthony


Fraser, Rt Hon H. (Stafford &amp; St)
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)
Stevens, Martin


Fraser, Peter (South Angus)
Mates, Michael
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Fry, Peter
Mather, Carol
Stewart, John (East Renfrewshire)


Galbraith, Hon T. G. D.
Mawby, Ray
Stokes, John


Gardiner, Georgs (Reigate)
Mawhinney, Dr Brian
Stradling Thomas, J.


Gardner, Edward (South Fylde)
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Tapsell, Peter


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Mayhew, Patrick
Taylor, Robert (Croydon NW)


Gilmour, Rt Hon Sir Ian
Mellor, David
Tebbit, Norman


Goodhart, Philip
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Temple-Morris, Peter


Goodhew, Victor
Miller, Hal (Bromsgrove &amp; Redditch)
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter (Hendon S)


Goodlad, Alastair
Mills, Iain (Meriden)
Thompson, Donald


Gow, Ian
Mills, peter (West Devon)
Thorne, Nell (Ilford South)


Gower, Sir Raymond
Miscampbell, Norman
Thornton, Malcolm


Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Gray, Hamish
Moate, Roger
Townsend, Cyril D. (Bexleyheath)


Greenway, Harry
Monro, Hector
Trippier, David


Grieve, Percy
Montgomery, Fergus
Trotter, Neville


Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St Edmunds)
Moore, John
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Griffiths, Peter (Portsmouth N)
Morris, Michael (Northampton, Sth)
Vaughan, Dr Gerard


Grist, Ian
Morrison, Hon Charles (Devizes)
Viggers, Peter


Grylls, Michael
Morrison, Hon Peter (City of Chester)
Waddington, David


Gummer, John Selwyn
Mudd, David
Wakeham, John


Hamilton, Hon Archie (Eps'm&amp;Ew'll)
Murphy, Christopher
Waldegrave, Hon. William


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Myles, David
Walker, Bill (Perth &amp; E Perthshire)


Hampson, Dr Keith
Neale, Gerrard
Walker-Smith, Rt Hon Sir Derek


Hannam, John
Needham, Richard
Wall, Patrick


Haselhurst, Alan
Nelson, Anthony
Waller, Gary


Hastings, Stephen
Neubert, Michael
Ward, John


Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael
Newton, Tony
Warren, Kenneth


Hawkins, Paul
Nott, Rt Hon John
Watson, John


Hawksley, Warren
Onslow, Cranley
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Hayhoe, Barney
Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs Sally
Wells, Bowen (Hert'rd &amp; Stev'nage)


Heath, Rt Hon Edward
Osborn, John
Wheeler, John







Whitney, Raymond
Williams, Delwyn (Montgomery)
TELLERS FOR THE NOES


Wickenden, Keith
Winterton, Nicholas
Mr. Spencer Le Marchant and


Wiggin, Jerry
Wolfson, Mark
Mr. Anthony Berry.


Wilkinson, John
Young, Sir George (Acton)

Question accordingly negatived.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I beg to move amendment No. 6, in page 1, line 6, leave out "the" and insert "a".

The Second Deputy Chairman: With this we may discuss the following amendments:
No. 7, in page 1, line 6, after "day", insert
not less than six months after the passing of this Act".
No. 35 in clause 2, page 2, line 8, after "constitution", insert
but no provision to elect the Senate, House of Assembly, President or member of the Executive shall be brought into force within 6 months of the Royal Assent to this Act".

Mr. Lyon: These amendments involve the second major item that we wish to raise on the Bill. Amendment No. 7 seeks to ensure that there will be a period of six months before an election. It is not phrased in such terms because the amendment could not be drafted in that way. The six months applies to the period between the passing of the Bill and the introduction of an independence Bill. The amendment is designed to provide six months for preparing for an election.
During the negotiations the Goverment argued that two months should be allowed after the introduction of the Governor. I understand that proposals at Lancaster House are that the two months might apply after a ceasefire, on the understanding that the ceasefire would be dictated by the warring parties and that that might spin out the time.
From the morning newspapers I understand that the Government might be prepared to wait a little longer than two months but not as long as six months. There is room for compromise at Lancaster House. None of us wishes to be too hard about the exact figure. Nevertheless, it is clear to my hon. Friends and me that the original Government proposal for two months is too short for mounting an election in Rhodesia following an agreement. We hope that the Goverment will indicate that they are prepared to be more flexible about the timetable.
I shall spell out the difficulties. The Muzorewa Government in Rhodesia have experienced an election already this year. The election took place on a popular roll in a national list for Africans, although whites were sub-divided into constituencies. The only acceptable way to conduct an election in any country which gives fair weight to each man's vote is to use constituencies where the numbers are roughly equivalent. The proper way to conduct an election is to use a register of voters and to divide the country into constituencies in the normal way. The Government have refused to accede to that request, and the indication is that they propose that the election be carried out in circumstances similar to those in May.
7.30 pm
One difficulty is that there is no way of ensuring that people normally resident in an area vote in that area and reflect the pattern of assent to candidates from that area. As in May, it is likely that there will be much shifting about. The result will be that in some areas more than the number registered will vote, which is the sort of nonsense that occurred in May and which is totally unsatisfactory.
Nevertheless, in order to try to reach a compromise the Patriotic Front has agreed to accept the popular roll and the national list. In the previous debate Conservative Members suggested that the Patriotic Front was dragging its heels for surreptitious reasons. I hope that they will recognise that major concession by the Patriotic Front and that its request for a longer period before the election should be given credit.
The Muzorewa Government have had control of the press, television, radio and other means of communication in Rhodesia. They have established a pattern of organisation for their respective parties, and in the villages they have placed their people to act as party functionaries. It is fair to say that the Patriotic Front has also had guerrillas in rural areas concerned with political education. It has that rudimentary organisation, but it cannot acquire the apparatus for fighting an election without being


allowed at least some weeks. It needs to set up an office and officials, attend to the installation of telephones and set up the normal apparatus for a national election before that election could be considered free and fair. In addition, it will need to establish organisations for publicising its programmes. Neither the Salisbury nor the Bulawayo newspapers will give the Patriotic Front the type of coverage that they will provide for the whites and the Muzorewa regime.
All that will require time, and I urge that some period is allowed, at least before the election proper, for that degree of preparation. If the Government insist on two months for the election proper, there should be a sufficiently long preparatory period.
In addition, in a short time it will be the rainy season, and there will be acute geographical difficulties in running an election campaign then. It would be easier to organise such things as transport in the drier season and after a period of preparation. That is a further reason for allowing the Patriotic Front a period to gain equality in the task of presenting its case. If the Government do not grant that, there must be a suspicion—which has already been voiced—that they want a rigged election in which the Muzorewa Government would win by concealment and trickery. The Patriotic Front would not be able to put its message across clearly and gain approval of its policies on a free and democratic basis. That suspicion is not entirely removed when considering what happened in May.
A group of Conservative politicians went to Rhodesia during the election, and the Prime Minister relies heavily on its report which said that the election was free and fair. It is interesting to note, however, that Pratap Chitnis visited Rhodesia on behalf of the all-party group in the House and prepared a document which is available in the Library. His conclusions were:
1. These elections should be discounted in any Government policy decisions about Rhodesia. It was not a valid test of opinion and its results are meaningless.
2. Free and fair elections cannot be held in Rhodesia under the present circumstances. For there to be a true test of black opinion there would need to be a ceasefire, which would of necessity presuppose the participation in the

election of the Patriotic Front, significant demilitarisation, the lifting of press and other censorship to allow a free political climate and impartial supervision by the United Nations, this would involve not simply observers but a UN peacekeeping force.
Before going into the reasons for that conclusion, I give way to the hon. Member for Barry (Sir R. Gower).

Sir Raymond Gower: Why does the hon. Gentleman weaken his case by regularly betraying an animus against Bishop Muzorewa? He always refers to the Muzorewa regime as something less worthy than the Patriotic Front. That is an astonishing slant in his remarks which I cannot understand.

Mr. Lyon: On two occasions I have strayed into calling it the Muzorewa Government. I resile from that because they are not a legal Government, and the Government of the hon. Member for Barry have not recognised it as a legal Government. A prerequisite for these negotiations was that the Muzorewa regime abandon the concept of a Government and give up the pretence that they were a legally-ordered Government.
I am not seeking to prejudge the attitude of the Muzorewa regime, but the report of Pratap Chitnis indicates the defects in the May election and draws our attention to how that could be improved. For instance:
a garage in Mount Pleasant, Salisbury, which employs around fifteen black workers received a visit from the security forces who said that they had heard that the employees did not want to vote and were being 'unco-operative'. The employees denied this but were told to expect a visit from UANC"—
that is the Muzorewa party—
auxiliaries. The auxiliaries visited the garage on April 16th and told the employees to be ready to go to vote at 9.30 a.m. the next morning. At 9.30 a.m. the next morning (day one of polling) all were taken to the polling station by their employer.
No one could argue that that is an ingredient of the free and fair exercise of a vote. It is significant because the intimidation came from the security forces, which are the very forces that the Government want to run the country under Government supervision during the election. That clearly must not be allowed to happen.
Although hon. Members may not accept the totality of the report, I hope that individual incidents will be accepted


as evidence of an unsatisfactory situation. I believe that Pratap Chitnis relates them in good faith. To ensure that similar incidents do not take place during the election, it must be made plain that the security force that takes control of Rhodesia is completely unbiased and fair. It must ensure that the degree of intimidation which inevitably takes place in African elections is reduced to the minimum. That duty must not be carried out by the security forces of the Muzorewa regime or the Patriotic Front.
That can happen only if there is a substantial force in operation ready to ensure that nobody disturbs the peace during the election campaign. That force cannot be assembled overnight and it will not be in position for a substantial period. It minimises the amount of time available for normal campaigning if only two months are allowed after the advent of the Governor. I could understand it if the Government agreed not to send the Governor until after the rainy season, and the limit was two months from that time.
The Government's case for getting the Bill on the statute book even before an agreement is that they wish to send a Governor immediately. They do not wish to wait for two hours while we debate the matter because the Governor must catch the plane as soon as the Patriotic Front says "Yes". It has until Wednesday to say "Yes", and the two months limit will then begin. The Government may not know anything about Rhodesia, but they know what it would mean if there were no election machinery in Britain.
To attempt to set up an election in two months is impossible. If that period is to be pressed by the Government, as it has been hitherto in the negotiations at Lancaster House, the only inference that can be drawn is that they do not wish the Patriotic Front to have a fair chance of winning the election. If that is the position, it will not be accepted by the international community.

Dr. Edmund Marshall: I add a few arguments to those of my hon. Friend the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon), relating the length of the transitional period to the fairness of the election as a whole.
I must complain that there has been precious little heard from Government spokesmen on what form the elections will take. I hope that the Under-Secretary will use the opportunity of the short debate to tell us more about how the election on the return to legality will be organised. First and foremost, may we have a clear statement whether the elections will be organised on the basis of an electoral roll? Will electors be required to register? My hon. Friend referred to a report made by five senior members of the Conservative Party on the elections held in Rhodesia last April. In paragraph 17 it states:
A national registration of the population is in process but is complete in certain districts only. We were told that the original intention of the Transitional Government had been to conduct the first elections on the basis of a constituency-based electoral roll, but political and Parliamentary delays have left insufficient time for this to be achieved, even by April 1979. Furthermore, it was thought that an electoral roll would allow the guerillas to victimise those who had registered".
We hope that if the elections go ahead on the basis of an agreement achieved at the Lancaster House conference there will not be any intimidation—for example, trying to persuade people not to register or vote. That objection to a form of registration and the issuing of voting cards to individual voters would not apply.
7.45 pm
What progress has been made in the development of a national register? It is only with a proper register that anything like fairness can be approached in democratic elections. There are two major objections to holding elections without any register, such as those held last April. The eight constituencies were called districts, but no one knew how many people were entitled to vote in those districts. No one knew the numerical size of the constituencies. There could be no accurate estimate of how many seats should be allocated to each constituency. It was done on a rough and ready basis of population projections from the appropriate department of the Administration in Salisbury. The result was that in Matabeleland South 51,000 voted to return five Members to the House of Assembly. In Mashonaland West 294,000 voted—nearly six times as many—and they elected only six Members to the Assembly.

Mr. Selwyn Gummer: What about Newcastle, Central?

Dr. Marshall: The hon. Gentleman points out that there is a difference between constituency sizes in this country. At least we know the exact figures. It is easier to iron out the differences when we know the basis on which we are working. In Rhodesia there is no register and it is done by guesswork.

Mr. Buchan: In this country constituency sizes are decided by an independent Boundary Commission, which sometimes takes one or two years to reach a conclusion, let alone two months.

Dr. Marshall: The present redistribution in England has been proceeding since 1976. There are provisional recommendations for only 12 out of 40 counties in England. The matter is dealt with extremely carefully.
To attempt to develop in Rhodesia a system of constituencies when the number of electors is not known is trying to achieve the impossible. It means that it is not possible to get to the position of each vote having an equal weight. That cannot be fair. If there is not a list of electors, voters can cross the constituency boundaries and vote in another constituency. That was done in the elections held last April.
A second report on those elections was made by Mr. John Drinkwater, a member of the Boundary Commission for England. It is significant that he went to Rhodesia in the company of Conservative Members who compiled their own report. Paragraph 48 of his report states that there was bussing of large numbers of voters supporting the United African National Congress, to vote in Mashonaland West where the party managed to obtain a clean sweep of all the six seats in that district. The returns in that district showed a turnout of around 108 per cent. because voters moved into the constituency to build up the support of the UNAC. That is rather as though in Britain at the time of the general election the different political parties persuaded British Rail to lay on special trains to bring large consignments of Labour voters from Yorkshire and Conservative voters from Sussex to vote, for example, in marginal Hertfordshire. Obviously it is not possible to approach fairness when it is not known who the voters are in each constituency.

Mr. Russell Johnston: I ask the hon. Gentleman a simple question that may be considered slightly silly. He has said that it was not known how many voters were in each constituency. If that is so, how was it known that 108 per cent. turned out?

Dr. Marshall: That cannot be explained only on the ground of bussing. A number of other factors could be involved, which Mr. Drinkwater mentions in his report. Before the election was held an attempt was made by the population department of the Salisbury Administration to estimate how many adult voters were in each of the districts. The reference to 108 per cent. is to the total number of votes cast in the district of Mashonaland West as a percentage of the original estimate of the electorate in that district. That demonstrates the difficulties of attempting to produce a fair election in such circumstances.
The only way of arriving at anything approximating to a fair system is to do away with constituencies altogether and to have one national list system covering the whole country—in other words, one constituency. We have not heard whether that is proposed by the Government, or whether they are intending to repeat the form of election that took place last April.
I return to some of the ground that was covered by my hon. Friend the hon. Member for York. A short period for an election puts immense difficulties in the way of candidates who for various reasons have not been able to be close to their people for months or even years. It has been said already that members of the Salisbury delegation attending the conference at Lancaster House have returned home early to start preparing for the elections. In the previous debate it was the hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) who talked about members of the Patriotic Front returning surreptitiously over the border into Zimbabwe to start trying to persuade their colleagues in the villages how they should vote in the elections.
That activity demonstrates how the politically minded in Rhodesia, including those who want to take part in the elections, realise that a lack of time imposes great constraints on the amount of preparation that they may make. Surely


there should be more time available for would-be candidates to put their case across to the electorate.
I hope that we shall receive a clear statement from the Minister about the form that the elections will take. I hope that he will go some way towards accepting that there needs to be a period longer than two months for election preparations, so that the candidates and the others involved will have longer to prepare and so that the elections may be as fair as possible, even within six months.

Mr. Newens: If it is the Government's objective to ensure that the interim period prior to the holding of elections is two months, it is impossible to expect the elections to be carried out fairly and satisfactorily.
Hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber have enormous experience of elections. We must remember that many of the candidates in the elections in Southern Rhodesia will not have been in the constituencies that they are expecting to fight for many years, if at all. Many of them have lived abroad for many years and have been unable to return to their homes. It is ludicrous to expect them to return to their constituencies to fight an election that takes place two months after the conclusion of the conference at Lancaster House.
We all know that it is the custom in Britain to select candidates a long time before a general election takes place. In the interim before the election takes place the candidates nurse constituencies. We know that that is extremely important. We also know that if the constituency contains a large number of voters it is almost impossible to cover the constituency to get the message across. There has been much greater stability in Britain than in Southern Rhodesia, where a civil war has been continuing for a considerable time, and where before that war there was an emergency. There is no real experience or tradition of elections in Southern Rhodesia. Surely it is the height of folly to expect, if anybody does, elections carried out two months after the agreement to be fair or reasonable.
Members of the Patriotic Front who are abroad will be obliged, presumably, to wind up their affairs in the countries in which they are living and to return home.

Presumably they will be expected to make arrangements to stay, to get their money into the area and to arrange for their keep. It may be possible to make those arrangements fairly expeditiously, but the time that it takes will have to be within the two months of which we are speaking. Anyone who seriously expects the proposed procedure to enable members of the Patriotic Front, or other candidates who are abroad, to feel that they have a reasonable chance of winning the election is not facing the facts.
My hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) referred to the media. He rightly said that in the past the press and media have been in the hands of the Muzorewa Administration. It will be necessary to provide a period during which alternative candidates and alternative leaders have the opportunity to put themselves across through the media. That is all the more important when Opposition candidates have been vilified over a considerable period as terrorists and as being responsible for all the difficulties that have occurred as a result of the civil war. Those Patriotic Front members could not possibly be expected to present themselves reasonably to the electorate during a two-month period.
8 pm
Clearly, many disputes will arise in a country where there has been civil war for some time. We have already referred to the possibility of intimidation. One hon. Member on the Government Benches said that he considered that members of the Patriotic Front were anxious to delay the interim period so that intimidation by them would be more successful. If that is so, how much more important it is that we should not rush the elections through within two months. Sufficient time should be given for observers to go to Rhodesia and to establish themselves so that if intimidation occurs on any side it will be clearly exposed.

Mr. Hastings: What I tried to make clear was that intimidation is starting now. What the hon. Member for Harlow (Mr. Newens) is now saying is clearly contrary to what he said on the previous amendments. The intimidation is starting now, and the longer the whole process stretches out the worse it will be.

Mr. Newens: I suspect that what can be described as intimidation may well


take place on both sides. The hon. Member for Mid-Bedfordshire (Mr. Hastings) shakes his head. I cannot believe that he seriously thinks that the Patriotic Front is capable of intimidation but that the Muzorewa supporters would never intimidate. That is nonsense, and we all know it. I am prepared to concede that in present circumstances there may be intimidation by both sides.
We should ensure that observers are able to see exactly what occurs and that the Governor has an opportunity to get to grips with the situation. By doing that the necessary steps can be taken to prevent any undue interference or intimidation.
During the debate on the previous amendment the Lord Privy Seal did not reply to the arguments voiced by Opposition Members. Far from showing any spirit of compromise, he did not even do us the honour of answering our questions. If the conduct of the Lord Privy Seal at the Dispatch Box is an example of the attitude taken by him and his colleagues at Lancaster House, one may be forgiven for not being surprised that there are still many issues outstanding.
The interim period is regarded as a matter of principle by the Patriotic Front. If there is to be any agreement the Government must be prepared to move from their present position of two months. The Government have shown themselves to be most inflexible in their attitude. I hope that the Minister who replies to the debate will direct his attention to the arguments that have been raised. If he really believes that it is possible to arrange an election within two months, I hope that he will say so. Better than that, I hope that he will be prepared to demonstrate some flexibility on the part of the Government, and that the Government themselves will be prepared to agree that the period of two months is unacceptable and will extend it so that elections can take place on a much fairer basis.

Mr. Buchan: I am sorry that the Lord Privy Seal is not present. I understand the difficulties: we all have to eat. However, after the last answer we had I believe that all of us are anxious about remaining discussions on the Bill.
The most important aspect of any election is that it should be accepted by the

electorate as being just and not rigged. I remember what happened in Scotland after the arguments on the famous 40 per cent. figure in the referendum. The only comments that are made about that figure now refer to the fact that people think that the whole thing was rigged and that the rules were changed to obtain a specific result. That is the only reason why the rejection of the referendum has left any bad feeling.

Mr. Tam Dalyell: I may have misunderstood my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrewshire, West (Mr. Buchan), but there is a strong feeling that we should have a Bill on rules for referenda, which is another matter.

Mr. Buchan: The point is that we did not have rules for the referendum. The rules were changed in mid-stream, which is precisely what gave rise to the feeling that the whole thing was rigged. The logic of the decision was very sensible, but changing the rules in mid-stream allowed this charge to be made. That was the point I was making—the cry of "Foul" could be raised. If we leave ourselves in the position of having to conduct an election that arises out of a civil war, it is not a simple question of "Foul" being cried; it could bring about the resurrection of the civil war. Above all else, this election must be accepted by the electorate as fair and just.
In that context we must appeal to the Government. The future of Rhodesia is now very much in their hands. The Government have a majority in the House and they have brought this Bill upon us very quickly. I ask the few Conservative Members who are present to consider carefully what they would be doing if they were to impose a timescale such as this which they know, and we know, is totally absurd. The thought of moving out of civil war and into an election within two months is known to be an absurdity, not only by the Opposition but also by many hon. Members on the Government Benches, and virtually every national and international commentator.
I remind the Committee of previous discussions in the House when a sudden election was sprung upon us during the devolution debates in March this year. It took all of the three to four weeks to


get any kind of electoral machinery into existence.
Large numbers of the population are refugees, concentrated in areas within Rhodesia, or even over the borders of Rhodesia, either for safety or because they are part of the Patriotic Front. There have been huge distortions about the displacement of people in Rhodesia. At least one party in these discussions is in the bush, in the sense that it is conducting a civil war on the side of legitimacy and against the rebel Government in Salisbury. Incidentally, these are the very people who brought this regime to the verge of legitimacy. It is against those people that this amendment would appear to be loaded. I am not saying that it is loaded, but that is what could be construed, which is sufficient to disrupt any consequence of the election.
For that reason, this amendment is one of the two crucial factors of our discussion, as it is in the discussions at the conference. One crucial factor is time, and the other is the question of an acceptable international or Commonwealth force to ensure security during the interim period.
Therefore, this is not an argument for a postponement. It is an argument for saying "For heaven's sake, you and the Government know that it is a nonsense to allocate two months to move out of this civil war". Incidentally, it is very rare for a civil war ever to cease overnight. By its very nature, there will be sporadic events and engagements before communication and proper order can be established. It will not be easy for agreement to be reached at Lancaster House and for a complete cessation to occur within 24 hours.
I was in action six days after the last war finished in Europe. At that time, I was on the borders of Karinthia facing a 100,000 strong group of Ustachi, Croatians and Panzers—mainly Yugoslavian-Balkan quislings who were refusing to surrender—who were trying to burst through Klagenfurt into Austria. That was after the war finished, in the highly organised situation of the Second World War. Action was still going on. It was not a small action. About 100,000 men were in that valley, and all I remember is saying "My God, I am not going to get killed a week after the war is over. I have survived it so far". If that

happens in a highly organised international war, what would be the situation following a guerrilla war?
A period of two months is nonsense, because sporadic actions, problems and incidents will arise long before a Governor's arrival can establish total order throughout the country. Time will be needed to get people back to those areas where they have lived and where they ought to live and vote.
The example was given earlier of a fair, just, acceptable and known electoral list. In the last election in Rhodesia the example was given of a 108 per cent. vote in a district in relation to the population. None of us feels that our electoral list is accurate, despite years of work by an independent Boundary Commission. We know that such a thing cannot be done in two months. It is almost pointless to argue the case, and Conservative Members know that they are asking the impossible. What I am stressing is the consequence of their not openly saying what they know—that this is an impossibility. The time limit should be extended.
I urge the Government to recognise the dangers of what they are doing. If any group at all can credibly cry "Foul", or claim that the election was rigged, the consequence could be another civil war and not merely a complaint in the letters column of The Scotsman, as we had. That is the first important point.
Secondly, we are dealing with a situation that is totally unlike any electoral situation that we have seen. It arises out of a civil war. It must be remembered that people have felt strongly enough about the issue to die. They will not accept easily any infringements of electoral justice. There is no equality of contact with the media. The candidates themselves may be out of the country and may have to return. There will not be a normal broadcasting service which is structured in the same way as our own. Incidentally, our broadcasting service took many months to work out codes of conduct for dealing with elections. All these things must be done. There is also the problem of literature, because there are many areas of illiteracy.
The Minister knows that he is asking an impossibility. I beg him to see the consequences of not facing up to all these problems. There are already accusations of intimidation. There will be the same


accusations and no doubt the reality of intimidation during the short space of two months because people will also be afraid. They would be afraid of the knowledge that it was not so long ago that they stepped out of a war to which they could return. Intimidation in those circumstances can be terrifying indeed.
8.15 pm
I have looked at the report of the British Parliamentary Human Rights Group, consisting of Lord Avebury, Liberal peer; Bruce Grocott, former Labour Member of Parliament; and the hon. Member for Woolwich, West (Mr. Bottomley), Conservative. That makes interesting reading in relation to the last election. There is one small fact relating to domestic servants. The report stated:
According to Government figures in 1979 there were 120,000 domestic servants in Rhodesia, many of whom had never been in their employers' cars in their lives, who were told that they were ready to take everybody to vote. A religious sister told us that she had talked to some domestic servants who had not wanted to vote but who had been given no choice by their employers.
That is a major factor in the most highly organised areas of Rhodesia, and it is a factor that will remain. Tom Driberg used to tell the story of a motor car turning up at a rural polling station in the Home Counties. Two old ladies stepped out of the car and asked the polling officer "Where do servants go to vote for Sir Charles Napier?" They were expecting to be directed to a back door and had been taken there having been told who to vote for.
As to the role of the security forces, accusations are being made about intimidation by the Patriotic Front. However, the report says that there is evidence of intimidation by the security forces. This is the situation in which we shall try to make some attempt at legitimising the elections along Western democratic lines. This cannot be done within two months, and I doubt whether the Government believe that it can be done. I urge them to accept the amendment relating to six months. If they cannot, they should accept an interim period of four or five months. That, backed by the acceptance of a security force, is the only way in which we shall make this conference stick if agreement is reached. I urge the Government to think again.

Mr. Russell Johnston: I wish to make only a short contribution.
One of the main arguments against the Government introducing this enabling legislation at the stage that they did is illustrated by what has happened in regard to this amendment and what will happen in relation other amendments. Inevitably, we enter into a discussion of matters that are still under negotiation and about which no decission has been reached. Therefore, I do not believe that the Minister is in any position to accept an amendment that is equivalent to the Patriotic Front's position.
That does not necessarily mean that within the negotiations the Government may not reach the conclusion that that would be a proper course to take, but it is not a course that they can be expected to take this evening. In many ways that is most unfortunate. As has been said on many occasions, by bringing this legislation forward much earlier than they ought, the Government have forced us into this situation. The hon. Member for Renfrewshire, West (Mr. Buchan) set out many of the difficulties, most of which we shall not overcome, even given the most favourable wind in Rhodesia in the search for a fair electoral process.
I want to ask only one question and make only one statement. It seems to me that one of the fundamental factors in trying to avoid intimidation in so far as we can—although there will be intimidation—is the secrecy of the ballot and the trust that people have in it. They want to be sure that the ballot will not be interfered with after it has been cast. They want to be assured that no one will know which way they vote so that they will not be subject to intimidation.
If the Minister takes the opportunity to say something about the Government's thinking on this matter, it might be to the advantage of us all. I do not ask the Government to lay down a specified time, because I hope that they will be flexible in this regard. They should not be rigid. They should consider the strong arguments for looking again at the eight-week period which they apparently propose.

Mr. Ioan Evans: I support what was said by my hon. Friend the Member for


York (Mr. Lyon) in moving the amendment. The transitional arrangements requested by the Patriotic Front deserve on merit to be considered sympathetically.
Next November the people of the United States will elect a president. Already the presidential campaign has started to select a candidate. Therefore the people of the United States have 12 months in which to shape up for an election.
It may be argued that in Britain we have four weeks for elections to the House of Commons. It could be a minimum of three weeks. However, in the well-established democracy of this country the elections start well before the date of the election campaign. In the constituencies the prospective parliamentary candidates are selected one, two or three years in advance. The candidates may then make themselves known to their constituents. Although there is an announcement that the election will take place in three weeks' time, there is a long period leading up to it.
In Southern Rhodesia there is an incumbent Administration, and a well-established party with Ian Smith at its head has been in power for 14 years or more. A new party, which has been campaigning for recognition, has established itself up to a point. There has been resistance to the established regime by a group of people who have spent the best part of this period in prison or in concentration camps. They have been compelled to lead the resistance to the regime from outside the country.
The Bill says that a Governor and observers will go in to observe the election, but apparently there will be no registration of electors. The Bill also says that the change from the existing to a democratic system will take place within eight weeks. That is a physical impossibility. Since 1965 both Conservative and Labour Members of Parliament have not recognised the illegal regime in Rhodesia. In addition, it has not been recognised by other countries. People who have stood by the Government of this country say that they are prepared to return and to campaign for election, but if the Government insist on a two-month rule they will place those inside the country at an advantage compared with those at present outside it.

Mr. Gwilym Roberts: Does my hon. Friend agree it is surprising that the Patriotic Front has been prepared to agree to six months? Does he agree that even with a six-month period there is no question of solving all the problems of intimidation, finding out who is entitled to vote and enabling the maximum number of people to vote? The only advantage of a six-month period as compared with a two-month period is that some of the problems will at least be considerably reduced.

Mr. Evans: I agree with my hon. Friend that not only should political justice be done, but that it should be seen to be done. It will certainly not be seen to be done if the election is rushed.
If we are to establish a Government in Rhodesia we should try to create a neutral political situation there in which the electorate can consider the varying points of view put forward by the political Parties emerging in the campaign and be free to choose. We find that a three-week campaign in this country is too short. How is it possible for a short campaign to take place in a country in which people are living in primitive conditions and where there are not the sophisticated media that we have in this country?
I am glad that my hon. Friend the Member for York is to persist with the amendment. I hope that the arguments put to the Government in Lancaster House will be considered and that they will not persist in the ultimatum for an unconditional surrender, which was virtually put to the Patriotic Front. If the people of Rhodesia come together and there is a ceasefire, there will be a democratic campaign in the country and all parties involved in the election will accept the result. However, if the election is rushed through, that will be to the advantage of the present Government in Rhodesia and to the disadvantage of the Opposition. That will be seen by the United Nations and the Commonwealth as an unfair procedure leading up to the election.

Mr. Eric Deakins: In considering the amendments it would be helpful if the Minister could clarify two points. First, will he confirm that the sequence of events is as follows: an agreement at Lancaster House, followed


by a ceasefire on the ground, followed by the arrival of the British Governor, followed by elections, followed by the appointed day? That is not a trick question. Presumably the information is known to the Minister. I should be grateful if he would confirm, or otherwise, that that is the case.
Secondly, will he say from what particular event the electoral period will begin? The amendments argue about a period of six months. The Government want two months. I am not concerned to argue about that now. Will the period begin from the agreement at Lancaster House, from the ceasefire, or from the arrival of the British Governor?

Mr. Edward Rowlands: The Minister should be more than impressed with the speeches made by the Opposition about the practicalities of the artificial time limit of two months imposed upon the period of electioneering, on which the Government insist. They speak with obvious total understanding as professionals—as we all are—on the question of electioneering. The practical issues that were raised by the Opposition should not be dismissed lightly or easily, as they apply with varying degrees to the situation that would exist in Rhodesia at the time of an election.
There is also the difficulty, if not the absurdity, of the way in which the Bill was brought forward and the lack of information and proper documentation available to the House. All Members have assumed in their speeches that there is before the Committee a document stipulating that the Government are laying down a two-month period. That is just not so. There is no document before the Committee which lays down the Government proposal for a two-month period. All we have are snippets of gossip, the odd replies to supplementary questions and one or two throw-away lines in the debate.
The only official document that has been offered to the House governing the whole period of the pre-independence arrangements is the document that was put into the Library and embodies the proposals that were put before the conference on 2 November. The paragraph relating to the whole of this debate is paragraph 10, which does not even mention a time limit. It says that the

interim period must not be excessively protracted".
I think that we can all agree with that.
It says that it
must allow all the political parties adequate time to put their case to the people of Rhodesia.
That is exactly the burden of the case advanced by Opposition Members.
8.30 pm
The document goes on to say:
The longer the interim period lasts before the people of Rhodesia are given the chance to decide their political future for themselves, the greater will be the period of political uncertainty
—and so on. Then it says:
It is in the interests of the people of Zimbabwe that they should be enabled to choose their future leaders as soon as is reasonably possible.
What has been argued by Opposition Members is that the phrase:
as soon as is reasonably possible
certainly does not mean two months. In no document that has been put to the Committee or the House have the Government justified the case for a two-month period. This was the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Waltham Forest (Mr. Deakins), which I also wish to raise shortly. It is a bull point in respect of the amount of information available to us.
We have no clear statement of the time scale in which the Government are operating and to which the debate is related. My hon. Friend the Member for Waltham Forest asked about the time scale. When considering the deadline, the rundown to the date of the election, does the clock start from the time of the agreement at Lancaster House, the moment when white smoke, or something, goes up there to say "There is an agreement"? Is it two months from that moment that there should be an election? Is it two months from a ceasefire agreement being announced at Lancaster House? Is that the starting date of the election period? Is it to be two months from the time that the Governor first puts his toes on Rhodesian soil? Is that the time from which the two-month countdown begins? Or is it to begin from some time after his arrival and after a period of the handing over of the Administration? These are all perfectly reasonable and legitimate questions in


the context of a debate on the time limits of the run-up to this election.
There is not one document before the Committee which clarifies or elaborates this matter. We have only the answers to a few supplementary questions. That is the absurdity into which the Committee has been placed as a result of the way in which the Bill has been brought forward and handled. The Committee has been kept wholly in the dark on the issues, except for snippets of gossip and our own bits of intelligence that we have gathered.
Yet it is clear—this is the sad thing about the whole process—that the issue of the length of the transitional period has become a major stumbling block in the process of negotiations and agreement. It is not that this is a secondary issue or one that can, sooner or later, be knocked about and decided. From snippets of information from the media and our own information, it has become a major stumbling block.

Mr. Gwilym Roberts: Does not my hon. Friend agree that this is a major issue because if the elections are to be in any way fair, to give any chance to organisations such as the Patriotic Front, against which the odds weigh so heavily, a reasonable period is essential?

Mr. Rowlands: I shall be making that point shortly. I was saying, however, that it is a major stumbling block, for whatever reason. We have had a totally inadequate explanation from the Government as to why they are sticking to the two-month period and from which point that period shall start. We demand clarification and a decent explanation from the Minister.
Among many of the things that we should like to raise is the time scale on which it would be possible to implement a ceasefire. My hon. Friend the Member for Renfrewshire, West (Mr. Buchan) made some very telling points based upon completely different experiences but which, nevertheless, revealed the nature of the problems of a ceasefire. It is nonsense to believe that, because a paper is signed at Lancaster House, overnight a ceasefire will take place. Mines which have been laid in paths or roads in circumstances very different from those in which an agreement may be reached cannot suddenly be removed.
A guerrilla campaign or a campaign involving liberation forces operating from two separate countries, often involved in complementary but separate operations, cannot suddenly be halted in hours or days. It takes time for a ceasefire, having been agreed, to be implemented. The members of one of the parties at the conference made the point that a ceasefire cannot be arranged and the war ended overnight.
Does the two-months period proposed by the Government start from a ceasefire declaration or from its implementation? If so, do they not underestimate the major practical problems referred to by my hon. Friend the Member for Renfrewshire, West, which are applicable to this situation?
From what we understand of the Government's thinking about the lead into the election—the pre-election preparations—we should ask ourselves whether two months is a feasible time scale. We should consider what has to be done to clear the decks in order to establish not only free and fair elections, but the pre-conditions. I refer not to the electioneering period, but the period before that.
My hon. Friends have made a host of practical points about registration, how we can ensure that there is no fraud, double voting, bussing and so on. In view of what I have gleaned from the discussions that have gone on during the past two or three weeks on the process of preparing for the elections—laying down the pre-conditions for free and fair elections—we should ask ourselves whether that, too, makes nonsense of the two-month time scale
I should like to draw attention to paragraph 32 of the pre-independence arrangements document. No one has so far mentioned this point. This concerns registration not only of voters, but of political parties. Paragraph 32 states:
The Governor will fix a date not less than four and not more than six weeks before the elections on which political parties wishing to contest the elections should apply for registration, name each electoral district for which they wish to be registered and provide a list of the candidates whom they wish to nominate for each electoral district.
That must be done within two weeks of the date set for the beginning of the two-month election period. Again, it will depend when the two-month period starts.


The arrangement is that parties must register, name each electoral district for which they wish to be registered and provide a list of candidates whom they wish to nominate for each electoral district. In other words, they have to go through selection procedures of one kind or another. I do not know how the Patriotic Front, Mr. Sithole or Bishop Muzorewa organise their selection procedures, but those parties which have not been inside the country—and the Patriotic Front has been outside—are expected to comply with all those conditions in a period not less than four and not more than six weeks before the election. They have only two weeks to carry out the whole of this operation. I ask Conservative Members, who will presumably support the Government, whether they think that is a reasonable proposal.

Mr. Buchan: Would they do it here?

Mr. Rowlands: I do not know. The Conservative Party moves in mysterious ways. Certainly, the Labour Party would he incapable of organising its selection processes within such a short time. Conservative selection processes, according to what I have heard, are even more prolonged. The wives of candidates are asked to turn up and there are various other tests of social acceptability. By any standards, let alone those in a war-torn country such as Zimbabwe, the provisions of paragraph 32 of this document cannot be complied with in an election period of only two months.
That paragraph deals with only one aspect of the run-up to an election period. There is provision elsewhere in the document, for the establishment of an election council. All the parties have to be represented in a full-scale election council, to make sure that the whole operation will be reasonable, fair and impartial. We wholeheartedly support the concept of an election council but a good deal of work is involved. It has first to meet and arrange its procedures and to work out proper guidelines for the conduct of the election, to ensure that it is free and fair. That must surely be done before any election period can properly be said to begin. It cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be done in a matter of days.
From what point is the two-month election campaign to begin? Is it to be from

the time when the conference finishes in London? Is it to be from the date when the Governor first puts his foot on Rhodesian soil?
Apart from arranging and implementing the ceasefire, there will be a host of practical problems of all kinds, such as the return and resettlement of refugees. The document to which I have referred quite rightly states that those outside the country will have every right to return and to involve themselves in the election. We are dealing here not only with the leaders but with the thousands of young people who for one reason or another have fled the country and are living in Mozambique, Zambia or Botswana.
Anyone who has talked, as I have, with refugees in the camps in Francis-town in Botswana, or who has seen the refugee camps in Zambia or Mozambique, will know how much work will be involved in the process of returning refugees. These refugees are as much entitled to play a part in determining the future of an independent Zimbabwe as are any of those who have stayed behind, or any European voters. The thousands of refugees have to get back to the regions in which they have previously lived. It is not simply a matter of crossing the border but of returning to the home village or town and then being able to take part in the processes of an election.
At what point is the Governor to declare that these thousands of refugees have made a successful return to their home areas? If, as a young man of 18 or 19, I had left my home to fight for my freedom, and later found myself in a camp in Botswana, Mozambique or Zambia. I would not feel in any way obligated to accept the decision of the electorate if I had not been enabled to get home in time to vote or to be involved in the electioneering process. Those who have fought the war—their kinsmen and fellow comrades—are entitled to vote in the election. That will take weeks to organise. It makes nonsense of the two-month period.
The protected villages have been secured by the existing Rhodesian security forces. Is the protected village to be dismantled and freedom of movement introduced in and out of those villages so that people can take part in the elections?


My hon. Friend the Member for Harlow (Mr. Newens) made the point about the problem of installing Commonwealth observers. Even the Government, I believe, accept that this will not be simply a polling day exercise. The Commonwealth observers have to be organised, introduced and brought into the process from the beginning. They have to be involved in the run-up to the election and in election day itself. It will take time to organise those observers. Is the two-month period to start from the time that the Commonwealth observers arrive? Or is the intention that they should turn up in the middle of a two-month election period?
8.45 pm
All these matters fall within the hand-over period during which the Governor assumes the responsibility and administration of this territory. This involves a period of many weeks. It is vital to know whether this will be inside or outside the two-month period.
Our basic point is that conditions for free and fair elections have to be established. There should be decent opportunity for all parties to prepare to organise themselves and to persuade the electorate that they are right. This Committee should be zealous and vigilant in trying to ensure that those conditions are well and truly met. As the Committee is not to take the point that there should be a referendum or some alternative test of acceptibility for the whole of these arrangements, an integral part of the establishment of the fifth principle, besides agreement at the Lancaster House conference, will be the elections themselves.
It was argued by some Conservative Members that the last elections involved observance of the fifth principle. We did not agree. Nor, fortunately, did the Conservative Party. But the next set of elections, in the context for which we are hoping, will be taken as an integral test of the fifth principle, that the whole operation is acceptable to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole. It is therefore doubly important that these elections are conducted in free and fair conditions. A two-month period for electioneering may seem reasonable in normal circumstances. But the circumstances in which Zimbabwe votes in its first independent elections are anything but normal.
The situation is, sadly, abnormal. We are discussing the prospect of trying to organise free and fair elections following a bitter civil war. We are talking about the prospect of organising free and fair elections when one of the parties is external to the territory. Its leaders are outside the country. They have been either banned or compelled to live outside the country for many years. One party has had the total and exclusive right to administer the country, to run and control the media, and to organise itself for a year and more, and it has had a dummy run with one set of elections already. That contrasts with the other party which has had none of these opportunities and has been excluded from the process and compelled to live for the most part outside the country.
It is very sensible and reasonable that, given the circumstances, there should be a real and proper opportunity for the other parties to organise, to construct formal civil party organisations and to get their points across in both the towns and the countryside—in other words, to have their chance to take part in free and fair elections. We must ensure that the electoral dice are not loaded against one party in this process. It behoves us, therefore, clearly to recognise that, given 14 years of UDI, given a civil war, given the exclusion of key political figures and given the state of affairs in the countryside and in the towns in Rhodesia, two months is totally inadequate for all the parties to organise and prepare themselves for free and fair elections. That is why the Opposition intend to press the amendment to a Division.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (Mr. Richard Luce): The discussions have concentrated on two amendments out of the three in this group, Nos. 7 and 35, which focus on the duration of the pre-independence period.
As the Committee can imagine, this is a very important problem which has been and is being discussed fully at Lancaster House. A number of very important matters have been raised by Opposition Members, and it would not be right to say that the Government underestimate the importance of the issue. It is important and, as I say, it has formed an important part of the discussions on the pre-independence arrangements. As


the Committee probably knows, these discussions have been going on now for about three weeks.
On Second Reading, my right hon. Friend and I sought to explain the reasons for our proposal about the timing of the pre-independence period. I should like to expand a little on this, dealing especially with Her Majesty's Government's thinking about the timing. After that, I shall attempt to pick up the specific arguments advanced by Opposition Members.
I ask the Committee to consider this very important factor. We are trying to reconcile two very significant and important problems. The first is that, because of the long-lasting war, the position is extremely fragile. As everyone has acknowledged both in this debate and in the House last Thursday, there is a great deal of mistrust. We have said many times that we hope to reach agreement with all the parties. But whatever the agreement we reach, no one in his senses will deny that any agreement which leads to a casefire is bound to be exceedingly fragile, and a very important factor in our minds is that the longer we leave this, the more fragile it becomes and the more likely that it will be difficult to fulfil the objective which we all want to see attained—free and fair elections.
We have to reconcile that very important responsibility which we are taking on with the essential criterion that we must provide conditions which enable all the parties to have a free and fair opportunity to participate in the elections. We have to take those two factors into account and try to reconcile them.

Dr. Edmund Marshall: Does not the very fragility of the present position require that there should be a period of healing? If there were such a period, there would be an opportunity for consolidation and for the country to return to normal rather than become more fragile.

Mr. Luce: It is difficult to decide how to reconcile those two factors and the appropriate time needed. Although I disagree about the specific period, I agree with those hon. Members who have said that it is essential to provide conditions for free and fair elections. The Government believe that those conditions

can be provided within that period. The only basis for stability for the black and white people of Rhodesia is to enable them to make their choice of Government as quickly as possible. The hon. Members for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands), for York (Mr. Lyon) and for Harlow (Mr. Newens) have said that the Government have shown no flexibility. However, when we started discussions on the pre-independence period we suggested that the basis of those discussions should be a period of two months from the conclusion of the conference.
Let us assume that there is an agreement between all the parties. The period would last for two months from that time until the election. The hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil is saying "It is not in this document"—

Mr. Rowlands: It is not.

Mr. Luce: However, my right hon. and noble Friend the Foreign Secretary has proposed to the conference at Lancaster House that the run up to the election should be two months from the date at which the ceasefire comes into operation. The hon. Member for Waltham Forest (Mr. Deakins) raised that important point. We have shown flexibility, and I ask hon. Members to consider that seriously.

Mr. Buchan: That is an important statement, and I welcome the hon. Gentleman's remarks so far. How will he define the commencement of a ceasefire? Will it be linked to the arrival of the Governor?

Mr. Luce: As we said last Thursday, our objective, after we have secured all-party agreement, is that the Governor will arrive as soon as possible after the agreement on the ceasefire.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The Under-Secretary has said that the Governor will arrive after an agreement to the ceasefire. The Patriotic Front has an incentive to delay that date until it has consolidated its organisation within the country. If the ceasefire were not to take place until four months after the signing of an agreement at Lancaster House, would not the Governor go to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia for four months? If so that would make nonsense of introducing this Bill.

9 pm

Mr. Luce: The Committee will not expect me to go into great detail about the discussions which are continuing on the pre-independence arrangements, or to anticipate the precise details that are worked out, as we hope they will be very shortly, concerning the ceasefire arrangements. As hon. Members will be aware, we have not yet reached the discussions on the ceasefire. We hope very shortly to secure agreement on the pre-independence arrangements which will then lead to a detailed discussion on the ceasefire.
I was answering a specific point about when the Governor would go out. At this stage I shall seek only to reiterate that our plan and our intention is that as soon as a ceasefire is agreed we should like the Governor to proceed to that country.

Mr. Rowlands: The Under-Secretary has just made the situation worse. There is even more reason now for us to be worried and concerned about the two-months period. The hon. Gentleman is now saying that the two-month period begins before the arrival of the Governor, before the establishement of the election council, before the observers arrive, and even before any handing over of administration to the Governor.

Mr. Luce: The Committee is getting a little confused, and I do not blame it. We are still embroiled in detailed negotiation, and I understand why these matters are difficult to follow. I was specifically asked when the Governor would arrive. A further point concerned the duration of the period between the conclusion of the agreement and the final election.
The Governor will arrive after the ceasefire agreement is reached at Lancaster House. That is an important point. As for the period between the Lancaster House agreement being reached and the holding of the election, I tried to explain that our thinking had adjusted in the last two or three weeks to there being a two-month period after the implementation of the ceasefire. The Committee will naturally realise that there will be a period of time—which has to be discussed—between the agreement on and the implementation of the ceasefire.
I have endeavoured to give the Committee as full a picture as I can in the

circumstances and I wish to do justice to other points that have been raised. The hon. Member for Goole (Dr. Marshall) raised the question of registration. Later, under amendment No. 28, the Committee will have the opportunity to raise the issue more fully. We have looked into this matter very carefully and it would take an exceedingly long time to obtain a proper process of registration. It took Botswana, for example, a year to complete the full process of registration, and we do not see that it is possible in the circumstance of the pre-independence arrangements.
The hon. Members for Harlow and for Merthyr Tydfil asked about the Rhodesian refugees who are living in surrounding countries and what arrangements would be made for them to vote. In paragraph 19 of the pre-independence proposals we have said that the British Government will carry the responsibility of ensuring that these people have an opportunity to vote. Of course, I realise that this point was made in respect of the timing that we have in mind, and obviously we shall have to give the highest priority to making fair arrangements for these people. We have that point very much in mind.
The hon. Member for Inverness (Mr. Johnston) asked about a secret ballot. As he knows, the proposals provide for there to be a British election commissioner—that is one of our salient proposals—who will have a team of British advisers. Our responsibility will be to supervise the election. In that context there will of course be a secret ballot.
The hon. Member for Aberdare (Mr. Evans) spoke of the activities of the Patriotic Front and of unconditional surrender. We are not asking for unconditional surrender from any side. The Government seek compromise from all sides at the Lancaster House talks. It is only through compromise that we will reach agreement.
I reiterate that, on the one hand, the Government attach the highest importance to seeing that this process is carried through with the utmost speed, bearing in mind the fragility of the operation and the major responsibility which the British Government bear. On the other hand, there is the clear need to ensure that the criteria for ensuring that all parties have


a free and fair chance to participate in the elections are taken very fully into account. I assure the Opposition that all the valid points that they have raised have been taken into account by the Government.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: For the reasons indicated by my right hon. Friend, we are not satisfied with that explanation. We wish to vote but we would prefer to vote on amendment No 7 which is the substantive one.

The First Deputy Chairman (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine): Does the hon. Gentleman wish to withdraw amendment No. 6?

Mr. Buchan: On a point of order, Mr. Godman Irvine. Amendment No. 6 is the paving amendment for amendment No. 7. Amendment No. 7 is the substantive amendment.

The First Deputy Chairman: I was about to put amendment No. 6, so perhaps I should proceed on that basis.

Amendment negatived.

Amendment proposed: No. 7, in page 1, line 6, after 'day', insert
not less than six months after the passing of this Act".—[Mr. Alexander W Lyon.]

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 230, Noes 302.

Division No. 100]
AYES
[9.11 pm


Adams, Allen
Dixon, Donald
Johnson, James (Hull West)


Allaun, Frank
Dobson, Frank
Johnson, Walter (Derby South)


Anderson, Donald
Dormand, Jack
Jones, Rt Hon Alec (Rhondda)


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Douglas, Dick
Jones, Barry (East Flint)


Armstrong, Rt Hon Ernest
Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Jones, Dan (Burnley)


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Dubs, Alfred
Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald


Ashton, Joe
Duffy, A. E. P.
Kerr, Russell


Atkinson, Norman (H'gey, Tott'ham)
Dunn, James A. (Liverpool, Kirkdale)
Kilroy-Silk, Robert


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Dunnett, Jack
Kinnock, Neil


Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (Heywood)
Dunwoody, Mrs Gwyneth
Lambie, David


Benn, Rt Hon Anthony Wedgwood
Eadie, Alex
Lamborn, Harry


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Eastham, Ken
Lamond, James


Bidwell, Sydney
Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
Leadbitter, Ted


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Ellis, Raymond (NE Derbyshire)
Leighton, Ronald


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)


Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur (M'brough)
English, Michael
Litherland, Robert


Bradley, Tom
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
Lofthouse, Geoffrey


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Evans, John (Newton)
Lyon, Alexander (York)


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Field, Frank
McCartney, Hugh


Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)
Fitch, Alan
McDonald, Dr Oonagh


Brown, Ron (Edinburgh, Leith)
Flannery, Martin
McGuire, Michael (Ince)


Buchan, Norman
Fletcher, L. R. (Ilkeston)
McKay, Allen (Penistone)


Callaghan, Rt Hon J. (Cardiff SE)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
McKelvey, William


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Ford, Ben
MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor


Campbell, Ian
Forrester, John
Maclennan, Robert


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Foster, Derek
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, Central)


Canavan, Dennis
Fraser, John (Lambeth, Norwood)
McNally, Thomas


Cant, R. B.
Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald
McNamara, Kevin


Carmichael, Neil
Garrett, John (Norwich S)
McWilliam, John


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Magee, Bryan


Cartwright, John
George, Bruce
Marks, Kenneth


Clark, David (South Shields)
Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John
Marshall, David (Gl'sgow, Shettles'n)


Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
Ginsburg, David
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)


Cohen, Stanley
Golding, John
Marshall, Jim (Leicester South)


Coleman, Donald
Graham, Ted
Martin, Michael (Gl'gow, Springb'rn)


Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
Grant, George (Morpeth)
Mason, Rt Hon Roy


Conlan, Bernard
Grant, John (Islington C)
Maxton, John


Cook, Robin F.
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Maynard, Miss Joan


Cowans, Harry
Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)
Meacher, Michael


Cox, Tom (Wandsworth, Tooting)
Hardy, Peter
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert


Crowther, J. S.
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Mikardo, Ian


Cryer, Bob
Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Cunliffe, Lawrence
Haynes, Frank
Miller, Dr M. S. (East Kilbride)


Cunningham, George (Islington S)
Heffer, Eric S.
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)


Cunningham, Dr John (Whitehaven)
Hogg, Norman (E Dunbartonshire)
Morris, Rt Hon Charles (Openshaw)


Dalyell, Tam
Holland, Stuart (L'beth, Vauxhall)
Morton, Barry


Davidson, Arthur
Home Robertson, John
Moyle, Rt Hon Roland


Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)
Homewood, William
Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick


Davies, E. Hudson (Caerphilly)
Hooley, Frank
Newens, Stanley


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Horam, John
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon


Davis, Clinton (Hackney Central)
Howell, Rt Hon Denis (B'ham, Sm H)
O'Halloran, Michael


Davis, Terry (B'rm'ham, Stechford)
Huckfield, Les
O'Neill, Martin


Deaklns, Eric
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley


Dempsey, James
Janner, Hon Greville
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David


Dewar, Donald
John, Brynmor
Palmer, Arthur




Park, George
Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert (A'ton-u-L)
Walker, Rt Hon Harold (Doncaster)


Parker, John
Shore, Rt Hon Peter (Step and Pop)
Watkins, David


Parry, Robert
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)
Weetch, Ken


Pendry, Tom
Silverman, Julius
Wellbeloved, James


Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch (S Down)
Skinner, Dennis
Welsh, Michael


Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)
Soley, Clive
White, Frank R. (Bury &amp; Radcliffe)


Prescott, John
Spearing, Nigel
White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)


Price, Christopher (Lewisham Weal)
Spriggs, Leslie
Whitlock, William


Race, Reg
Stallard, A. W.
Wigley, Dafydd


Richardson, Miss Jo
Stoddart, David
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Roberts, Allan (Bootle)
Stott, Roger
Williams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)


Roberts, Ernest (Hackney North)
Strang, Gavin
Wilson, Rt Hon Sir Harold (Huyton)


Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)
Straw, Jack
Wilson, William (Coventry SE)


Robertson, George
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley
Winnick, David


Robinson, Geoffrey (Coventry NW)
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton West)
Woolmer, Kenneth


Rooker, J. W.
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Roper, John
Thomas, Mike (Newcastle East)
Wright, Shella


Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)
Thomas, Dr Roger Carmarthen)
Young, David (Bolton East)


Rowlands, Ted
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)



Ryman, John
Tinn, James
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Sandelson, Neville
Torney, Tom
Mr. Joseph Dean and


Sever, John
Varley, Rt Hon Eric G.
Mr. Austin Mitchell.


Sheerman, Barry
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)





NOES


Adley, Robert
Cormack, Patrick
Hastings, Stephen


Aitken, Jonathan
Corrie, John
Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael


Alexander, Richard
Costain, A. P.
Hawkins, Paul


Alison, Michael
Cranborne, Viscount
Hawksley, Warren


Ancram, Michael
Critchley, Julian
Hayhoe, Barney


Arnold, Tom
Crouch, David
Heath, Rt Hon Edward


Aspinwall, Jack
Dickens, Geoffrey
Heddle, John


Atkins, Robert (Preston North)
Dorrell, Stephen
Henderson, Barry


Atkinson, David (B'mouth East)
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael


Baker, Nicholas (North Dorset)
Dover, Denshore
Hicks, Robert


Banks, Robert
du Cann, Rt Hon Edward
Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Hill, James


Beith, A. J.
Durant, Tony
Holland, Philip (Carlton)


Bell, Ronald
Dykes, Hugh
Hooson, Tom


Bendall, Vivian
Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Howell, Rt Hon David (Guildford)


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Edwards, Rt Hon N. (Pembroke)
Howell, Ralph (North Norfolk)


Benyon, Thomas (Abingdon)
Eggar, Timothy
Howells, Geraint


Benyon, W. (Buckingham)
Elliott, Sir William
Hunt, David (Wirral)


Best, Keith
Emery, Peter
Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)


Bevan, David Gilroy
Eyre, Reginald
Hurd, Hon Douglas


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Fairbairn, Nicholas
Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)


Biggs-Davison, John
Fairgrieve, Russell
Jessel, Toby


Blackburn, John
Faith, Mrs Sheila
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey


Blaker, Peter
Farr, John
Jopling, Rt Hon Michael


Body, Richard
Fell, Anthony
Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Kaberry, Sir Donald


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Finsberg, Geoffrey
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine


Bottomley, Peter (Woolwich West)
Fisher, Sir Nigel
Kilfedder, James A.


Bowden, Andrew
Fletcher, Alexander (Edinburgh N)
Kimball, Marcus


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Fletcher-Cooke, Charles
King, Rt Hon Tom


Braine, Sir Bernard
Fookes, Miss Janet
Kitson, Sir Timothy


Bright, Graham
Forman, Nigel
Knox, David


Brinton, Tim
Fraser, Rt Hon H. (Stafford &amp; St)
Lamont, Norman


Brittan, Leon
Fraser, Peter (South Angus)
Lang, Ian


Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher
Fry, Peter
Langford-Holt, Sir John


Brooke, Hon Peter
Galbraith, Hon T. G. D.
Latham, Michael


Brotherton, Michael
Gardiner, George (Relgate)
Lawrence, Ivan


Brown, Michael (Brigg &amp; Sc'thorpe)
Gardner, Edward (South Fylde)
Lawson, Nigel


Browne, John (Winchester)
Garel-Jones, Tristan
Lee, John


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Glimour, Rt Hon Sir Ian
Lester, Jim (Beeston)


Bryan, Sir Paul
Goodhart, Phillip
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)


Buck, Antony
Goodhew, Victor
Lloyd, Ian (Havant &amp; Waterloo)


Budgen, Nick
Goodlad, Alastair
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Bulmer, Esmond
Gow, Ian
Loveridge, John


Burden, F. A.
Gower, Sir Raymond
Luce, Richard


Butcher, John
Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)
Lyell, Nicholas


Butler, Hon Adam
Gray, Hamish
McAdden, Sir Stephen


Cadbury, Jocelyn
Greenway, Harry
McCrindle, Robert


Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Grieve, Percy
Macfarlane, Neil


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St Edmunds)
MacGregor, John


Chalker, Mrs Lynda
Griffiths, Peter (Portsmouth N)
MacKay, John (Argyll)


Channon, Paul
Grist, Ian
McNair-Wilson, Michael (Newbury)


Chapman, Sydney
Grylls, Michael
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)


Churchill, W. S.
Gummer, John Selwyn
McQuarrie, Albert


Clark, Dr William (Croydon South)
Hamilton, Hon Archie (Eps'm&amp;Ew'll)
Madel, David


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Major, John


Cockeram, Eric
Hampson, Dr Keith
Marland, Paul


Colvin, Michael
Hannam, John
Marlow, Tony


Cope, John
Haselhurst, Alan
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)







Mates, Michael
Percival, Sir Ian
Stewart, John (East Renfrewshire)


Mather, Carol
Pink, R. Bonner
Stokes, John


Mawby, Ray
Pollock, Alexander
Stradling Thomas, J.


Mawhinney, Dr Brian
Porter, George
Tapsell, Peter


Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Prentice, Rt Hon Reg
Taylor, Robert (Croydon NW)


Mayhew, Patrick
Price, David (Eastleigh)
Tebbit, Norman


Mellor, David
Prior, Rt Hon James
Temple-Morris, Peter


Meyer, Sir Anthony
Proctor, K. Harvey
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter (Hendon S)


Miller, Hal (Bromsgrove &amp; Redditch)
Raison, Timothy
Thompson, Donald


Mills, Iain (Meriden)
Rathbone, Tim
Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)


Mills, Peter (West Devon)
Rees, peter (Dover and Deal)
Thornton, Malcolm


Miscampbell, Norman
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)
Rhodes James, Robert
Townsend, Cyril D. (Bexleyheath)


Moate, Roger
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Trippier, David


Monro, Hector
Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Trotter, Neville


Montgomery, Fergus
Rifkind, Malcolm
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Moore, John
Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey
Vaughan, Dr Gerard


Morgan, Geraint
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
Viggers, peter


Morris, Michael (Northampton, Sth)
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Waddington, David


Morrison, Hon Charles (Devizes)
Robinson, Peter (Belfast East)
Wakeham, John


Morrison, Hon Peter (City of Chester)
Rost, Peter
Waldegrave, Hon, William


Mudd, David
Royle, Sir Anthony
Walker, Bill (Perth &amp; E Perthshire)


Murphy, Christopher
Scott, Nicholas
Walker-Smith, Rt Hon Sir Derek


Myles, David
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Wall, Patrick


Neale, Gerrard
Shelton, William (Streatham)
Waller, Gary


Needham, Richard
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)
Ward, John


Nelson, Anthony
Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge-Br'hills)
Warren, Kenneth


Neubert, Michael
Shersby, Michael
Watson, John


Newton, Tony
Silvester, Fred
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Nott, Rt Hon John
Sims, Roger
Wells, Bowen (Hert'rd &amp; Stev'nage)


Onslow, Cranley
Skeet, T. H. H.
Wheeler, John


Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs Sally
Speed, Keith
Whitney, Raymond


Osborn, John
Speller, Tony
Wickenden, Keith


Page, John (Harrow, West)
Spence, John
Wiggin, Jerry


Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)
Wilkinson, John


Paisley, Rev Ian
Sproat, Iain
Williams, Delwyn (Montgomery)


Parkinson, Cecil
Squire, Robin
Winterton, Nicholas


Parris, Matthew
Stainton, Keith
Wolfson, Mark


Patten, Christopher (Bath)
Stanbrook, Ivor
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Patten, John (Oxford)
Stanley, John



Pattie, Geoffrey
Steen, Anthony
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Pawsey, James
Stevens, Martin
Mr. Spencer Le Marchant and


Penhaligon, David
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)
Mr. Anthony Berry.

Question accordingly negatived.

Mr. Spearing: I beg to move amendment No. 15, in clause 1, page 1, line 18, at end insert
'and shall be subject to affirmative approval by both Houses.'.

The First Deputy Chairman: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments:
No. 14, in page 1, line 17, leave out from 'section' to end of line 18 and insert
'shall be subject to the approval of each House of Parliament'.
No. 16, in page 1, line 18, at end insert
'and shall be subject to negative resolution of both Houses.'.

Mr. Spearing: This is a series of probing amendments which will not detain the Committee unduly. I hope that when the Lord Privy Seal replies to the debate he will be able to explain something that might otherwise be complicated and give rise to some questions later. If he puts the issue on record in a clear way, there

will be no difficulty in following his explanation.
Clauses 2 and 3 contain provisions for Orders in Council to be approved by the House. That is proper, because clause 2 brings in a new constitution and elections. Clause 3 brings in the powers of the Governor and powers of government up to the appointed day. We are told in clause 1 that the "appointed day" will be referred to in a forthcoming Act. We do not know when that Act will come, although we know from the White Paper the sort of constitution that the Government hope to include within that measure.
Clause 1(2) states:
Her Majesty may by Order in Council revoke the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961, and may make such transitional provision as appears to Her Majesty to be necessary or expedient in connection with the coming into effect of the new constitution or the revocation of the said Constitution of 1961.
As I understand it, three constitutions are in operation. There is the 1961 constitution until it is repealed; there is the de


facto constitution, under clause 3, which may from time to time be governed by the affirmative order procedure; and there is the final constitution, yet to be seen in legal form and yet to be put into a Bill or an Act, which the Government hope to bring forward.
The status of the provisions
in connection with the coming into effect of the new constitution
which may be necessary or expedient are not governed by an order that must pass through the House of Commons, as are the other provisions of the Bill. I understand that the coming into effect of the constitution itself will follow an agreement. That will therefore be putting into effect what has been agreed at Lancaster House or elsewhere as a new constitution. It would perhaps not be suitable for that arrangement to be included in an order to be passed by the House, or for that provision to be written into a Bill, but the transitional provisions which appear
to Her Majesty to be necessary or expedient in connection with the coming into effect of the new constitution
could be of a different nature.
Will the Lord Privy Seal confirm that the transitional provisions will come into effect only after a new constitution has been put into a Bill and the measure has been approved by Parliament? If that is not the position, why has he not put into the Bill a provision for the orders to be affirmed by the House of Commons, as he has in the other two clauses?
The amendment need not detain the Committee for too long. It is not necessary for us to regard the amendment other than as probing in character. However, if the next Bill is delayed for any reason, or if for some reason there is controversy about its nature and it is not enacted, it may be that the Government will wish to think about transitional provisions as may appear expedient to them. The House of Commons will have no control over what happens because it will be entirely for the Government or Her Majesty to decide what those provisions should be. It is right that the right hon. Gentleman should explain the status of the transitional provisions and their relationship to the final Act and the Bill now before us.

Sir Ian Gilmour: The question of the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) may be answered fairly shortly.
The independence constitution will be promulgated by an Order in Council made under the Act. The reason why it is not open to amendment is that it is the result of an agreement between the parties at Lancaster House. It would be complicated and undesirable for the House of Commons to unravel a constitution and to try to put it before the parties again. The independence Bill that will come before the House later will have to be enacted before the independence constitution comes into effect. I hope that this is clear. The Bill has very little to do with the independence constitution except that it is necessary that the Order in Council bringing it into effect will be made under the other Bill. The rest of the independence Bill deals with the effect on English law—citizenship and so on—and has more effect here than in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. It is fully in accordance with precedent that independence constitutions are not subject to amendment by the House of Commons, for the reasons that I have given.

Mr. Spearing: I am grateful to the Lord Privy Seal for his explanation, which indicated that the trigger is in this Bill and not in the constitution Bill. Can he enlighten the Committee as regards the other matters relating to transitional provisions as appear
to Her Majesty to be necessary or expedient"?
While they may be part of the new constitution which we shall see in legal form in due course, the Lord Privy Seal is saying, is he not, that the Government can take action relating to those matters without coming to the House of Commons at all? Can he explain why?

Sir I. Gilmour: Yes. Some of the independence constitution has to be brought into effect before independence in order to have elections. Elections will have to take place before independence. Moreover, some of the orders that will be made will not be fully in accordance with the constitution. In other words, we will not have registration of voters or constituencies whereas in subsequent elections there will be registration of voters and delimitation of constituencies.

Mr. Spearing: In view of what the Lord Privy Seal has said, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 2

POWER TO BRING PARTICULAR PROVISIONS OF NEW CONSTITUTION INTO FORCE BEFORE APOINTED DAY

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I beg to move amendment No. 20, in page 2, line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except paragraph B1 of Command Paper No. 7758.'.

The First Deputy Chairman: With this amendment it will be convenient to take the following amendments:

No. 21, in page 2, line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except paragraph B.6b of Command Paper No. 7758.'.

No. 22, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except paragraph V(1) of Command Paper No. 7758'.

No. 23, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except paragraph V(3) of Command Paper No. 7758'.

No. 24, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except any part of section D(i) and (ii) of Command Paper No. 7758.'.

No. 25, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except section D(iii) of Command Paper No. 7758.'.

No. 26, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except section D(iv) of Command Paper No. 7758 '.

No. 27, in page 2, line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except that any Electoral Supervisory Commission established under paragraph E 3 of Command Paper No. 7758 shall have only officials from Great Britain and other independent Commonwealth countries as members.'.

No. 28, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except that paragraph E 4 of Command Paper No. 7758 will not be used as the basis

of any electoral representation but there shall be constituencies for all voters'.

No. 29, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except that paragraph E 5 of Command Paper No. 7758 will not be used as the basis of the franchise for any election but there will be registration of all voters on common rolls'.

No. 30, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except that there shall be no election for a senate composed in accordance with paragraph E 6 of Command Paper No. 7758 and that all members will be elected on common rolls of all voters'.

No. 31, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except that there shall be no election for a House of Assembly composed in accordance with paragraph E 10 of Command Paper No. 7758 but that all members will be elected on common rolls of all voters'.

No. 32, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except that the executive power of Zimbabwe shall be vested in the President and not as in paragraph D 6 of Command Paper No. 7758'.

No. 33, in line 8, after 'constitution', insert:
'except that no judges shall be appointed under section F of Command Paper No. 7758 who have exercised judicial functions during the period of illegal government since 1965'.

No. 34, in line 8, after 'constitution' insert
'save that no part of section D of Command Paper No. 7758 will be brought into force until there has been a reconstruction of the Defence Forces based on the present illegal force and the guerrillas of the Patriotic Front with unacceptable elements of each excluded'.

Mr. Lyon: This group of amendments was originally intended to probe the whole of the constitution. Had the Government continued with their headstrong idea of pushing the Bill through in one sitting it would have taken a long time. I hope that it will not be necessary to take much time on this matter tonight. Most of the issues that arise on these amendments are related to the document published as a White Paper, which is the constitution, and which is the subject of qualified agreement by all the parties.
At this stage I would not want to go into much depth on this matter, with the exception of one issue. It arises out of paragraph 5 on page 6 of the White Paper, which is the subject of amendment No. 22 relating to compensation for


land. This springs from the so-called declaration of rights contained in the constitution. It reads:
Every person will be protected from having his property compulsorily acquired except when the acquisition is in the interests of defence
and so on. It also says that that would not be done without proper compensation. That provision is unamendable for 10 years after independence unless there is a unanimous vote of the House of Assembly.
In our own circumstances it is impossible to understand the deep feelings about land in Africa. The whole argument about independence is an attempt by the black people in Rhodesia to get equality with the whites—not only in terms of status and effectiveness of vote, but in terms of the control of the assets of their own country and of the power that goes with the wealth of their own country. That equality must relate to land in the circumstances of a largely agrarian society.
In Africa, the land is paramount. In Rhodesia at present—this obtains even after the changes that have taken place since May—African farmers have 53 per cent. of the land on which 80 per cent. of the population lives. European farmers have 47 per cent. of the land on which 20 per cent. of the population lives. It is impossible to have a sense of economic as well as political independence if that imbalance is to remain. One does not have to be the Marxist Mr. Mugabe—one could also be the Christian Bishop Muzorewa—but one could not continue to assert to one's people that they had won independence if that situation were to continue. It is actually worse than it appears from those bald figures, because the black population is growing much faster than the white population. The birth rate is higher, and the black population does not have the same emigration rate as the white.
Inevitably, the black population feels the sense of land hunger much more than does the white population. In the areas in which they are consigned to live and have land, they do not have the right to own farms to anything like the extent that the whites do. The tribal trust lands are held in common by all the people

living there. There are no farms of an independent nature such as is the case in the white areas. The African-purchased land, which is designed to be an interim stage between those two systems, occupies a very small section of the total land of Rhodesia.
Therefore, when the Patriotic Front argued that this provision—cementing for 10 years the present unequal division of land—was totally unacceptable, it was not a specifically Left-wing stance. It merely reflected the deep feelings of most of the black people in Rhodesia. Anyone who has heard the response that comes from a crowd of Africans in Salisbury, Bulawayo or the tribal trust lands about the future division of land can be under no illusion about how crucial is this point.
The Government may say "Well, there has been a provisional agreement. Moreover, the present Muzorewa regime has accepted it". All I can say is that the present Muzorewa regime would not be able to sell this land for 10 years. Given that 100 per cent. of the Assembly has to vote for any change, and that 20 per cent. of the seats will be allocated to whites, it is inconceivable that there will be a change within 10 years that does not depend upon compensation for the land.
We do not nationalise without compensation, and we may say that it is uncivilised—that was the word used by the Foreign Secretary in the negotiations—to take over land without compensation. I only ask the committee to consider how the whites got the land in the first place, and where the ownership of the land resided before they took it over. I also ask the Committee to consider the present position, when farms have been vacated by whites over a large area of Rhodesia. They have been vacated because blacks have fought and shed their blood to occupy that land.
It is inconceivable that the land should be handed back to the owners who have gone to a foreign territory and that they should then receive compensation. The blacks who died to occupy that land would have died in vain. It is impossible to put such a proposition to a black elector and hope to be able to contain his frustration and apprehension. Even


though this part of the constitution was accepted to that degree, I ask the Government to consider whether Bishop Muzorewa intended this position to be congealed for 10 years.
The proposition advanced by the Government, that the new Zimbabwe Government must raise the resources with which to compensate whites for the land of which they will be dispossessed, is, on the face of it, ludicrous. It means that an emerging developing country, with real problems of hard currency abroad, must use its depleted reserves to pay out expatriates for land, which is the vital reason for economic independence, rather than use the money for the development needs of the country.
On occasion I advance some difficult propositions to my electorate. I am not unusued to advancing propositions that I know are unpopular. However, I doubt whether I would want to be an African politician in the independent Zimbabwe who had to say to his electorate "No, we cannot do this, partly because we had to agree to a constitution which said that we must compensate landowners. We cannot change it for 10 years. We do not have the money with which to pay compensation. If we use up our money we cannot provide the people with the nursery schools and health clinics that we want to provide. You must decide."
That was not the situation in Kenya. The Conservative Government of the time had a wiser insight into the significance of the land problem. They made funds available to pay the whites, so that if they wanted to leave their land it would revert to Kenya and be split up among the blacks. However, in these negotiations the British Government said that they would not do that.
One of the key features of the beginning of the Kissinger initiative in South Africa was that the United Kingdom and American Governments would provide a sum of £1½ billion for the development of Rhodesia after independence. Inevitably that sum was to be used to buy land from the whites. That was the main initiative. The proposition cannot, therefore, be so remote from reality. It was put forward by Kissinger and was repeated by my right hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) in the Anglo-American agree-
ments. Therefore, it was part of the dialogue. That fact has not been sufficiently put into perspective by the British Government in their announcement to the British public for us to be sure that it can be relied upon by whoever wins the election after independence. If the Government intend that the announcement should be relied on, the money must come from outside the Government.
I accept that the Government would not provide £1½ billion in the near future with which to buy out the whites in Rhodesia. I would not support them if they did. However, they should make a sizeable contribution. Given the approach that was made earlier, I believe that the United States Government would be prepared to pay a considerable slice of that money to ensure that the resources came from outside.
Therefore, I am raising this issue at this stage not necessarily to ask the Government to go back on what has been agreed on the constution—although I have my reservations about it—but to ensure that they say publicly from the Dispatch Box what they intend should happen about compensation from outside resources for the land. It is inconceivable that any African Government, of whatever complexion, could honour the constitution and yet honour their commitments for economic independence for their people. That clash would mean an early breach of the constitution if the British Government are not prepared to play their part in financing the operation.

9.45 p.m.

Mr. Ian Lloyd: The hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) has raised the very important question of expropriation of land.
The constitutional provisions in the document are important and carefully considered, and they provide that there should not be expropriation without appropriate compensation—although, as I have implied earlier, when a Government can plead the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health and, finally, town and country planning, as a basis for any measures which they seek in pursuing the objective of changing the ownership of land on a drastic scale, I should not have thought that anyone of the political calibre of those likely to be in office in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in several months'


time would find very much difficulty in finding an excuse.
However, there is a rather more fundamental principle involved here. The hon. Member for York has implied—it is an important argument—that the Africans have fought for their land. Of course, he injects all the emotive arguments that are deep in the Socialist philosophy behind the ownership of land and behind the ownership of land which might in some circumstances have been expropriated from those who once owned it. But the land that was in Rhodesia at the beginning of this century—the land which was developed by the European settlers—was for the most part totally undeveloped bush with no one on it. It produced absolutely nothing.
We must not forget that, because the implication is that productive farms were seized from Africans who were creating wealth from them. The truth is exactly the opposite. It is exactly the opposite even to what the hon. Member for York has asserted recently, with the implication that the only people who are concerned with the defence of their property rights are the Africans.
I should like to read something that was published a matter of weeks ago about a town called Karoi in Rhodesia:
There are about 460 white men, women and children in the village and 360 farms in the Karori area with another 65 or so in the neighbouring Tengwe block. Nearly every farm (and some small mines still left working) is a frontier fortress.
Labour compounds have been burnt out, sheds and tobacco barns destroyed, homesteads attacked and sometimes gutted.
One border homestead recently was hit by at least 600 bullets. Rockets 'took out' another. A store was attacked three times. But the homesteads are being rebuilt and the farmers are carrying on, despite ambushes, land-mines and almost weekly incidents.
Some like one Scots-born farmer, his wife and two children, have been 'taken out' twice.
But they simply moved into the village temporarily and are rebuilding their homestead with the help of neighbours and friends.
The farmer told us last week: 'We are not leaving, that's for sure', and then went back to his police reserve duties in the control room at Karoi police headquarters,
The simple question I put to the Committee is this: why on earth should people such as that suffer expropriation without compensation? What possible justification for it can there be? If any

productive wealth is being created on the farms of Rhodesia—and we know that Zambia is dependent on Rhodesian maize—the productive farms are those essentially controlled by people such as those in Karoi, and I see no reason why they should give them up.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: rose—

Mr. Lloyd: No, I shall not give way to the hon. Gentleman. He has spoken a great deal.
I see no reason why they should give them up. I certainly see no reason why they should be expropriated without compensation.
It is disgraceful that we should be advocating expropriation without compensation.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I think that I am entitled to speak again, so I shall answer the question that the hon. Member for Havant and Waterloo (Mr. Lloyd) would not allow me to answer in an intervention.
The fact is that 60 per cent. of European farms are so unproductive that they fail to provide any income tax returns. Their production is too low to qualify for taxation. Seven per cent. of European farms account for 50 per cent. of European land. The great bulk of European farms are unproductive. The land could be better used if it were divided among the blacks. The productive farms represent a very small number of very large land owners. The hon. Gentleman's emotive description of the man defending his shack is just as capable of being repeated in terms of the blacks who have suffered in this day. I hope that the Government will not be too unduly worried about the attack that has been made by the hon. Gentleman.

Mr. Luce: The hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) has focused attention on amendment No. 22 relating to the important question of land. I hope that I understood him aright when he said that it would not be right for the Government—certainly I take this view—to reopen questions on the constitution which have been agreed at Lancaster House. I think that is what the hon. Gentleman said and that is certainly my view and that of the Government. After six weeks of painstaking work at Lancaster House,


with agreement on a constitution which required compromise on all sides, it would be absolutely wrong to reopen constitutional issues. I acknowledge that the hon. Gentleman has touched on an issue of supreme importance to black and white Africans or the people of the African continent—having served in Africa, I realise this is an important issue—but it would not make sense for us to revive it because all the parties have agreed.
There is one aspect regarding land on which I might help the hon. Gentleman and the Committee. As he said, the independence constitution will make it possible to acquire under-utilised land compulsorily provided that adequate compensation is paid. We have made it clear that we recognise that the future Government of Zimbabwe, whatever their political complexion, will wish to extend land ownership. We recognise the importance of this issue and will be prepared to help within the limits imposed by our financial resources. For instance, we would be ready to provide technical assistance for settlement schemes and capital aid for agricultural development projects and infrastructure. If an agricultural development bank or some equivalent institution were set up to promote agricultural development, including land settlement schemes, we would be prepared to contribute to the initial capital.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The hon. Gentleman knows that that does not go far enough. Is he prepared, either through this Government's resources or an international fund, to finance a scheme such as obtained in Kenya after independence? If not, why not?

Mr. Luce: We are talking about a completely different situation. The Rhodesian problem is quite different from that of Kenya. I am setting the background outside the agreement to the constitution to the kind of assistance that Britain and the United States and, we hope, other Western Governments will be prepared to give towards land resettlement and helping black and white people in Rhodesia to improve agricultural productivity.
I thought it right, as the hon. Gentleman raised the important issue of land,

to set the scene and the background. It Britain can set the lead, the United States and, we hope, other Governments will follow. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will acknowledge that it is totally inappropriate to reopen issues which have already been agreed. However, I hope that what I have said about the assistance that we are prepared to give will be of some help.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The Minister has not told us how much the Government are prepared to pay; therefore I will not persist. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Buchan: I beg to move amendment No. 36, in page 2, line 9, leave out 'with or without modifications'.
The main effect of the amendment is to ensure that any bringing in of the provisions of the constitution would be done without modifications. This is in the nature of a probing amendment. Subsection (1) gives the power to bring in particular provisions even before the appointed day, and that is then heavily qualified by subsection (2) which relates to modifications ceasing to have effect. That seems to me to be an insufficient safeguard precisely because subsection (1) emphasises that the reason that the Government want to bring in provisions in advance of the appointed day is, above all, to enable elections to be held.
The difficulty is in allowing provisions—we now have a summary of them—which have been accepted and agreed by definition to be brought in unchallenged with modifications during the preliminary period leading up to an election.
It is of interest to notice some of the matters which are covered, such as freedom of assembly and association. It seems to me highly dangerous that parts of this can be brought in or modifications made in an agreed constitution on subjects such as those. On the matter of freedom of movement, there is the authorisation of a court to impose restrictions on any person's movements if he is not a citizen or permanently resident in Zimbabwe, and so on. Where amendments existed, they could have a serious implication for the fair and just operation of the election.
Page 22 of the summary of the provisions refers to the registration of voters


in elections and points out that the conduct of the elections will be under the supervision and direction of an electoral supervisory commission. The modifications could be of crucial importance exactly when it matters, and that is in the transitional period preparatory to the election. Finally, there is the section on the judiciary.
By definition, we shall have an agreed constitution. It is perfectly appropriate that parts of it should be brought in to facilitate the transitional period and help in the election, but it is very dangerous to do this by means of modifications which we alone will be passing here by Order in Council and which are not subject to agreement.
I should be grateful to have the Minister's comments on these points.

Sir Ian Gilmour: I hope that I can set at rest the hon. Gentleman's fears. The modifications that we seek here are purely in accordance with the agreement that we hope to reach on the interim arrangements. For example, the independence constitution refers to the President, who will be the Head of the new State, whereas under the interim arrangements the Governor will be in charge.
Similarly, with regard to elections, we do not propose to have the registration of voters at this election because of the time factor. Only such matters will be modified. There is nothing radical or grandiose in mind, such as the hon. Gentleman appears to fear. He will also have noticed that any order made under the clause is subject to an affirmative resolution. If it does not meet with the wishes of the House, it will be cancelled.

Mr. Buchan: The Minister has been helpful so far. I understand that it must

be agreed in this House. But it does not provide for any shift agreed afterwards by the parties at Lancaster House. This is what worries me. The Lord Privy Seal has now said, I understand, that the sense of any modifications, rather than being incorporated into the constitution, will be the subject of discussion during the process of agreement and that it will therefore in one sense be part of the interim—

It being ten o'clock THE CHAIRMAN left the Chair to report Progress and ask leave to sit again.

Committee report Progress.

Ordered,

That the Southern Rhodesia Bill may be proceeded with at this day's sitting, though opposed, until any hour.—[Mr. Waddington.]

SOUTHERN RHODESIA BILL

Again considered in Committee.

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Mr. Buchan: I understand that the Lord Privy Seal is saying that any such modification will, in general, have been subject to prior discussion or agreement in the course of Lancaster House or later discussions for the interim arrangements and will therefore have been subject to some kind of view or agreement with the other parties involved.
Given that, and given the Lord Privy Seal's knowledge that I have put down a marker should the matter come before the House, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mr. Peter Archer: I beg to move amendment No. 39, page 2, line 15, leave out subsection (3) and insert—
'(3) No recommendation shall be made to Her Majesty in Council to make an Order under this section unless a draft of the Order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.'
The Committee has discussed how far the Bill is premature and how far the powers that it confers on the Government may be used before the proper occasion has arisen for using them. This amendment is concerned with the situation that may arise if the Government exercise their powers in advance of any supervision by Parliament. Clause 2 confers wide powers on the Government. Clause 1 confers on the Government power to provide a new constitution. The Government may do so by Order in Council. All that is required to exercise that power is that the Order in Council shall be laid before Parliament after it has been made. There is no provision that it shall be approved by Parliament.
Clause 2 then says that once that constitution has been proveded the Government may use that clause to activate any provision of the constitution that is authorised under clause 1, provided only that it can be said to be for the purpose of enabling the new constitution to function from the appointed day. It may provide for elections, but the powers go much wider. It may activate any constitutional provision which it is proper to make under clause 1, provided that it falls within that wide purpose. So the power extends to an entire constitution.
Clause 2 is about activating any provision in that constitution, and it may be done by Order in Council. Subsection (3) provides that the Government may enact the Order in Council to that effect without any reference to Parliament. It will remain in effect for 28 days, although, admittedly, it expires at the end of that period unless, meanwhile, it is approved by a resolution of each House.
The Committee may wonder what is to happen if, at the end of that period, either the two Houses have not considered the order or, if they have, either has declined to endorse it. There are some things which may have been done

which cannot be undone. The White Paper makes provision for a judicature. Let us suppose that the Government either appoint a Governor and he appoints a chief justice or that the Government by Order in Council decide to appoint a chief justice so that disputes about the constitution may be resolved in the interim, and let us suppose, further, that the chief justice orders someone to be hanged. As lawyers know when they have had decisions reversed, often what is done cannot be undone.
But what of the things which could be undone? If the Bill said nothing on the subject, there would be a number of questions to be answered. There is some law on the conclusiveness of powers which have subsequently been revoked, but I have not been able to find very much guidance in the circumstances which the Committee is now discussing.
It is largely academic, however, because the Bill has made provision for such a situation. It might have provided that anything which can be undone shall be undone if the two Houses declined to endorse the Order in Council. But, on the contrary, it provides that the expiration of an order shall not affect things done in the interim. So the Bill confers on the Government very wide powers to affect the whole future of people in Rhodesia, and Parliament cannot stop them.
We are driven to ask why it is important that the Government should be able to act so precipitately without consulting Parliament. Why may the Government find that they cannot bring the matter before Parliament for 28 days? Of course, Parliament may be in recess, but usually it is not impossible to reconvene us. So what kind of provisions do the Government envisage making under the clause?
The Lord Privy Seal has already given a brief answer to my hon. Friend the Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing). His answer referred largely to preparations for elections. But, if that is all that the Government have in mind, why do we need such an extremely wide power in the clause? Fairly obviously, the Government have in mind a number of provisions which go very much wider than that.
If the Under-Secretary of State will say why the Government find it necessary to draft the clause in such wide terms and what provision they might have in mind to make under it, the Committee may be able to decide whether it is necessary for the Government to have power to set in motion machinery which Parliament cannot halt for up to 28 days.
The amendment would provide that the Order in Council should not become effective until it was confirmed by an affirmative resolution of each House. A few moments ago, the Lord Privy Seal said that any Order in Council under this clause required an affirmative resolution. That is perhaps a rather elliptical way of putting what the clause provides. It would be the effect of this amendment.
I suspect that it may be said that in the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 a similar provision is to be found in section 2(5). I suspect that that may have been where the draftsman found the formula which is now in this Bill, though I appreciate that it is probably not unique. That section had a very different purpose. It was to confer on the Government power to make provision in consequence of any unconstitutional action taken in Southern Rhodesia in the early days of what has come to be called UDI. There, of course, legal sanctions for many activities may have been withdrawn. There may have been many detailed orders relating, for example, to specific commodities which required to be adjusted. Here, we are dealing with the provisions of a constitution, which are very much weightier matters.
During the Second Reading debate on the 1965 Bill, the Attorney-General of the day said that as soon as practicable the House would have a full opportunity to debate the provisions of any order. So far, we have had no similar undertaking from the Government in relation to this provision. Sir John Hobson, who was the Opposition spokesman in that debate, said that the undertaking would allay many doubts which there may have been about the wisdom of the 28-day period. The Opposition of that day may well have had reason to doubt the wisdom of the provision. But there at least there were some actions of a detailed nature which may have required to be carried out as a matter of urgency. We have had

no such undertaking today, and we are not dealing with similar provisions Indeed, under section 3 of the 1965 Act, which give power to continue the provisions of the Act beyond the 12-month period, the Order in Council there requires an affirmative resolution before it becomes effective.
I understand that we can assume that the constitution which the Government still contemplate enacting under clause 1 is that set out in the White Paper. Let us consider some of the things that the Government might decide to do under that constitution. They might appoint a Governor who would be acting as President. He may appoint a commissioner of police. Suppose that he were to do that and that the commissioner ordered the police force to take certain action, for example, to arrest someone. That arrest would therefore depend indirectly on the powers conferred in this Bill and on the Order in Council made under those powers.
If, subsequently, either House of Parliament decided that that Order in Council should not have been made, the effect would be that the arrest was improperly made. But the effect of the clause would mean that the arrested person would have no redress. And the matter does not end there, because if the subsection remains unamended its effects continue into clause 3, where the Government are given very extensive powers to make such provision as appears to Her Majesty in Council to be necessary or expedient
in consequence of any unconstitutional action taken therein".
Admittedly, that is like the power to which I referred in the 1965 Act. However, then we were dealing with the situation in the early days of UDI. Now, I envisage that the Government have in mind acts of indemnity in relation to particular individuals in Southern Rhodesia.
The Government then have power to do what is necessary or expedient
in connection wth the repeal, revocation, expiration or lapse of any statutory provision relating to sanctions"—
a very wide power indeed to which the Committee will turn its attention later.
Then, without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), an Order in Council might make provision
for conferring power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Southern


Rhodesia, including laws having extra-territorial operation".
It would be out of order if I were to expand on that, but those are the powers that we are talking about. The Order in Council may provide
for suspending or modifying the provisions of the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia 1961
and
for suspending or modifying the operation of any enactment or instrument in relation to Southern Rhodesia or persons or things in any way belonging to or connected with Southern Rhodesia".
Those are the powers in clause 3. Subsection (6) provides that section 2(3)
shall apply to any Order in Council made under
clause 3. This provision, then, extends right through the Bill. We are discussing the control which Parliament may exercise over virtually all the powers in the Bill.
There are, therefore, questions to which we on this side would like an answer. First, what kind of provisions do the Government envisage using under this power in clauses 2 and 3? Second, what mischief would result if, first, they had to secure the consent of Parliament? Third, why is it not possible to provide that, if these powers are used and either House subsequently disapproves, at least some of the things done under those powers should not be deemed to be validly done?
I do not propose to drag out the debate. When the Committee has received answers to those questions, we may decide what are the appropriate conclusions to be drawn. I hope that the hon. Gentleman who replies may seek to catch your eye, Mr. Deputy Chairman, at an early stage in this debate so that we may have the answers and proceed from there.

Mr. Bob Cryer: There are one or two points which should be brought to bear on this issue in the light of the comments of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Warley, West (Mr. Archer), who described in great detail the wide powers which the Bill gives to the Government. Those powers will be subject to an affirmative resolution only. I imagine that the spokesman for the Government will say that an

affirmative resolution is better than an order by annulment under which an objection can be made simply by praying during the time that the order is laid before Parliament. However, the orders that we are dealing with determine the constitution of a country and they grant enormous powers.
It might be informative for us to examine some of the actions of the Foreign Office in relation to a similar order which conferred immunity on the persons taking part in the Lancaster House talks and which were subject to exactly the same procedure—an affirmative order to be laid before Parliament for 28 days.
Past experience of the House of Commons does not give one the greatest confidence that even the democratic safeguards built into an affirmative order will necessarily be observed. The Southern Rhodesia (Immunity for Persons attending Meetings and Consultations) Order 1979 was produced by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and laid before the House. Subsequently, because of a miscalculation on the part of the Foreign Office, and contrary to instructions circulated in 1975 regarding the laying of statutory instruments, the order was allowed to lapse. This was an extraordinary thing to do. It meant that the participants could no longer enjoy the immunity granted by the order.
Cross-examination of officials of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office contained in the sixth report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, printed on 30 October 1979, demonstrated that there was cause for alarm. It was not simply a question that some officials had not read the instructions clearly or that they did not understand the proceedings of the House of Commons. Officials in Government Departments should at least have a full and competent knowledge of what goes on in the assembly which gives Ministers powers in the first place so that they may advise their ministers properly.
The Joint Committee noted
that even were the order to have remained effective for the further week there was no indication that the Government were intending to table motions in both Houses to approve the order before it expired. In explaining that a Bill concerning Southern Rhodesia and including matters contained in section 2 of the 1965 Act would soon to be introduced, witnesses


could not reassure the Committee that the Government intended fully to comply with the existing statutory requirements. The Committee can only infer that the Government would have found it expedient to lay a second order without the first having been approved even if the first had not already expired.
This is an unusual use of powers. It is a possible use of powers that would allow the scrutiny which the House rightfully exercises on affirmative orders to be bypassed.
When there is bloodshed and when those involved have deep and lasting suspicions of each other, we must ensure that everyone feels that nothing underhand is being undertaken. In those circumstances, we must be involved in the affirmation of an order before it comes into effect. That would ensure that the loophole which was examined by the Statutory Instruments Committee last month was not circumvented by the Government.
In 1972–73, the then Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation drew the attention of the House to the power that we are now discussing. The Committee said:
The attention of Your Committee has been drawn to the opportunity open to a Government artificially to prolong the period within which an affirmative instrument must be approved in both Houses, by laying a fresh but identical order just before the expiry of the period. In theory this could be done over and over again, thus keeping the order in force throughout a Parliament without ever obtaining approval for it. No Government is likely to engage in an abuse of that magnitude, but it appears to Your Committee that there is a standing temptation to postpone the moving of affirmative resolutions for reasons of mere convenience to the Administration.
Recently, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office failed to bring before the House an affirmative order solely because it was inconvenient to do so. Is it not possible that the Administration may find it convenient not to bring before the House the order which we are discussing but to lay a further order, even if it is an affirmative order?
Wide powers are contained in the Bill. The amendment simply seeks to give all hon. Members the power to move an affirmative resolution to the order so that none of the parties to an agreement can accuse the Government of using backdoor methods of obtaining the powers.

The amendment will ensure that we are allowed to debate the order before it is put into effect. That is a reasonable demand for the House of Commons to make.
I have quoted from two Select Committee reports which show that an affirmative order is not necessarily protection enough when considerable powers are handed over to the Government. I urge the Government to accept the amendment.

Mr. Deakins: When dealing with amendment No. 36, the Lord Privy Seal said that most, if not all, of the modifications to the constitution will have been agreed between the parties. I was not clear whether he meant that they will have been agreed at the Lancaster House negotiations or subsequently. If that is so, surely it would be possible to lay before Parliament draft orders in respect of those modifications prior to their coming into effect. I wonder whether the Minister will comment on that.

Mr. Luce: As the right hon. and learned Member for Warley, West (Mr. Archer) implied, the effect of amendment No. 39 would be to compel the Government to lay before the House in draft any Order in Council made under section 2 for the purpose of introducing parts of the constitution before independence.
I remind the right hon. and learned Member that the purpose of the Bill is to allow the Government to implement the agreement quickly. As he knows, we made that point as strongly as we could during Second Reading. The constitution has been agreed by all the parties, subject to the pre-independence arrangements, and it would not be right to insist that orders to bring parts of it into effect for the purpose of holding elections should be subject to prior parliamentary approval. The orders will be subject to affirmative resolution, and hon. Members will have opportunities to express their views.
It is important that I should give specific answers to the right hon. and learned Gentleman's questions. I should first like to give him a clear picture of the provisions that we have in mind, which might help him to assess whether he wishes to press the amendment. I hope that he will not do so. The purpose of the three sets of provisions which


I shall highlight is to advance the implementation of the constitution which has been agreed by all the parties and to enable the essential parts to be implemented in time.
The first provisions are for the elections to the House of Assembly which are to be held under the new constitution. Secondly, there are provisions for separate elections for the Senate, which again are part of the constitution that has been agreed and which apply also to the appointement of the President-elect. Finally, it is necessary to have provisions for appointing Ministers after the elections. We have those three sets of provisions in mind in asking the House of Commons for power under the enabling Act.
I listened carefully to the remarks of the hon. Member for Keighley (Mr. Cryer). I served on the Select Committee on Procedure and am also anxious that the rights of the House should be preserved. However, we are dealing here with a very short period. Once we have agreement, we want to move fast and the Government will have to take quick decisions. We cannot wait for 28 days. That is why we want the powers in these three areas to activate the elections and ensure that the pre-independence arrangements and the constitution are properly implemented.

Mr. Archer: I wish to put three further questions to the Minister. First, I remind him that I put two additional questions in opening. Secondly, what proposals do the Government have in mind under the powers in clause 3? Thirdly, the Minister said that the Government could not wait 28 days, but why would it be necessary for them to wait 28 days? If there is agreement, what is the difficulty in bringing the matter before Parliament at once?

Mr. Luce: The whole burden of the discussion about the Bill and its purposes—we have been over this many times—is that we are asking for powers to enable us to move swiftly once agreement is reached at Lancaster House. That is almost the salient feature behind the Bill. We feel that speed of action is essential if we are to make progress quickly. I am sure that there will be few on either side of the Chamber who dis-

agree with that objective. Once we have an agreement, which we hope to have, we shall wish to pursue it as rapidly as possible.
I must apologise to the right hon, and learned Gentleman. I thought that I had answered his main questions. He asked about powers under clause 3. If it is in order, I shall seek to answer that question. The most important power that we seek under clause 3 is the power to establish the office of Governor. That is something on which we shall wish to act extremely rapidly. That is an essential power. There are other orders that we have in mind concerning the orderly termination of sanctions. Clearly, there are many technicalities that must be followed. Principally, there is the power to deal with the appointment of the Governor.

Mr. John Morris: I do not think that the Under-Secretary of State has faced the case advanced succinctly by my right hon, and learned Friend the Member for Warley, West (Mr. Archer). There is an assumption all along the line that there will be an agreement. We have heard nothing about what happens in default of an agreement.
We are all anxious to make progress. It is in the interest of the House of Commons that the hon. Gentleman faces the questions asked by my right hon, and learned Friend. The Government seek to confer extremely wide powers. The greater the powers, the greater the entitlement of the Committee to scrutinise. Another Act will be required to implement the whole of the constitution. In that event there will be preliminary consideration by the House of Commons. However, when one is dealing with the implementation of parts of the constitution, no preliminary inquiry is allowed. I find that a contradiction in terms.
The reasoned amendment introduced by my right hon. Friend and learned Friend deserves and commands a full response. The hon. Gentleman says "We cannot wait 28 days." That was fundamental to his case. Nobody is asking him to wait 28 days. The Government wanted to complete all stages of the Bill in one sitting. Surely, it is not beyond the wit of the Government to imagine the House of Commons giving approval for an order to be made under the Bill within a


similar, if not shorter, period. I do not know from where the hon. Gentleman gets 28 days for the preliminary approval of the House of Commons to implement an order made under the Bill.
We are deeply aware of the need for speed. The hon. Gentleman knows how ready the House of Commons is on such occasions to meet the needs of the Government of the day when the objects that they are seeking to achieve are approved.

Why should he put such a difficulty in our way when all that is desired is to scrutinise important powers? If we do not do so in advance, we shall be too late because the horse will have bolted.

I ask my right hon and hon. Friends to vote in support of the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made:

The Committee divided: Ayes 244. Noes 299.

Division No. 101]
AYES
[10.35 pm


Adams, Allen
Dunnett, Jack
Leadbitter, Ted


Allaun, Frank
Dunwoody, Mrs Gwyneth
Leighton, Ronald


Anderson, Donald
Eadie, Alex
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Eastham, Ken
Litherland, Robert


Armstrong, Rt Hon Ernest
Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
Lofthouse, Geoffrey


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Ellis, Raymond (NE Derbyshire)
Lyon, Alexander (York)


Ashton, Joe
Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
McCartney, Hugh


Atkinson, Norman (H'gey, Tott'ham)
English, Michael
McDonald, Dr Oonagh


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
McGuire, Michael (Ince)


Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (Heywood)
Evans, John (Newton)
McKay, Allen (Penistone)


Beith, A. J.
Field, Frank
McKelvey, William


Benn, Rt Hon Anthony Wedgwood
Fitch, Alan
MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Flannery, Martin
Maclennan, Robert


Bidwell, Sydney
Fletcher, L. R. (Ilkeston)
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, Central)


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
McNally, Thomas


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Ford, Ben
McNamara, Kevin


Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur (M'brough)
Forrester, John
McWilliam, John


Bradley, Tom
Foster, Derek
Magee, Bryan


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Fraser, John (Lambeth, Norwood)
Marks, Kenneth


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald
Marshall, David (Gl'sgow, Shettles'n)


Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)
Freud, Clement
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)


Brown, Ron (Edinburgh, Leith)
Garret), John (Norwich S)
Marshall, Jim (Leicester South)


Buchan, Norman
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Martin, Michael (Gl'gow, Springb'rn)


Callaghan, Rt Hon J. (Cardiff SE)
George, Bruce
Mason, Rt Hon Roy


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John
Maxton, John


Campbell, Ian
Ginsburg, David
Maynard, Miss Joan


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Golding, John
Meacher, Michael


Canavan, Dennis
Gourlay, Harry
Mellish, Rt Hon Robert


Cant, R. B.
Grant, George (Morpeth)
Mikardo, Ian


Carmichael, Neil
Grant, John (Islington C)
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Carter-Jones, Lewis
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Miller, Dr M. S. (East Kilbride)


Cartwright, John
Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)
Mitchell, Austin (Grimsby)


Clark, David (South Shields)
Hardy, Peter
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, ltchen)


Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Morris, Rt Hon Charles (Openshaw)


Cohen, Stanley
Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith
Morris, Rt Hon John (Aberavon)


Coleman, Donald
Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy
Moyle, Rt Hon Roland


Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
Haynes, Frank
Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick


Conlan, Bernard
Healey, Rt Hon Denis
Newens, Stanley


Cook, Robin F.
Heffer, Eric S.
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon


Cowans, Harry
Hogg, Norman (E Dunbartonshire)
O'Halloran, Michael


Cox, Tom (Wandsworth, Tooting)
Holland, Stuart (L'beth, Vauxhall)
O'Neill, Martin


Crowther, J. S.
Home Robertson, John
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley


Cryer, Bob
Homewood, William
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David


Cunliffe, Lawrence
Hooley, Frank
Palmer, Arthur


Cunningham, George (Islington S)
Horam, John
Park, George


Cunningham, Dr John (Whitehaven)
Howell, Rt Hon Denis (B'ham, Sm H)
Parker, John


Dalyell, Tam
Howells, Geraint
Parry, Robert


Davidson, Arthur
Huckfield, Les
Pendry, Tom


Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Penhaligon, David


Davies, E. Hudson (Caerphilly)
Janner, Hon Greville
Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch (S Down)


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)


Davis, Clinton (Hackney Central)
John, Brynmor
Prescott, John


Davis, Terry (B'rm'ham, Stechford)
Johnson, James (Hull West)
Price, Christopher (Lewisham West)


Deakins, Eric
Johnson, Walter (Derby South)
Race, Reg


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Johnston, Russell (Inverness)
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds South)


Dempsey, James
Jones, Rt Hon Alec (Rhondda)
Richardson, Miss Jo


Dewar, Donald
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Roberts, Albert (Normanton)


Dixon, Donald
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Dobson, Frank
Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Roberts, Ernest (Hackney North)


Dormand, Jack
Kerr, Russell
Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)


Douglas, Dick
Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Robertson, George


Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Kinnock, Neil
Robinson, Geoffrey (Coventry NW)


Dubs, Alfred
Lambie, David
Rooker, J. W.


Duffy, A. E. P.
Lamborn, Harry
Roper, John


Dunn, James A. (Liverpool, Kirkdale)
Lamond, James
Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)




Ross, Stephen (Isle of Wight)
Strang, Gavin
White, Frank R. (Bury &amp; Radcliffe)


Rowlands, Ted
Straw, Jack
White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)


Sandelson, Neville
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley
Whitlock, William


Sever, John
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton West)
Wigley, Dafydd


Sheerman, Barry
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)
Wiley, Rt Hon Frederick


Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert (A'ton-u-L)
Thomas, Mike (Newcastle East)
Williams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)


Shore, Rt Hon Peter (Step and Pop)
Thomas, Dr Roger Carmarthen)
Wilson, Rt Hon Sir Harold (Huyton)


Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)
Wilson, William (Coventry SE)


Silkin, Rt Hon S.C. (Dulwich)
Tilley, John
Winnick, David


Silverman, Julius
Tinn, James
Woolmer, Kenneth


Skinner, Dennis
Torney, Tom
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Snape, Peter
Varley, Rt Hon Eric G.
Wright, Shella


Soley, Clive
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)
Young, David (Bolton East)


Spearing, Nigel
Walker, Rt Hon Harold (Doncaster)



Spriggs, Leslie
Watkins, David
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Stallard, A. W.
Weetch, Ken
Mr. Ted Graham and


Stoddart, David
Wellbeloved, James
Mr. George Morton


Stott, Roger
Welsh, Michael





NOES


Adley, Robert
Dickens, Geoffrey
Holland, Philip (Carlton)


Aitken, Jonathan
Dorrell, Stephen
Hooson, Tom


Alexander, Richard
Dover, Denshore
Howell, Rt Hon David (Guildford)


Alison, Michael
du Cann, Rt Hon Edward
Howell, Ralph (North Norfolk)


Ancram, Michael
Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Hunt, David (Wirral)


Arnold, Tom
Durant, Tony
Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)


Aspinwall, Jack
Dykes, Hugh
Hurd, Hon Douglas


Atkins, Robert (Preston North)
Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)


Atkinson, David (Bournemouth, East)
Edwards, Rt Hon N. (Pembroke)
Jessel, Toby


Baker, Nicholas (North Dorset)
Eggar, Timothy
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey


Banks, Robert
Elliott, Sir William
Jopling, Rt Hon Michael


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Emery, Peter
Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith


Bell, Ronald
Eyre, Reginald
Kaberry, Sir Donald


Bendall, Vivian
Fairbairn, Nicholas
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Fairgrieve, Russell
Kilfedder, James A.


Benyon, Thomas (Abingdon)
Faith, Mrs Sheila
Kimball, Marcus


Benyon, W. (Buckingham)
Farr, John
King, Rt Hon Tom


Berry, Hon Anthony
Fell, Anthony
Kitson, Sir Timothy


Best, Keith
Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Knox, David


Bevan, David Gilroy
Finsberg, Geoffrey
Lamont, Norman


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Fisher, Sir Nigel
Lang, Ian


Biggs-Devison, John
Fletcher, Alexander (Edinburgh N)
Langford-Holt, Sir John


Blackburn, John
Fietcher-Cooke, Charles
Latham, Michael


Blaker, Peter
Fookes, Miss Janet
Lawrence Ivan


Body, Richard
Forman, Nigel
Lawson, Nigel


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Fraser, Rt Hon H. (Stafford &amp; St)
Lee, John


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Fraser, Peter (South Angus)
Le Marchsnt, Spencer


Bottomley, Peter (Woolwich West)
Fry, Peter
Lester, Jim (Beeston)


Bowden, Andrew
Galbraith, Hon T. G. D.
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutand)


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Gardiner, George (Reigate)
Lloyd, Ian (Havant &amp; Waterloo)


Braine, Sir Bernard
Gardner, Edward (South Fylde)
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)


Bright, Graham
Garel-Jones, Tristan
Loveridge, John


Brinton, Tim
Gilmour, Rt Hon Sir Ian
Luce, Richard


Brittan, Leon
Goodhart, Phillip
Lyell, Nicholas


Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher
Goodhew, Victor
McAdden, Sir Stephen


Brooke, Hon Peter
Goodlad, Alastair
McCrindle, Robert


Brotherton, Michael
Gow, Ian
Macfarlane, Neil


Brown, Michael (Brigg &amp; Sc'thorpe)
Gower, Sir Raymond
MacGregor, John


Browne, John (Winchester)
Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)
MacKay, John (Argyll)


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Gray, Hamish
McNair-Wilson, Michael (Newbury)


Bryan, Sir Paul
Greenway, Harry
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)


Buck, Antony
Grieve, Percy
McQuarrie, Albert


Budgen, Nick
Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St Edmunds)
Madel, David


Bulmer, Esmond
Griffiths, Peter (Portsmouth N)
Major, John


Burden, F. A.
Grist, Ian
Marland, Paul


Butcher, John
Grylls, Michael
Marlow, Tony


Butler, Hon Adam
Gummer, John Selwyn
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)


Cadbury, Jocelyn
Hamilton, Hon Archie (Eps'm&amp;Ew'll)
Mates, Michael


Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Mawby, Ray


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Hampson, Dr Keith
Mawhinney, Dr Brian


Chalker, Mrs Lynda
Hannam, John
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin


Channon, Paul
Haselhurst, Alan
Mayhew, Patrick


Chapman, Sydney
Hastings, Stephen
Mellor, David


Churchill, W. S.
Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael
Meyer, Sir Anthony


Clark, Dr William (Croydon South)
Hawkins, Paul
Miller, Hal (Bromsgrove &amp; Redditch)


Cockeram, Eric
Hawksley, Warren
Mills, Iain (Meriden)


Colvin, Michael
Hayhoe, Barney
Mills, Peter (West Devon)


Cope, John
Heath, Rt Hon Edward
Miscempbell, Norman


Cormack, Patrick
Heddle, John
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)


Corrie, John
Henderson, Barry
Moate, Roger


Costain, A. P.
Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael
Monro, Hector


Cranborne, Viscount
Hicks, Robert
Montgomery, Fergus


Critchley, Julian
Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Moore, John


Crouch, David
Hill, James
Morgan, Geraint







Morris, Michael (Northampton, Sth)
Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Temple-Morris, Peter


Morrison, Hon Charles (Devizes)
Rifkind, Malcolm
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter (Hendon S)


Morrison, Hon Peter (City of Chester)
Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey
Thompson, Donald


Mudd, David
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)


Murphy, Christopher
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Thornton, Malcolm


Myles, David
Robinson, Peter (Belfast East)
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Neale, Gerrard
Rost, Peter
Townsend, Cyril D. (Bexieyheath)


Needham, Richard
Royle, Sir Anthony
Trippier, David


Nelson, Anthony
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy
Trotter, Neville


Neubert, Michael
St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon Norman
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Newton, Tony
Scott, Nicholas
Vaughan, Dr Gerard


Nott, Rt Hon John
Shaw, Gies (Pudsey)
Viggers, Peter


Onslow, Cranley
Shelton, William (Streatham)
Waddington, David


Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs Sally
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)
Wakeham, John


Osborn, John
Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge-Br'hills)
Waldegrave, Hon. William


Page, John (Harrow, Wast)
Shersby, Michael
Walker, Bill (Perth &amp; E Perthshire)


Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
Silvester, Fred
Walker-Smith, Rt Hon Sir Derek


Paisley, Rev Ian
Sims, Roger
Wall, Patrick


Parkinson, Cecil
Skeet, T. H. H.
Waller, Gary


Parris, Matthew
Speed, Keith
Ward, John


Patten, Christopher (Bath)
Speller, Tony
Warren, Kenneth


Patten, John (Oxford)
Spence, John
Watson, John


Pattie, Geoffrey
Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Pawsey, James
Sproat, Iain
Wells, Bowen (Hert'rd &amp; Stev'nage)


Percival, Sir Ian
Squire, Robin
Wheeler, John


Pink, R. Bonner
Stainton, Keith
Whitney, Raymond


Pollock, Alexander
Stanbrook, Ivor
Wickenden, Keith


Porter, George
Stanley, John
Wiggin, Jerry


Price, David (Eastleigh)
Steen, Anthony
Wilkinson, John


Prior, Rt Hon James
Stevens, Martin
Williams, Delwyn (Montgomery)


Proctor, K. Harvey
Stewart, Ian (Hitchln)
Winterton, Nicholas


Raison, Timothy
Stewart, John (East Renfrewshire)
Wolfson, Mark


Rathbone, Tim
Stokes, John
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)
Stradling Thomas, J.



Rees-Davies, W. R.
Tapsell, Peter
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Rhodes James, Robert
Taylor, Robert (Croydon NW)
Mr. Carol Mather and


Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Tebbit, Norman
Lord James Douglas-Hamilton

Question accordingly negatived.

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Mr. Ian Lloyd: I hope that I am in order in concluding that this debate on the clause is the only occasion on which one may discuss the provisions of the constitution which the clause empowers the House of Commons to bring into operation. I should like to discuss just that—very briefly, sensitive as I am to the impatience of hon. Members at this time of night.
I start by asking the Minister two questions in relation to the State and the independence constitution. First, it would seem that Zimbabwe is now to be the name of the new country and that the name Rhodesia is to disappear. Do I take it that is the considered conclusion of the conference? I think that this point will bring different degrees of support from different people. Many hon. Members will realise that Zimbabwe refers to a ruin, whereas Rhodesia refers to a country that was created by probably one of the greatest colonial servants of all time. [HON. MEMBERS: "Rhodes!"] Hon. Members who jeer at Rhodes may recall that Cecil J. Rhodes has supported at least 3,000 Rhodes scholars at Oxford university. Jeer at that if they wish.
Perhaps I may return to an important section to which I have already referred—
Freedom from Deprivation of Property
Paragraph V(2) on page 6 states:
Exception will be made for the taking of possession of property during a period of public emergency.
It is not clear whether this exception is qualified by the provisions of paragraph V(1), which properly states that "adequate compensation" should be paid. It would appear from reading this summary that paragraph v(2) does not fall within that provision. I shall be glad to have the Minister's assurance that my conclusion is correct.
On page 7, paragraph V(3)(b), the constitution provides that, where compensation is to be remitted to the United Kingdom,
reasonable restrictions as to the manner in which the payment is to be remitted
shall be applied in all cases. "Reasonable" has different meanings as between individuals. Sometimes it is unreasonable when handled by a Government such as that of Idi Amin. Who is to interpret the word "reasonable"? Is it entirely the new Government, their civil servants or the Zimbabwe Parliament? Or is there to be some arbitration procedure by the IMF?
The next question refers to a point that I made earlier. It comes under paragraph VI(2)—
Protection for Privacy of Home and Other Property.
Again, we have what I might describe as the six ugly sisers. Virtually anything can be done
in the interests of defence, public safety, public order, public morality, public health, or town and country planning ".
Who is to decide what these interests are? How are they to be interpreted? Are any criteria to be laid down? If so, where are they to be laid down? Are they to be laid down by the Zimbabwe Parliament, and are they to be interpreted by the Zimbabwe courts?
On page 8 there is an interesting qualification that is repeated on several subsequent occasions:
What would be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.
That is a very broad definition. Which type of democratic society? Our type of democratic society? Again, what kind of reasonableness? I referred earlier to this being a coach-and-horses constitution. This is certainly a very wide gate through which all kinds of interpretations can be driven.
I turn now to page 13, paragraph XII— "Protection from Discrimination". I imagine that this must have been a very difficult provision for my right hon. Friend to bring to the point of agreement in a draft constitution. It is understandable that it should be forbidden for any law to contain a provision that is discriminatory. This is discriminatory not as qualified further down—
race, tribe, place or origin, political opinions, colour or creed"—
but in the broadest possible sense. For example, would this prohibit any new Government of Zimbabwe, for reasons which they considered justifiable, declaring a particular tribal area to be the property of a particular tribe or for a particular tribe to have defined or stated privileges in such an area? I can imagine circumstances in which the new Government of Zimbabwe would find it reasonable and justifiable to wish to do something of that kind. Under the clause, as I understand it, they are totally prohibited from doing so.
Finally, I ask the Lord Privy Seal to advise us whether the constitution is in its absolutely final form or whether, when it is printed, there will be considerable detailed emendations of the constitution which will affect the meaning of the very broad summary document which the House is being asked to approve under clause 2 this evening.
It seems to me that we bear the same relation to this constitution as the Senate in the United States of America bears to SALT II. We are not even asked to advise and consent; we are merely asked to consent.
Although, obviously, we wish to help my right hon. Friend in every possible way, it would be useful to have an answer to the points I have raised.

Mr. Cryer: The clause is a very powerful one, conferring enormous powers on the Executive. We had a debate earlier, on an amendment put forward by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Warley, West (Mr. Archer), to which no answers whatever were provided, although the matter was of great constitutional importance. I thought that the House of Commons was here to do some sort of scrutinising job on the Executive. Parliament is handing over enormous powers to the Executive, and yet when we made a request that proper procedure should be followed we had no response whatever from the Minister.
Will the Lord Privy Seal give an assurance to the Committee that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office will not use the powers in clause 2(3) to avoid bringing an order before the House when the order has been laid for 28 days? In other words, will he assure us that he will not lay an order, avoid debate for 28 days and then lay a further order before the expiration of the first order, and so on, which would have the effect of continuing the powers but without giving the opportunity to the House for debate? It is a very important point.

Sir Ian Gilmour: I certainly give the hon. Gentleman that assurance.
My hon. Friend the Member for Havant and Waterloo (Mr. Lloyd) said that the House of Commons was being asked to consent to the constitution under clause 2 of the Bill. That is not so. It


is not being asked to consent to the constitution. As I explained earlier, when my hon. Friend may not have been present, in accordance with precedent the constitution is being worked out with two other parties at the conference, and it would be quite impossible if the House were able to alter parts of the constitution. It will be given to the House as a fait accompli in an Order in Council. Therefore, clause 2 does not have the effect that my hon. Friend suggested.
One or two of my hon. Friend's questions came out so fast that I could not catch them. I hope that he will forgive me if I write to him about them when I have been able to read them in Hansard. I can, however, answer one or two of them now. The answer to his first question is that the country will be called Zimbabwe. The courts will decide what "reasonable" means. "Democracy" is a notoriously difficult word to define, and I would not seek to do so at this moment. The constitution is not, of course, in its final form, as I stated earlier. It is in ordinary language. It is comprehensible, and the final version probably will not be.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 2 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 3

OTHER POWERS WITH RESPECT TO SOUTHERN RHODESIA

11 pm

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I beg to move amendment No. 43, in page 2, line 30, at end insert
'save that the existing armed forces should not be used for security work during the period up to the appointed day'.

The Chairman (Mr. Bernard Weatherill): With this, it will be convenient to take the following amendments:

No. 44, in page 2, line 30, at end insert
'save that the existing police forces should not be used for policing during the period up to the appointed day.'.

No. 45, in page 2, line 30 at end insert
'save that General Walls should not be the commander of the armed forces during the period up to the appointed day.'.

No. 46, in page 2, line 30, at end insert
'save that the Selous Scouts should be disbanded.'.

No. 47, in page 2, line 30, at end insert
'save that the security forces should be provided by the independent countries of the Commonwealth'.

No. 50, in page 2, line 30, at end insert
'save that the governor should be advised by a council of 6 members of the Muzorewa régime and 6 members of the Patriotic Front'.

Mr. Lyon: We now move to an important set of amendments which comprehend the position of security during the period of transition and raise the issue of the part to be played by the present Rhodesian security forces and the present Rhodesian police force and which also call for the abandonment of the Selous Scouts and the dismissal of General Walls as the head of the security forces. The amendments invite the security forces to become composed of independent forces from the Commonwealth. They also raise the issue of an advisory committee to the Governor composed of members of the Patriotic Front and members of the Muzorewa regime.
I shall not be referring much to the last of these amendments because it now appears that there has been some agreement at Lancaster House on the absence of the need to have an advisory committee. My concern relates to the remainder of the amendments dealing with the state of the security forces in the interim. We have touched upon this matter in earlier debates, but this series of amendments provides the opportunity to explore at length the somewhat ludicrous position in which the Government have found themselves after the discussions that have so far taken place. It was originally proposed that security would be handled in the interim by the existing security forces and police force. That must seem, even to Conservative Members, an intolerable situation.
A civil war has been raging for 10 years. The fight between the two sides has resulted in incidents which one side or other has characterised as a massacre or an atrocity. There were well-confirmed allegations by the Justice and Peace commission that on one occasion the security forces entered a village where the villagers had been addressed by some members of the Patriotic Front. By the


time the security forces entered, the Patriotic Front had gone. But the villagers had done what normally happens in such a situation. They had fallen to the ground. The allegation was that the security forces then opened fire on them on the ground and that well over 100 people were killed.
That story can be repeated endlessly. Conservative Members will no doubt argue that it was an unjust assertion and that a similar story could be repeated endlessly about the activities of the Patriotic Front. With so recent an allegation believed by one side or the other, it is inconceivable that the people who support the Patriotic Front, or members of the Patriotic Front forces, would look upon the security forces with the same degree of detachment as that with which the armed forces or the police of this country are viewed. The situation is not the same.
The security forces and the police forces have been the military arm of a Government against which the Patriotic Front and the guerrillas, and a great many who support them, have been fighting. It is not satisfactory for the Government to say that the Governor, when he arrives, will take over control of the security forces and the police and that they will behave in accordance with the rules under which we would expect the military and police forces in this country to behave. That will not happen. These are people who have been imbued with the sense of hatred, malice and fight which is necessarily involved in fighting a war against an enemy.
Anyone in Rhodesia who talks about the guerrilla forces discovers that it is enough to get representatives of the Army or the police spitting at the very word "guerrilla". They call them "terrs". They insist on calling them tens because it has the propaganda value of diminishing the sense that the people who are fighting against them are fighting for a reasonable, responsible cause. Whether that is right or wrong, it is impossible with that degree of conditioning over 10 years that the men who have been fighting the tens and going back to Meikle's hotel and boasting about what they have done in the bush should be allowed to go and administer the ceasefire and take a

view of the conduct of people in the Patriotic Front which is entirely dispassionate.
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to say that the present security forces and the present police force should not be allowed to administer the transitional period in the time up to elections. One can conceive of any number of occasions when the security forces, whoever they are, will be required in an atmosphere of tension to hold the peace in that tension. It would be easy to imagine that in a hard-fought election in this country. I remind the Committee of the 1974 election, when the police had to intervene to hold down passion in a very hard-fought election. But if that task is to be entrusted to the police and the security forces who have that reputation with the other side, clearly there can be no sense in which that can be fair.
The Government have moved a little. They have now moved to the position where they say that they will not entrust the task entirely to the security forces and the police force but that the security forces will remain in being, the Patriotic Front forces will remain in being, the responsible commanders of each will be responsible to the Governor, and, therefore, it will be administered fairly.
One can conceive of very obvious difficulties in such a state of affairs. If an incident occurred which was likely to precipitate violence and required a force of armed men to put it down, who should put it down? Should it be the forces of the Patriotic Front, or those of the present regime? Should General Walls send in his men, or should Commander Tongagara send in his men? The answer would be likely to lead to a major row in Salisbury when the issue was arising 30 or 40 miles out in the bush, the dispute simmering up to open bloodshed in minutes.
That is inconceivable as a way of dealing with such incidents, and I suspect that what is really in the minds of the Government is that the security forces themselves will not on the whole be required to do anything but that the police will be allowed to administer such incidents and that the security forces of the Muzorewa regime will stand opposite the security forces of the Patriotic Front regime and the two will cancel out each other by looking on while the police go in and deal with matters.
The record of the police is just as tainted in the eyes of those who support the Patriotic Front as are the security forces themselves. The police do not serve a non-military role in Rhodesia. They are part of the total security of the armed forces. They take part in operations in the same way as the troops, and out in the bush they wear a uniform more akin to the military uniform of the security forces. Therefore, it is not true that they have the kind of non-military, non-violent role of the police here, and it cannot be acceptable that they and they alone will be responsible for appeasing whatever kind of momentary disturbance occurs around the country.
Therefore, I think that the Government logically are left with the only conclusion that is viable. Conservative Members were earlier despising the attitude of the Patriotic Front in negotiations. That proposition, however, has been advanced by the Patriotic Front for some time—namely, that neither it nor the security forces should do the policing but that it should be done by some independent force brought into the country for the purpose.
Initially, the Patriotic Front wanted the United Nations. However, the Government were not prepared to have that. The Patriotic Front was willing to compromise on the Commonwealth. The Government have accepted the idea of having the Commonwealth. All that has happened since last Thursday when they were planning to push the Bill through the House without providing proper time for discussion. We discovered during the weekend that a major change of Government policy had taken place. They have conceded that the Commonwealth observers will actually be swollen to a force nearer to 800 men, but again they are failing to give full effect to the rational compromise—namely, that that force would itself be charged with administering security. The Government are claiming that it would simply observe the other forces, particularly the police force, at work.

Mr. Bowen Wells: Is not the hon. Gentleman discussing matters that are currently being negotiated between the parties at Lancaster House? Does he agree that that is no part of the function of the House of Commons this evening and that these matters should be agreed

between the parties involved, not debated on the Floor of the Committee tonight?

Mr. Lyon: I know that discussions in the House are sometimes so formalistic that nobody listens to the other side, but, surely, in a debate such as this we are trying to talk to each other. The hon. Gentleman knows the answer to that interjection because he has heard it several times today. If the Government did not want us to talk about the very guts of what is happening at Lancaster House, they should not have brought in the Bill. That was why we said that it was absurd to bring it in before agreement was reached.
The fact that the Government brought the Bill in means that we have to talk about things that are being discussed at Lancaster House. For the hon. Gentleman to say that we ought to be a responsible Opposition and lie down and let the Lord Privy Seal walk all over us so that he can have his Bill without a discussion is an absurdity. I was not sent to the House of Commons to take the diktat of the Lord Privy Seal—nor that of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition. I shall do what I conceive to be right in the circumstances presented to us in the House.
We would not be in this position if the Government had done as a requested last Thursday and delayed the Bill until they secured an agreement. Since we have to discuss it, however, I think that I am perfectly right in raising the question of the kind of security force that there will be. The Government have not faced up to the logic that if it cannot be the Patriotic Front, the Salisbury security forces or the police force of the Muzorewa regime, it must be an independent force. They have gone only as far as allowing observers.
Eight hundred observers in a country that is only slightly smaller than the United Kingdom will have the major job of being around in the right place at the right time. The idea is that one man serving up in the bush in one of the tribal trust lands will be able to go to an area where trouble has flared up between supporters of different parties, where violence is likely and where the police, the security forces or the Patriotic Front forces have been sent to try to maintain order. The observer is expected to determine whether they are doing the job properly, whether


they are favouring one side or the other or whether a dangerous situation is brewing up and the forces are making matters worse. What on earth is he to do? He will send back a report to the Governor saying that it was unfortunate that the Patriotic Front forces or the police or the security forces had not done very well and that several people had been killed.
11.15 pm
One can imagine the effect that such a report would have on the conduct of the elections. It would call forth the worst kind of emotions in a situation which the Government have constantly said would be "fragile" anyway. Would it not be better if there were sufficient troops from outside sources who could take a grip of such a situation and ensure law and order? Their orders would be accepted by both sides because they would be dispassionate

Sir Raymond Gower: Does not the hon Gentleman think that it might be extraordinarily difficult for a force consisting of Canadians, Ghanaians or Nigerians, in completely strange surroundings, to make the arrangements required for the holding of an election without very close help from the other forces to which he referred?

Mr. Lyon: Even a soldier from Nigeria or Canada would realise that if there were a crowd of people, some of them flourishing and firing guns, that situation must be contained. It would not necessarily matter that the outside troops were not familiar with the country. They would be able to bring their presence to bear in order to contain that violence. Of course, there would be problems with native customs, language and the local geography and they would need advice from the people familiar with those questions.
The Government's scheme is different. They suggest that there should be advisers and observers. Under the scheme that I propose, the Commonwealth forces would decide issues with the help of local advisers. That would make a world of difference to the attitude of the people of the countryside and the townships about whether to accept the decisions of the Commonwealth forces or of the other security forces.

Mr. Ernie Ross: Does my hon. Friend agree that the argument put forward by the hon. Member for Barry (Sir R. Gower) is perhaps the reason why the time scale of two months is not long enough? The hon. Gentleman should be joining with us in trying to ensure that the time given for the forces who go into Rhodesia, and who will be unfamiliar with the environment of that country, should be at least six months, if not longer.

Mr. Lyon: I accept that, but we have already debated that issue.

Mr. Farr: The hon. Gentleman seems to think that 800 observers are insufficient. Is he aware that that will be the equivalent of one observer per 10,000 electors? That will make these elections the most closely scrutinised in the history of the world.

Mr. Lyon: It is when there is only one observer to 10,000 electors that the trouble starts. I do not believe that that is the right proportion. In any case, according to the Government's proposal they would be there not to quell disorder but simply to report what happens to the Government. That is the way the Government see it. This is the major difference between the parties at the moment. It is one of the most serious issues of contention.
However, there is on offer from the Commonwealth a force of 20,000 men. Such a force would more than match the existing forces of the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa regime. Twenty thousand men would be able to get a grip of the situation and, if they were to come in before the implementation of the ceasefire, even I might be persuaded that we could organise an election in two months.
If the present security forces are left in charge, it will be impossible to have fair elections. I do not wish to go on at length about the iniquities of the security forces, the military or the police in the past 10 years. I have referred to one incident but there are many more. It is certain that if the security forces which are entrusted with acting for the Governor include the Selous Scouts there can be no hope of assent to their activities during the interim.
That impression was gained when I was in Rhodesia a year ago, when I saw


the townships of refugees from the tribal trust lands. During the Lancaster House conference, the BBC has followed its bulletin about what happens there with a bulletin about the attitude of the whites and the Muzorewa regime in Rhodesia. Last Friday, the BBC reported what was going on in Salisbury at a crucial time. Inevitably, the report was conditioned by the Smith—Muzorewa Government press agency. If the BBC presents a wrong report, its reporters will be thrown out.
The reporter said that he saw the townships of refugees in Salisbury. The refugees said that they had been displaced by the terrorists in the bush. When I was there a year ago, I talked to many people on my own. No one with a particular point of view accompanied me. Overwhelmingly I was told stories of people fleeing from the countryside because of the activities of the security forces, not of the terrorists.
It is inappropriate, to say the least, to accept that the security forces should be left with this job. Perhaps they cannot be stood down but perhaps they can be stood back, just as the Patriotic Front forces have to be stood back. It is totally unacceptable that they should engage in peace-keeping in this crucial period. I hope that the Government's proposals include a plan which involves something more than 800 observers.
One of the amendments demands that General Walls be dismissed. This is a crucial, symbolic act to indicate that the future will be different from the past. There is no doubt that the effective government of Rhodesia is in the hands not of Muzorewa, or, indeed, of Smith but of General Walls. For him to continue as commander of the defence forces in the interim would give a wrong impression.

Mr. Nicholas Winterton: I disagree with practically every argument advanced by the hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon). He told the Committee that he had spent time in that wonderful country, Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, a year ago. He said that he had visited some townships and that he had been permitted to talk to as many people as he wanted without any other person being present. He said that there was no intimidation and no pressure was brought to bear on the person interviewed. He implied that quite a number of those to whom he spoke indicated that

they had fled the countryside to get away from the outrages committed by the security forces.
Although I was not there 12 months ago, I was there two years ago and also six weeks ago. Like the hon Gentleman, I visited various areas of the country, including townships such as Seki, Zengazi and St. Mary, and I found there many people who wanted peace. They had come to the areas surrounding Salisbury and Bulawayo for the protection of the security forces, who were in greater numbers in the more populated areas.
I met many people and, like the hon. Gentleman, was permitted to speak to them without impediment. I wonder, however, whether the same facility would be extended if we went to Tanzania, Zambia, Angola or Mozambique.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Has the hon. Gentleman been to those countries?

Mr. Winterton: No, I have not. I was merely speculating whether the same facility would be extended.

Mr. Lyon: I have been to those countries.

Mr. Winterton: Bearing in mind that Mozambique and Angola have Marxist regimes, I am not surprised that the hon. Gentleman has been invited there. Judging from what he has said in this place and elsewhere, I am sure that he would be welcomed by the leaders.
The people whom I saw in the townships were grateful to Bishop Muzorewa and his Government—and I do not call it a regime. They are a properly elected Government and the most democratic Government in the entire African continent. These people were grateful to their Government, even in a time of what the hon. Gentleman calls war or civil war. I believe that the hon. Gentleman overplays his hand.
I visited various parts of the country. I saw many members of the security forces and the police but was able to go anywhere I liked. The Patriotic Front and its guerrilla leaders peddle the nonsense that there are "no go" areas for the security forces and for the people of Rhodesia.
Even in a time of war, the Rhodesian Government in one area of townships were building 20,000 houses in the current financial year.

Mr. Buchan: That is better than the Tory Government.

Mr. Winterton: Perhaps it is also rather better than previous Socialist Governments.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: I wish to respond to the hon. Gentleman's attack on me for going to other front-line States. I went to all the front-line States as well as Rhodesia. I was not invited to go to any. I went of my own accord and paid with money given to me by a well-known charitable trust in England. Under whose auspices did the hon. Gentleman go to Rhodesia and who paid for his trip?

Mr. Winterton: I have stated it in the Chamber before—

Mr. J. W. Rooker: No, the hon. Gentleman has not.

Mr. Winterton: I should be quite happy if the hon. Gentleman checked the register of Members' interests.

Mr. Rooker: It is not there.

Mr. Winterton: It most certainly is there. It has been entered by the Clerk responsible for keeping the register. I went to Southern Africa at the expense of the South African Government and I made private arrangements to visit Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. While I was in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, I received hospitality from the Bishop's Government on this last occasion and two years ago from the then Rhodesian Government, from private Rhodesian citizens and from my own resources. I paid for certain things.
I am happy that every hon. Member and every member of the public should know exactly how I got to Southern Africa. I am not well breeched, and perhaps I am not particularly well looked upon by the trust to which the hon. Member for York referred, and thus the sort of benefits extended to him were not extended to me. I still believe that, as the House of Commons has a responsibility for the future of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, hon Members from the Back Benches should have the opportunity to visit that vital part of the world, which is of such strategic importance to this country.
I say to the hon. Member for York that it would appear from what he says

that he is completely unaware that an election took place in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in April of this year. Whatever the hon. Gentleman might think about the constitution on which that election was fought, the vast majority of the observers found the elections to be fair and free. Freedom House in the United States—an extremely liberal organisation—held this view, as did a representative of the Labour Party from Australia. He is on record as having said that the elections were fair and free. The Boyd Commission, sent out from this country, found the elections to be fair and free.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: And Lord Chitnis?

Mr. Winterton: What Lord Chitnis said in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and what he said in this country appear to be in conflict. I can only presume that influence was brought to bear. The vast majority of the observers at those elections—[Interruption.] It is amazing that the hon. Member for York, a man, supposedly, of intelligence, should hold his head when facts are uttered and the truth is spoken.

Mr. Clement Freud: rose—

Mr. Winterton: No, I shall not give way.

Mr. Freud: On a point of order, Mr. Weatherill. I must ask the hon. Member to withdraw that filthy slur against Lord Chitnis.

The Chairman: I did not hear the "filthy slur".

Mr. Christopher Price: Further to that point of order, Mr. Weatherill. Is it not set down in "Erskine May" that it is against the rules of this place to cast such aspersions against a member of another place?

The Chairman: I am sorry, I did not hear the filthy slur. If it was a filthy slur, I am certain that the hon. Member will withdraw it.

Mr. Winterton: It was not a filthy slur and I have no doubt, Mr. Weatherill, that when you study the record you will be able so to decide.

The Chairman: Before the hon. Gentleman continues, may I ask him to relate his remarks to the "existing armed forces" and their use for security work, and not to the last elections?

Mr. Winterton: I am trying to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that elections were held in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia in April and that they were highly successful. They were held with the present security forces doing precisely what they are there to do. The security forces, under the command of Lieutenant-General Peter Walls, have a fine reputation, not only in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia but elsewhere. They are highly disciplined, and I believe that any elections contested under the new constitution which the House of Commons is recommending to the people of Rhodesia will be well safeguarded with the existing security forces.

Mr. Peter Hardy: rose—

Mr. Winterton: I shall not give way. If I may relate one remark to the amendment of the hon. Member for York about the Selous Scouts, I believe that the hon. Gentleman has a deep hate of that force, which is at least 80 per cent. black. I have met representatives of both its black and its white members. The force is one of the finest antiterrorist groups in the world. I am confident that the Patriotic Front would not like to see it survive, because it is perhaps owing to the existence of the Selous Scouts that the Front and its terrorist guerrillas in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia have made such little progress in bringing that country to its feet. [HON. MEMBERS: "Knees."] I am happy to accept that amendment to what I have said.
The Selous Scouts have done a wonderful job for Rhodesia, holding up the advance of Marxism and the advance of terrorism. They have probably given more blows to the terrorists than the country has received from the terrorist forces. They have killed and taken out—a phrase that is often used where terrorists are concerned—more terrorists than any other army force in the world today. They are doing a wonderful job.
I wonder why there is this malice. If that is an unparliamentary word, I am happy to withdraw it. Why is there this hatred, this bigotry, against an armed

force that has a fine record? I believe that that country will long be proud of what the Selous Scouts have done.
The Committee should disregard the hon. Gentleman's views. Perhaps he has been as consistent from his point of view as I have been from mine. Our points of view differ. I believe that I am right, and I am sure that the hon. Gentleman believes that he is right. But his philosophy and mine differ.
I believe in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia playing a major part in the development of Southern Africa. It can do that only if it is a stable country.
Lieutenant-General Peter Walls has stated publicly—and I believe him—that he will serve loyally any Government who are elected in that country. [HON. MEMBERS: "If he is asked."] Of course, if he is asked. He was asked to be the commander of combined operations by Bishop Muzorewa, as Prime Minister, and he has served the present Government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia very well and very loyally. If he is asked to stand down by any subsequent Government, I am sure that he will be prepared to do just that. But nobody is better qualified by experience and knowledge to assist the orderly conduct of the elections—whenever they come, and the sooner the better—than the present security forces, under the command of Peter Walls.

Mr. Frank Dobson: As I am sure that the hon. Gentleman agrees that the only legal Government of Southern Rhodesia is that of whom he is a supporter, would he not agree that it would be as well if that only legal Government of Southern Rhodesia asked Mr. Walls to give up his post immediately?

Mr. Winterton: My reply to that question is "No, I do not."

Mr. Freud: Well thought out.

Mr. Winterton: I am always happy to receive compliments from the hon. Gentleman.
Rhodesia has been, de facto if not de jure, an independent country for 14 years. If it had not been for the collapse of the Portuguese empire, it would be a thriving, prospering country today. However, it is probably more thriving and


more prosperous than any of the black African countries to its north, with, perhaps, the exception of Kenya, despite the civil war that has been described to us in such graphic detail.
I have a deep love for Rhodesia. I have no vested interest in the country despite the cheap comments that are made from time to time below the Gangway on the Opposition Benches. If more Labour Members were prepared to visit Rhodesia, they would see the potential that there exists for peace and the example that it could set for development in the rest of Southern Africa.
I saw in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia a greater harmony between black and white than exists even in Britain. My right hon. Friend will be well advised to reject the amendment, to ensure that the die that is now cast is carried forward as quickly as possible and to allow the record of the Rhodesian security forces to continue. They can serve their country and ensure that the elections, when they come, are held in peace.

Mr. Newens: The hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton) stated that the Selous Scouts comprised the best antiterrorist force in the world. He said that it took out more terrorists than any other similar force. The hon. Gentleman is maintaining that that force is a reasonable contingent of the security forces to police an election in which those whom he describes as terrorists will be contesting the election. I cannot believe that he is serious in what he says.
Throughout the period of illegality, the security forces have existed to maintain the illegal regime against all challenge. As a result, it is unlikely in the extreme that any of the senior army officers can be neutral in their attitude towards the Patriotic Front, against which they have been conducting armed hostilities. During the course of the war the security forces must have had many experiences that have hardened their attitudes against the Patriotic Front. Civil war is conducted along the most barbaric lines, and it is not feasible that members of the security forces will change their attitudes overnight. Surely, the members of the existing security forces are singularly ill adapted to police the change that we are saying should now take place.
It is argued by Conservative Members that it is not to be accepted that former guerrillas or members of the Patriotic Front will regard the security forces with the respect generally accorded to the British police or the British Armed Forces. It is only natural that that should be so.
I accept that in the long run it is possible that the security forces of the Salisbury regime and the Patriotic Front will be merged. However, if anyone imagines that that can take place in the short period of two months, he is simply not facing the realities of the situation. No time is to be given for tempers to cool and for attitudes to be changed. To allow the existing security forces to be responsible for policing during the elections would, I believe, be a recipe for disaster.
11.45 pm
Of course, the election will be a crucial experience. It is liable to give rise to all sorts of intense feelings which may easily burst into acts of violence. Even in this country during election periods intense feelings are created, and this at a time when we have had more than 30 years of peace. If we experience these clashes, how much more liable is Zimbabwe-Rhodesia to much greater outbursts of violence? I believe that it will be very difficult to prevent clashes where the guerillas come into close proximity with the security forces of the Salisbury regime.
In these circumstances, there is only one possible way of preventing those clashes. That is, to relieve the security forces of the Salisbury regime, as well as the guerrilla forces, of any liability for maintaining law and order during the election period and to bring in an independent force—preferably from the Commonwealth—as my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) suggested.
The problems are not limited to the election period. It is true that during that period there will be real fears that the security forces will back the candidates of the Muzorewa regime, but there will also be fears that a force which supported the illegal regime in the past might not accept the outcome if the Patriotic Front was victorious. Conservative Members may argue that it is completely unthinkable that the security forces would not


respect the outcome of the election. My answer is that as the security forces in the past were prepared to support an illegal regime, those who have to contend with them might well be excused—particularly those who spent many years in detention—for fearing that those security forces might again take over and maintain power for an illegal regime if the Patriotic Front was victorious.

Mr. John Townend: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is also a distinct possibility that if Bishop Muzorewa was successful the Patriotic Front might not accept the democratic decision?

Mr. Newens: I believe that the brevity of the election period, together with the existence of the security forces, makes it all the more likely that the Patriotic Front will refuse to accept the outcome of the election if it goes against it. One of my arguments is that we must be realistic, understand the situation and try to create circumstances in which, as far as possible, both sides will be prepared to respect the outcome of the election.
We are being incurably optimistic if we expect the Patriotic Front to conduct its campaign, and subsequently to accept with equanimity the outcome of the election, if we have a truncated election period and if at the same time the Salisbury regime security forces remain in control. I believe that we are creating conditions in which the outcome of the election will not be accepted. Our discussions on this clause illustrate just how ill timed the Bill is.
We ask the Government to consider seriously how they may relieve the security forces of the Salisbury regime of the responsibility to maintain law and order in this period and transfer it to an alternative force. Since last week, we have moved to a position where outside observers are to be brought in. I hope that the Government will consider seriously the arguments advanced this evening to ensure that security rests with a force that can in no way be regarded as biased as to the outcome of the election. If we can persuade the Government to take that point of view seriously, we shall greatly increase the chance that peace will ultimately be restored to Rhodesia.

Mr. Ioan Evans: The case presented by my hon. Friend the Member for York (Mr. Lyon) was convincing. However, the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Winterton) said that he disagreed with every word. When the hon. Gentleman disagrees on matters relating to Southern Africa, we can depend on it that he is wrong.
I hope that the Government will give serious consideration to my hon. Friend's amendments. Suppose that we were considering the question whether the Patriotic Front should be in charge of security in Rhodesia. That proposition could be argued in a better way than the proposition that the existing armed forces should be put in charge. The Patriotic Front resisted the illegal regime, whereas the armed forces have sustained the illegal regime for the past 14 years. In fact, I wonder whether the hon. Member for Macclesfield speaks for the unpatriotic forces.
I realise the difficulties experienced by the Government in dealing with their own Back Benchers. The hon. Gentleman and some of his hon. Friends said that we should recognise the Ian Smith regime. Thirteen years ago they would have recognised the illegal regime in Rhodesia. That is shameful. Not one country in the world recognised the illegal regime in Rhodesia.
The hon. Gentleman goes to South Africa under the auspices of the South African Foundation. We know that the Government of South Africa in a surrepetitious way have broken sanctions and tried to sustain the illegal regime in Rhodesia. It was said that the regime should have ended in weeks rather than months. That would have happened if the former colonial territories of Portugal, which have now been liberated, and the Government of South Africa had not gone against the wish of this House to bring that illegal regime back to legality.
The Government state that after the ceasefire, when the Lancaster House talks are over, if we can reach an agreement we shall move forward to elections within two months. We argue that two months is not long enough. There should be a longer period. Let us imagine the situation in Rhodesia. For the past 14 years there was a rebellion against the Crown, which was supported by some


members of the Conservative Party. [Interruption.] Read the reports of our debates. All the evidence is in Hansard. The Tory Party was split on subsequent occasions. One minute, the Front Bench Members recommended Tory Members of Parliament to abstain, on other occasions, they advised them to go into the Lobby and support the Labour Government. Even the Conservative Government did not recognise the illegal regime. Therefore, we recognise the difficulties that the Government now face. In fact, there are those of us who believe that we are having this enabling Bill in order to enable the Government to maintain a sort of unity on sanctions which does not exist. I believe—

The Chairman: Order. Will the hon. Gentleman relate his remarks to the armed forces and election in Rhodesia?

Mr. Evans: I shall come to the amendments, Mr. Weatherill.
The point I am making is this. If we get agreement at Lancaster House, we shall be moving towards real democratic elections in Rhodesia under a new constitution. There will be the chance then that for the first time for 14 years a Government will emerge in the new Zimbabwe who will have international recognition.
If we are to have free elections and if the people who vote are to feel that they are free to exercise their democratic right, it is important that the very people who have been accused of harassing them and have been employed to support and sustain the illegal regime are not seen to be the people in charge of law and order, of the military and of policing.
The Government are now having serious talks. They have accepted the suggestion that there should be Commonwealth observers there. I think that we need to go further than that. We need a peacekeeping force. There have been offers from Australia, Canada and other Commonwealth countries. I hope that such a force will come from Commonwealth countries, although it could be argued that this force could be provided under the United Nations auspices.
But whether it is under Commonwealth or United Nations auspices, it is important

that in the two-month period, or whatever it is, between the ceasefire and the election there should be an independent military and police force in the territory Then it will be seen by the outside world that the people there are really free, without being oppressed by the military who have been there over the years, to come to a decision. We would then have a real chance of the outside world recognising that the people are being given a chance to form their own Government.

Mr. Hooley: This amendment involves issues of principle and of practicality. The issue of principle is that the elections shall be seen to be free and fair. I do not see how the Government can expect to convince the world that the elections are free and fair if the effective power on the ground supervising the process is the executive arm and the armed forces of the existing Muzorewa Government.
I find it incredible that the Government suppose that they will be able to convince the Commonwealth, the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity and others that the elections have been properly conducted if the forces that have been waging the war at the behest of the rebel regime—and are at present waging the war—are the same forces as have been controlling security during the transitional period.
We must remember that more than two sets of forces are involved. There are other private armies in Rhodesia at present. Mr. Sithole himself complained bitterly, after the so-called election, that his supporters had been intimidated by the forces of Muzorewa. A whole complex of security arrangements is required to be made if these eventual elections, and the transitional period itself, are to proceed effectively and lead to the emergence of an acceptable Government.
A number of things have been said about the Rhodesian forces as they are at present constituted and about their record. The fact is that Rhodesia is now under martial law and the forces about which we are now talking are enforcing that law. They are constituting summary courts in various parts of Rhodesia and they have been condemning Rhodesians to death and carrying out those sentences. These are the forces that the Government think will effectively take control of the


situation and command the confidence of all Rhodesians in the forthcoming transitional period.
12 midnight
Reference has been made to the Selous Scouts. I shall not go into detail on that subject. But the World Council of Churches, through missionaries of many denominations who have spent years in Rhodesia ministering to the needs of its people, has reported ugly and unpleasant tales of the Selous Scouts. There may be arguments about atrocities perpetuated on either side within Rhodesia, but there has been little argument about atrocities such as the massacre at Chimoio, carried out by Rhoclesian forces, which they did not attempt to hide and about which they openly boasted. We should be aware of the kind of forces that are available to the current regime and of their record and powers in recent years.
Incidentally, apart from the black and white Rhodesians in those forces, mercenaries are involved. According to some estimates, there are 1,500 or more. I do not believe that hon. Members would seriously wish foreign mercenaries to be involved in the policing of what we hope will be free and fair elections in Rhodesia.
There is the practical question of how best we can control warring factions which are engaged in a civil war. The lesson of the Congo and Southern Lebanon is that, unless there is an effective, independent force on the ground, there is little hope of maintaining a stable and peaceful situation in which to conduct the kind of exercise that we all hope will come about in the transitional period. Whatever their limitations, the United Nations peacekeeping forces in Cyprus, Southern Lebanon and the Congo demonstrate that a highly trained, well-organised, independent international force can contribute an element of stability to a situation that would otherwise be uncontrollable and completely impossible to supervise.
The offer of Commonwealth forces—not just observers—should be accepted by the Government in the interests of their own policy. Part of that policy must be not only that the transitional period is carried through and that the elections are conducted properly but that the international community is assured that the process has been free and fair. The

police in Rhodesia are an armed fighting force. They are not police as we understand that term. World opinion would not be convinced that the transitional period and the election campaign had been conducted in a free and fair manner if the Government relied on the armies of the Rhodesian regime and the so-called British South Africa Police.
I hope that the Government will accept the substance of the amendments, will seriously consider requiring the armed forces of the regime to withdraw to their barracks and to take no part in the transitional period and will take advantage of the generous offers of our Commonwealth friends to supply an effective supervisory force for this process.

Mr. Ernie Ross: Labour Members would be quite willing to welcome the hon. Member for Macclesfield (Mr. Wintenon) into the Lobby at the end of the debate, because it is clear that, like us, he is opposed to the Bill. The best way for him to express that opposition is by voting with us. He obviously understands the problems that would arise if the Bill were to be passed by the House tonight.
Labour Members have been greatly concerned at the lack of any real negotiations during the Lancaster House talks. It is only because of pressures from outside bodies that the proposals put forward by the Foreign Secretary have been negotiated at all. We have the impression from listening to the reports—certainly those coming from the Patriotic Front—that there are no negotiations taking place. Documents are simply placed on the table for consultation. It is all talk, with no real negotiation.
The question of the security forces is of prime importance if Zimbabwe is to return to legality. We have to recognise that there is a war going on in Zimbabwe. That war should be brought to an end. The question is how to bring it to a successful conclusion. Labour Members are suggesting that the method of policing the return to legality should be such as to ensure that at the end of the day all the people within the country have confidence in the Government who, it is hoped, will be elected. The present security forces are working at the behest of an illegal regime. The people of Zimbabwe could have no confidence in those forces if they


were to remain after the country's return to legality. They cannot be regarded as legal forces. If the regime is illegal, it can hardly employ forces which are themselves legal.
The role of the police is a crucial one. The police would be expected to be a regulating force, operating to ensure that all those wishing to participate in the elections would have the right to freedom of speech, freedom of movement and freedom of action. Labour Members are concerned that the police may be under some pressure at some stage, not perhaps to interfere with the leading members of the Patriotic Front but to be concerned with the lesser-known members of the Patriotic Front, many of whom would be involved in the infrastructure of an election campaign. Some of them might be wanted for alleged crimes within the country against the illegal regime. There could be pressures on the police to make some effort to arrest those people and charge them with crimes, thus ensuring their removal from any election procedures.
If such decisions were left to a British Governor, he would find it very difficult to make them, because they would be based not on his political judgment but on the law of the land as it stood at that time. We would be concerned to see that the police force was one which was able to make judgments of that kind free from any pressures which might exist within the country. The only type of force which would recommend itself to Labour Members would be a Commonwealth force which had no commitment other than to the rule of law and order.
This side of the Committee is also concerned about the involvement of South African Ministers in the discussions. It is obvious to the outside world that South Africa is watching closely how these discussions proceed. One wonders what has been said and what meetings have taken place between General Walls and Ministers of the South African Government. One wonders what would happen if an attempt was made after the election, assuming that it was won by the Patriotic Front, to give a directive to the existing security forces and that directive was not accepted. What would happen if civil war broke out at a time when Britain had moved out of the conflict? Would there be a direct involvement by South Africa?

Would we consider that we retained some responsibility? These are the situations we are trying to avoid, hoping that, after the election, reconciliation will take place in Zimbabwe. That cannot happen unless reconciliation is seen to be taking place in the run-up to the election.
Opposition Members have explained their reasons for proposing a Commonwealth force. If the Government are serious about wanting a reconciliation in Zimbabwe, they should take these arguments on board and accept the amendments. The hon. Member for Macclesfield, at least, should be voting with us.

Mr. Shore: The amendments are concerned with the most difficult of all the questions—namely, the problem of security and how it is to be achieved and maintained during the period up to the appointed day and up to the elections. If the debate has done nothing else, it has brought out vividly the enormous problems to be faced. Years of terror and counter-terror of the kind to which Rhodesia has been subjected for so long between the main forces of the guerrillas and the security forces can only leave total mistrust and distrust. On top of that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Heeley (Mr. Hooley) pointed out, inside the main separate forces there are other forces and private armies that pose an additional problem in making effective security arrangements.
If one put to the European and Muzorewa wing of the conference proposals that the security arrangements should be substantially monitored and policed by the forces of the Patriotic Front, such proposals would be treated with the utmost suspicion and hostility. It is equally true that the Patriotic Front would view with the utmost hostility and seek to remove what they would see as the discrimination that would follow upon security arrangements leading up to the election being in the hands of the State security apparatus that it has been fighting for many years. We know that this is the matter to be discussed in the crucial, last and most difficult stage three of the Lancaster House conference.
I do not see any perfect solution to the security problems that are posed. When, two years ago, my right hon. Friend, the Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr Owen) attempted to advance the cause


of a settlement and peace with his colleague the American Secretary of State, the Anglo-American proposals were produced. As the Committee will recall, basically they were to bring in a third force precisely to attempt to deal with the very obvious and acute hostilities and suspicions which existed between the two main parties to the present conflict. The idea was to have a third force which would be sufficiently powerful to keep apart the opposing factions and parties and to achieve security in which proper elections could be held.
12.15 am
I understand the appeal of an independent force. I think that most fair-minded people can see the strength of it. Whatever other arrangements we make, they are bound to be flawed. We shall be making considerable efforts to remove some of the major flaws. From the point of view of the contending parties, however, the proposals which are emerging are bound to be treated with considerable suspicion.
In a sense, the trouble is that the Lusaka conference, from which the London conference draws so much of its guidelines and strength, did not deal with this aspect. But it was not just a matter of omission by error. We have to accept that the parties at the Lusaka conference were not proposing that there should be a United Nations third force brought into Rhodesia, and this was a significant departure from the previous Anglo-American plans.
Against that background, it must be asked, what is left? What are the alternatives? One obvious alternative is touched on in paragraph 21 of the document which I described as "phase three" In essence, the proposal is to achieve a ceasefire which at the same time will neutralise the main forces of both the contending factions. The idea is to neutralise the main Rhodesian security forces in the sense, I assume, that they would have very limited duties and would basically be in barracks or camps, and also to neutralise the major guerrilla forces in their bases and camps mainly across the frontiers of Rhodesia in neighbouring countries.
That is one part of the alternative which has been put forward. My understanding is that the Government are trying to set

up advisory machinery in which the military commanders of both the Patriotic Front and the Salisbury Government are advising the Governor about how the ceasefire can be preserved.
The paragraph goes on to say that it will require all parties to commit themselves to accept the Governor's authority. It is asking a lot. All the same, it is one element in this inevitably second-best arrangement for securing a ceasefire and reasonable conditions for fairness under it.
Of course, it is not the only factor. The only other option that the Government have is to bring in an independent element, but in a rather different form. Here, I think, the Lord Privy Seal should take the Committee more into his confidence. Earlier, I spoke about the proposal which had become public on Friday for a somewhat extended Commonwealth observer role. I put that proposal to the right hon. Gentleman when I replied to his statement on 24 October. It seemed to me that the idea that the Commonwealth, which had played such a major role in making Lusaka and London possible, should be invited simply to witness the elections was a kind of absurdity, given the Commonwealth's good will and influence and the possibility of its resources being brought to bear to assist in reaching a solution.
Since then, the Government have moved forward in two ways. They have made it perfectly plain that the Commonwealth civil observer role will not be simply to witness the ballot box operation but will extend to cover the whole conditions of the territory. That is fine.
Now, the additional proposal has been made since Friday for there to be a Commonwealth military observer force containing a substantial British contingent. I hope that the Lord Privy Seal will tell us something about it and whether any consideration has been given to the proposal contained in one of the amendments we are discussing for the Commonwealth military role to be made more extensive to help to bring about a greater sense of security, stability and fairness in Zimbabwe in the period up to election day.
I understand that many of the amendments are designed to elicit a response, to deal with particular problems. There is


at this stage, however, one point upon which we can agree. Provided that there is a ceasefire—and that is the great proviso—
the existing armed forces should not be used for security work during the period up to the appointed day.
I am using the precise words of the amendment we are discussing. I include in "existing armed forces" the guerrilla armies of Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe as well as the Rhodesia main security forces. The main effort of seeking to neutralise them in one way or another offers the best prospect of making progress in the direction that we all want.
However, it is perfectly plain that a very heavy burden will fall upon the police. The Government's document of 2 November states specifically in paragraph 20, in which law and order are discussed, that
In the event of an effective ceasefire, the necessity for martial law will disappear. The task of maintaining law and order in the pre-independence period will be the responsibility of the civil police.
The civil police have some sections with associations of which we are all aware, but I am glad to see that they are to be reinforced and substantially commanded by senior personnel from this country who will not merely be available at headquarters but will operate in the different regions of the country where the police presence will be of great importance.
That is a crucial role for the police. They will have to see not merely that there are conditions of reasonable security—it will not be perfect security—against armed men and bits of private armies. In addition, they will have the job of safeguarding the lives of political leaders and of making certain that proper election activities can take place. There will also be the problem of protecting the candidates who are some way from centres of authority and communication.
Their task will be very heavy. If the right hon. Gentleman can tell us how he envisages the police being helped and assisted, maybe by outside elements other than those I have discussed, we shall be most happy to hear. We shall support the amendment, which seeks to exclude the main armed forces of both sides. That is not, in my view, a controversial issue between us. The amendment

accepts that the main task of maintaining security and the conditions under which fair and free elections can take place must be for the police, however they may be fortified, reorganised and supervised under the arrangements that are being negotiated.

Sir Ian Gilmour: The hon. Member for York (Mr. Lyon) stated, rightly, that the House of Commons had every right to discuss these matters. I am sure he appreciates that these issues are still being negotiated at Lancaster House. I was surprised to hear the right hon. Member for Stepney and Poplar (Mr. Shore) say that he proposed to support amendment No. 43.
The right hon. Gentleman did, however, quote accurately and fairly the Government's proposals in paragraphs 20 and 21 of our paper on the interim arrangements. We envisage that the role of the armed forces of both sides will be limited to the maintenance of the ceasefire. The maintenance of law and order will be the responsibility of the existing police forces under the Government. No matter what the hon. Member for York says, there is no practicable alternative. We must use the existing forces. The hon. Gentleman bandied numbers around and spoke of 800 observers and an outside force of 20,000 men. Those are his figures. They are not ours. I do not know where they come from, and as far as I am concerned they are entirely speculative. I do not believe that a force of 20,000 men is available or that it would be desirable. [HON. MEMBERS: "Why not?"] To have another army of 20,000 men in a country which already has too many armed forces would not necessarily be a good idea.
The hon. Member for York earlier cited Lebanon as a country where observers had not been much good and where a United Nations force had been useful. I do not believe that the experience of UNIFIL has entirely borne out that judgment. There would be great difficulties with such a force even if it were available.
Amendment No. 43 aims to stop the armed forces being used. We do not envisage the armed forces being used, but I think that it would be quite wrong for us to inhibit the Governor from making what might be difficult and disagreeable decisions. This should be a matter for


agreement between the parties, and I repeat that this stage has not yet been reached.
Amendment No. 44 would prevent the Governor from using the existing police. That cannot be right. Another amendment requires the dismissal of General Walls. We believe strongly that it is for the newly elected Government of Zimbabwe to decide whom they employ. It is not for us to lay down whom that Government shall employ.

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: The amendment relates to the transitional period. Is it intended that General Walls should command the security forces during that period?

Sir. I. Gilmour: We have no proposals to alter the commands of the security forces, the Patriotic Front forces or those of anyone else. If the hon. Gentleman were consistent, he should have called for the dismissal of General Tongagara as well. That also seems to me to be quite gratuitous and we should not countenance it.
The right hon. Member for Stepney and Poplar asked, very fairly, for more particulars of the Government's plans for monitoring. These proposals have not been put to the conference. Before we could do that, we had to ascertain whether certain Commonwealth countries were prepared to provide forces. That is how the information became public. We have always recognised that there must be adequate machinery for monitoring the observance of the ceasefire. These details must be left for negotiation at the next

stage of the conference. We shall be making two proposals.

Mr. Buchan: The right hon. Gentleman says that these matters are still subject to negotiation. Will he therefore reconsider what he has said? He has endorsed the use of the illegal security force for the transitional period before negotiation at Lancaster House. That is a serious proposition.

Sir I. Gilmour: The hon. Gentleman cannot have listened to what I said. We shall be making two proposals. First, we envisage that there will be a ceasefire commission which will meet in Salisbury under the chairmanship of the Governor's military adviser. The military commanders of both sides will be represented on the commission. The task of the commission will be to ensure that the agreed arrangements, whatever they may be, are complied with and to investigate breaches.
Secondly, we shall propose to establish a Commonwealth monitoring group to which other Commonwealth Governments will be invited to contribute. That is for the next stage of the conference. We have not yet reached that stage but I trust that we shall do so soon. It must be right not to set conditions now for these negotiations. These are matters for Lancaster House. I ask the House to reject the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made:

The Committee divided: Ayes 230. Noes 301.

Division No. 102]
AYES
[12.32 am


Adams, Allen
Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Davies, Ifor (Gower)


Allaun, Frank
Campbell, Ian
Davis, Clinton (Hackney Central)


Anderson, Donald
Campbell-Savours, Dale
Davis, Terry (B'rm'ham, Stechford)


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Canavan, Dennis
Deakins, Eric


Armstrong, Rt Hon Ernest
Cant, R. B.
Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Carmichael, Neil
Dempsey, James


Ashton, Joe
Cartwright, John
Dewar, Donald


Atkinson, Norman (H'gey, Tott'ham)
Clark, David (South Shields)
Dixon, Donald


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
Dobson, Frank


Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (Heywood)
Cohen, Stanley
Dormand, Jack


Beith, A. J.
Coleman, Donald
Douglas, Dick


Benn, Rt Hon Anthony Wedgwood
Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
Douglas-Mann, Bruce


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Conlan, Bernard
Dubs, Alfred


Bidwell, Sydney
Cook, Robin F.
Duffy, A. E. P.


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Cowans, Harry
Dunn, James A. (Liverpool, Kirkdale)


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Cox, Tom (Wandsworth, Tooting)
Dunnett, Jack


Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur (M'brough)
Crowther, J. S.
Dunwoody, Mrs Gwyneth


Bradley, Tom
Cryer, Bob
Eadie, Alex


Bray, Dr Jeremy
Cunliffe, Lawrence
Eastham, Ken


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Cunningham, George (Islington S)
Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)


Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)
Cunningham, Dr John (Whitehaven)
Ellis, Raymond (NE Derbyshire)


Brown, Ron (Edinburgh, Leith)
Dalyell, Tam
Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)


Buchan, Norman
Davidson, Arthur
English, Michael


Callaghan, Rt Hon J. (Cardiff SE)
Davies, E. Hudson (Caerphilly)
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)




Evans, John (Newton)
Lyon, Alexander (York)
Rooker, J. W.


Field, Frank
McCartney, Hugh
Roper John


Flannery, Martin
McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)


Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
McGuire, Michael (Ince)
Rowlands, Ted


Ford, Ben
McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Ryman, John


Forrester, John
McKelvey, William
Sandelson, Neville


Foster, Derek
MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Sever, John


Fraser, John (Lambeth, Norwood)
Maclennan, Robert
Sheerman, Barry


Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, Central)
Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert (A'ton-u-L)


Freud, Clement
McNally, Thomas
Shore, Rt Hon Peter (Step and Pop)


Garrett, John (Norwich S)
McNamara, Kevin
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)


Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
McWiIIiam, John
Silkin, Rt Hon S.C. (Dulwich)


George, Bruce
Magee, Bryan
Silverman, Julius


Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John
Marks, Kenneth
Skinner, Dennis


Golding, John
Marshall, David (Gl'sgow, Shettles'n)
Soley, Clive


Grant, George (Morpeth)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
Spearing, Nigel


Grant, John (Islington C)
Marshall, Jim (Leicester South)
Spriggs, Leslie


Hamilton, W. W. (Central Fife)
Martin, Michael (Gl'gow, Springb'rn)
Stallard, A. W.


Hardy, Peter
Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Steel, Rt Hon David


Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Maxton, John
Stoddart, David


Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith
Maynard, Miss Joan
Stott, Roger


Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy
Meacher, Michael
Strang, Gavin


Haynes, Frank
Mikardo, Ian
Straw, Jack


Healey, Rt Hon Denis
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Heffer, Eric S.
Miller, Dr M. S. (East Kilbride)
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton West)


Hogg, Norman (E Dunbartonshire)
Mitchell, Austin (Grimsby)
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Holland, Stuart (L'beth, Vauxhall)
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)
Thomas, Mike (Newcastle East)


Home Robertson, John
Morris, Rt Hon Charles (Openshaw)
Thomas, Dr Roger Carmarthen)


Homewood, William
Morris, Rt Hon John (Aberavon)
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)


Hooley, Frank
Morion, Barry
Tilley, John


Howell, Rt Hon Denis (Bham, Sm H)
Moyle, Rt Hon Roland
Tinn, James


Howells, Geraint
Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick
Torney, Tom


Huckfield, Les
Newens, Stanley
Varley, Rt Hon Eric G.


Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)


Janner, Hon Greville
O'Halloran, Michael
Walker, Rt Hon Harold (Doncaster)


Jay, Rt Hon Douglas
O'Neill, Martin
Weetch, Ken


John, Brynmor
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Wellbeloved, James


Johnson, James (Hull West)
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David
Weish, Michael


Jones, Rt Hon Alec (Rhondda)
Palmer, Arthur
White, Frank R. (Bury &amp; Radcliffe)


Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Park, George
White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)


Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Parry, Robert
Whitlock, William


Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Pendry, Tom
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Kerr, Russell
Penhaligon, David
Williams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)


Kilroy-Siik, Robert
Fowell, Raymond (Ogmore)
Wilson, Rt Hon Sir Harold (Huyton)


Kinnock, Neil
Prescott, John
Wilson, William (Coventry SE)


Lambie, David
Price, Christopher (Lewisham West)
Winnick, David


Lamborn, Harry
Race, Reg
Woolmer, Kenneth


Lamond, James
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds South)
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Leadbitler, Ted
Richardson, Miss Jo
Wright, Sheila


Leighton, Ronald
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)
Young, David (Bolton East)


Lestor, Miss Joan (Elton &amp; Slough)
Roberts, Ernest (Hackney North)



Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES


Litherland, Robert
Robertson, George
Mr. Ted Graham and


Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Robinson, Geoffrey (Coventry NW)
Mr. James Hamilton




NOES


Adley, Robert
Bowden, Andrew
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)


Aitken, Jonathan
Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Cockeram, Eric


Alexander, Richard
Braine, Sir Bernard
Colvin, Michael


Alison, Michael
Bright, Graham
Cope, John


Ancram, Michael
Brinton, Tim
Cormack, Patrick


Arnold, Tom
Brittan, Leon
Corrie, John


Aspinwall, Jack
Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher
Costain, A. P.


Atkins, Robert (Preston North)
Brooke, Hon Peter
Cranborne, Viscount


Atkinson, David (Bournemouth, East)
Brotherton, Michael
Critchley, Julian


Baker, Nicholas (North Dorset)
Brown, Michael (Brigg &amp; Sc'thorpe)
Crouch, David


Banks, Robert
Browne, John (Winchester)
Dickens, Geoffrey


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Bruce-Gardyne, John
Dorrell, Stephen


Bell, Ronald
Bryan, Sir Paul
Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James


Bendall, Vivian
Buck, Antony
Dover, Denshore


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Budgen, Nick
du Cann, Rt Hon Edward


Benyon, Thomas (Abingdon)
Buimer, Esmond
Dunn, Robert (Dartford)


Benyon, W. (Buckingham)
Burden, F. A.
Durant, Tony


Berry, Hon Anthony
Butcher, John
Dykes, Hugh


Best, Keith
Butler, Hon Adam
Eden, Rt Hon Sir John


Bevan, David Gilroy
Cadbury, Jocelyn
Edwards, Rt Hon N. (Pembroke)


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Eggar, Timothy


Biggs-Davison, John
Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Elliott, Sir William


Blackburn, John
Carlisle, Rt Hon Mark (Runcorn)
Emery, Peter


Blaker, Peter
Chalker, Mrs Lynda
Eyre, Reginald


Body, Richard
Channon, Paul
Fairbairn, Nicholas


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Chapman, Sydney
Faith, Mrs Sheila


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Churchill, W. S.
Farr, John


Bottomley, Peter (Woolwich West)
Clark, Dr William (Croydon South)
Fell, Anthony







Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Loveridge, John
Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey


Finsberg, Geoffrey
Luce, Richard
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)


Fisher, Sir Nigel
Lyell, Nicholas
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)


Fletcher, Alexander (Edinburgh N)
McAdden, Sir Stephen
Robinson, Peter (Belfast East)


Fookes, Miss Janet
McCrindle, Robert
Ross, Wm. (Londonderry)


Forman, Nigel
Macfarlane, Neil
Rost, Peter


Fraser, Rt Hon H. (Stafford &amp; St)
MacGregor, John
Royle, Sir Anthony


Fraser, Peter (South Angus)
MacKay, John (Argyll)
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy


Fry, Peter
McNair-Wilson, Michael (Newbury)
St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon Norman


Gardiner, George (Reigate)
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Scott, Nicholas


Gardner, Edward (South Fylde)
McQuarrie, Albert
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Madel, David
Shelton, William (Streatham)


Gilmour, Rt Hon Sir Ian
Major, John
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Goodhart, Philip
Marland, Paul
Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge-Br'hills)


Goodhew, Victor
Marlow, Tony
Shersby, Michael


Goodlad, Alastair
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)
Silvester, Fred


Gow, Ian
Mates, Michael
Sims, Roger


Gower, Sir Raymond
Maude, Rt Hon Angus
Skeet, T. H. H.


Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)
Mawby, Ray
Speed, Keith


Gray, Hamish
Mawhinney, Dr Brian
Speller, Tony


Greenway, Harry
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Spence, John


Grieve, Percy
Mayhew, Patrick
Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)


Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St Edmunds)
Mellor, David
Sproat, Iain


Griffiths, Peter (Portsmouth N)
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Squire, Robin


Grist, Ian
Miller, Hal (Bromsgrove &amp; Redditch)
Stainton, Keith


Grylls, Michael
Mills, Iain (Meriden)
Stanbrook, Ivor


Gummer, John Selwyn
Mills, Peter (West Devon)
Stanley, John


Hamilton, Hon Archie (Eps'm&amp;Ew'll)
Miscampbell, Norman
Steen, Anthony


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)
Stevens, Martin


Hampson, Dr Keith
Moate, Roger
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Hannam, John
Monro, Hector
Stewart, John (East Renfrewshire)


Haselhurst, Alan
Montgomery, Fergus
Stokes, John


Hastings, Stephen
Moore, John
Stradling Thomas, J.


Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael
Morgan, Geraint
Tapsell, Peter


Hawkins, Paul
Morris, Michael (Northampton, Sth)
Taylor, Robert (Croydon NW)


Hawksley, Warren
Morrison, Hon Charles (Devizes)
Tebbit, Norman


Hayhoe, Barney
Morrison, Hon Peter (City of Chester)
Temple-Morris, Peter


Heddle, John
Mudd, David
Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs Margaret


Henderson, Barry
Murphy, Christopher
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter (Hendon S)


Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael
Myles, David
Thompson, Donald


Hicks, Robert
Neale, Gerrard
Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Needham, Richard
Thornton, Malcolm


Hill, James
Nelson, Anthony
Townend, John (Bridlington)


Holland, Philip (Carlton)
Neubert, Michael
Townsend, Cyril D. (Bexleyheath)


Hooson, Tom
Newton, Tony
Trippier, David


Howe, Rt Hon Sir Geoffrey
Nott, Rt Hon John
Trotter, Neville


Howell, Rt Hon David (Guildford)
Onslow, Cranley
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Howell, Ralph (North Norfolk)
Oppenhelm, Rt Hon Mrs Sally
Vaughan, Dr Gerard


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Osborn, John
Viggers, Peter


Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Page, John (Harrow, West)
Wakeham, John


Hurd, Hon Douglas
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
Waldegrave, Hon. William


Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)
Paisley, Rev Ian
Wall, Patrick


Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick
Parkinson, Cecil
Waller, Gary


Jessel, Toby
Parris, Matthew
Ward, John


Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Patten, Christopher (Bath)
Warren, Kenneth


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Patten, John (Oxford)
Watson, John


Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Pattie, Geoffrey
Wells, John (Maidstone)


Kaberry, Sir Donald
Pawsey, James
Wells, Bowen (Hert'rd &amp; Stev'nage)


Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Percival, Sir Ian
Wheeler, John


King, Rt Hon Tom
Pink, R. Bonner
Whitelaw, Rt Hon William


Kitson, Sir Timothy
Pollock, Alexander
Whitney, Raymond


Knox, David
Porter, George
Wickenden, Keith


Lamont, Norman
Price, David (Eastleigh)
Wiggin, Jerry


Lang, Ian
Prior, Rt Hon James
Wilkinson, John


Langford-Holt, Sir John
Proctor, K. Harvey
Williams, Delwyn (Montgomery)


Latham, Michael
Ratson, Timothy
Winter on, Nicholas


Lawrence Ivan
Rathbone, Tim
Wolfson, Mark


Lawson, Nigel
Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Lee, John
Rees-Davies, W. R.
Younger, Rt Hon George


Le Merchant, Spencer
Rhodes James, Robert



Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Lewis, Kenneth (Rutand)
Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Mr. David Waddington and


Lloyd, Ian (Havant &amp; Waterloo)
Rifkind, Malcolm
Mr. Carol Mather.


Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)




Question accordingly negatived.

Mr. Rowlands: I beg to move amendment No. 66, in page 3, line 34, at end insert—
(e) the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) (No. 2) Order 1968;

(f) the Southern Rhodesia (United Nations Sanctions) Order 1977.".

The First Deputy Chairman (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine): With this we are to take the following amendments:

No. 52, in page 2, line 31, leave out paragraph (b).

No. 53, in page 2, leave out lines 37 to 39.

No. 55, in page 3, line 1, leave out from "(2)" to "any" in line 5.

No. 58, in page 3, line 10, at end insert
shall remain effective until the end of the transitional period referred to in section 1(2), except insofar as they may impede the exercise of the lawful authority of Her Majesty's Government in Southern Rhodesia during such transitional period".

Mr. Rowlands: This group of amendments deals with sanctions. It is central to the whole of our argument, as it was to the reasoned amendment on Second Reading, that the Government's failure to renew sanctions under section 2 of the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 is a major reason why we should oppose the Bill. In the amendments we try to restore the position.
Nothing has been more emotive in all the 14 years of debate on Rhodesia than the issue of sanctions. There is no greater litmus test of our integrity and the British Government's commitment, nationaly and internationally, to stand by the principle of Rhodesia's return to legality and the establishment of majority rule than our commitment to, and involvement in, the maintenance of sanctions.
Therefore, the issue is both practical and symbolic. It has been the subject of some of the most probing and searching debates in the United Nations and in the international community. It is the international community's test of our willingness to stay the course and to stand by the principles of majority rule and the return to legality. It is no exaggeration to say that the sanctions issue is the fundamental one.
During the debates on the Bill we have been given an odd mixture of reasons why the Government have decided not to retain the section 2 sanctions. These have concealed the basic reason, which is that the Government were not prepared to stand up to a group of their Back Benchers on the issue. That is the sole reason, behind which a whole host of other reasons has been thrown up.
Let us see whether the reasons that the Government have given stand up to investigation. First, we have been told that the lapse of section 2 orders covers only about 20 per cent. of all sanctions, that

they are of no real concern, that, after all, the bulk of sanctions remains, and that no breach of any international obligations is involved.
Secondly, we were told a number of times by the Lord Privy Seal—it was crudely put—that the Government wished to reward Bishop Muzorewa and that they were dropping these sanctions as a reward for his worthy efforts, as they see them, in promoting a settlement. Thirdly, the Government have argued that under existing legislation it would not be possible to renew sanctions for a shorter period than the 12 months for which previous sanctions orders have been renewed.
Let us take first the argument that section 2 is of only minimal concern as it covers only 20 per cent. of all sanctions. That makes nonsense of the agonizing, emotional debates that the House has had for 14 years. It makes nonsense of some of the major debates at successive Conservative Party conferences, which rightly saw that section 2 orders were a matter of great concern, both practically and symbolically, and, therefore, sought to remove them or to prevent their being renewed. It is nonsense for the Government to argue that the sanctions under section 2 are of no consequence.
If the Committee considers some of the sanctions which will fall as a result of the decision not to renew the order, our argument will be demonstrated. The 1968 United Nations sanctions order
restricts the importation into the United Kingdom of goods exported from Southern Rhodesia.… The Order imposes restrictions with respect to undertakings in Southern Rhodesia for the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles. It authorises restrictions upon the entry into the United Kingdom of certain persons connected with Southern Rhodesia.… The Order also makes provision for the investigation of ships and aircraft that are suspected of contravening the Order.
The United Nations sanctions order—it was enforced by section 2 of the 1965 Act, which falls as a result of nonrenewal—was of considerable importance and significance practically, symbolically and in terms of our international obligations.
It is nonsense to dismiss the importance of section 2 sanctions and the international implications of our failure to retain all sanctions until there has been a return to full legality.
We have only to consider the words of distinguished commentators made since Thursday on the Government's decision not to renew. President Kaunda gave a restrained interview. It was given after a weekend of discussions. He was obviously trying to be helpful, to promote discussion and to bridge the gap separating the difference of view. I do not think that the Minister will do other than accept that that was the President's role and function. Even President Kaunda commented that the Government's decision was unfortunate and a miscalculation. He stated that the decision had aroused much suspicion. In his press interview he said:
You … may say 80 per cent. of the sanctions are still on … of course there is no way to stop any other countries from opening trade with Rhodesia in all other fields. I think this was a miscalculation. It's very unfortunate.
The Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa has brought specific attention to the fact that the Lusaka agreement made no provision for the dropping of any part of the sanctions before agreement and implementation of a full settlement. Again, the Government have raised unnecessary suspicions and doubts as a result of their decision not to maintain sanctions.
There has been no time in the 14 years of discussion and debate on the principle of sanctions and whether they should be renewed when we have tried to divide sanctions into two categories. The right hon. Member for Worthing (Mr. Higgins) has a reputation for defending the principle of sanctions. Not even the most hostile critics of sanctions have tried to divide sanctions into two categories—namely, those that have to be observed until the moment of the legality and those that do not. That is the effect of the Government's decision not to renew section 2 sanctions.
The principle of retaining sanctions until the moment of the return to effective legality has been indivisible. There has never previously been a division of category, but that is the effect of the Government's decision. The Government are to retain some sanctions while allowing a collection of important ones under section 2 to lapse. As the Opposition know, the Government's actions have nothing to do with principle. They have more to do

with plastering over the cracks within their party. It is a tawdry move to conceal the cowardice of the Government in facing up to some of their own Back Benchers.
The Government have argued that to renew sanctions would be a positive act which would not be justified in this situation. It is argued that it would be a slap in the face for the Bishop if they renewed section 2 sanctions. At the present time, when the Government are chairing an important conference at a crucial and delicate moment, I do not believe that they should be in the business of slapping faces, or, for that matter, patting the backs of bishops, whoever they are. It is their job to forge an agreement as an impartial chairman of the conference, yet in some of his arguments last week, when he defended the conference, the right hon. Gentleman came close to showing his own partiality rather than impartiality at a crucial moment in time.
We offered to assist the Government. Had they wanted to renew sanctions for a shorter period than 12 months they could have brought forward a one-clause Bill to amend the Southern Rhodesia Act 1965. They declined to do so. Instead they have brought forward this Bill, and by adding the existing orders to clause 3 we find that they could renew sanctions. At the same time, the Government will have the power to terminate all sanctions the moment that there has been a return to effective and real legality. The Government are taking powers under the Bill to do just that. We suggest in our amendments that they should use the Bill to maintain the indivisible principle of retaining sanctions until there has been a proper return to legality.

Mr. David Steel: I want to say a few words in support of the amendment, which I regard as an important and key amendment. Had the Government wished simply to make a gesture of good will during the Lancaster House conference, because of the unfortunate timing of the order requiring the renewal of sanctions at this time of year, they could have done so in precisely the way which the official Opposition are suggesting. In other words, instead of asking the House to renew sanctions for a full year, they could have


done so on a temporary basis pending the successful outcome of the negotiations.
That would have been understood and accepted. It would have been a reasonable gesture to make. But that is not what the Government have done. In speculating as to why the Bill is in front of us at all, I reject the view that it could be to prepare the way for a unilateral settlement, first because it would not be a settlement, and secondly because it would be deluding the House and securing the passage of a Bill under false pretences.
The only real reason is the one referred to by the hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands), namely, that for some extraordinary reason the Government seem suddenly to be over-embarrassed by the divisions on the Conservative Back Benches over the question of the sanctions order. I cannot understand why they should be so embarrassed, because we have had this embarrassment every year since 1965, both in Government and Opposition. It is nothing new.
One is led to the uncomfortable conclusion that perhaps the lunatic men of the Right have a rather greater say in current events than they have had in each of the last 13 or 14 years. That I find ominous, but it is not a sufficient reason for forcing the Committee into the ludicrous position where it cannot even discuss amendments rationally because, as the Lord Privy Seal said a few minutes ago, they are matters currently under negotiation. That is entirely a difficulty of the Government's own making.
I believe that the principle that the House established in 1965, and has reestablished each year—namely, that we maintain sanctions until there is a return to legality—is the right one. It is a major departure from that policy to bring the Bill forward now. Legality—this was confirmed by the Lord Privy Seal in an answer to me when he made his statement—resumes on the arrival of the British Governor as proposed under the Bill. That is the point at which sanctions ought to be lifted, not now in anticipation of future events. What the Government propose to do is wrong. However, it could be put right by the adoption of the amendment.

1 am

Mr. Peter Bottomley: Perhaps the leader of the Liberal Party slightly overstated his case. I have no doubt that if the Government had asked the House to renew sanctions there would have been no difficulty in carrying the order, even if all the members of the other parties had gone away for the day or the night. There must have been some other consideration in the Government's mind that led them to decide not to go for a renewal of section 2.
How will it be possible for the Government to reimpose section 2 sanctions if it is decided that that is necessary? I know that my right hon. Friend the Minister said that he could not envisage circumstances in which this would be so. However, I should like him to spell out how the enabling Bill will give the Government powers.
I feel strongly about sanctions, but I am willing to give the Government the benefit of the doubt. I recognise that we in this country take sanctions rather more seriously than many other countries have done. I recall the report of the United Nations sanctions committee, which gave evidence that the Soviet Union, East Germany and Czechoslovakia were trading in Rhodesian chrome, tobacco and maize. We have not often heard in sanctions debates—and certainly not this year—that those countries should be brought before the Security Council.
Having said that, I recognise the widespread concern from many interest groups, including the United Nations Association and the British Council of Churches. It is important that we try to give a fair wind to the Government's proposals, which will make the continuing imposition of sanctions—other than under section 2—unnecessary within a very few weeks. If section 2 sanctions turn out to have a great deal of relevance, the Government will have little hesitation in coming back to the House.

Mr. Rooker: I wish to raise a narrow point on sanctions. It relates to the effect that the Bill has on the possibility of prosecutions or non-prosecutions of the companies which are currently under investigation or ought to be under investigation. In some ways it is inconceivable for the Committee to believe that, having obtained a settlement, the Government


would then wheel out prosecutions for sanctions busting that took place in past years. They could make a formidable case for a clean slate and not pursuing prosecutions. I wish to mention the case of one company, as the House was misled. There is an opportunity for the Lord Privy Seal to put the matter right now.
During the major debate on Rhodesia last November, my right hon. Friend the then Foreign Secretary, referring to the mention in the preface of the Bingham report of Castrol Limited, which some of us raised in debate, said:
Where Castrol is concerned, in view of the reference in the preface of the report to that company, the DPP will already be considering whether to investigate the matter further."—[Official Report, 7 November 1978; Vol. 957, c. 708.]
Given the fact that we had an interruption in the proceedings of the House over the winter and the early spring, I followed that reference, promise and the commitment that the DPP was looking at this matter with the present Government.
On 12 June 1979, I asked the Attorney-General whether he had yet received the report from the Director of Public Prosecutions in respect of Castrol Ltd.
The Attorney-General answered:
No. The Director of Public Prosecutions is not making an investigation into any alleged supply of petroleum products to Rhodesia by Castrol Ltd."—[Official Report, 12 June 1979; Vol. 968, c. 178.]
During the recess, having had discussions with some of the journalists who had followed this matter both before and subsequent to the Bingham report, I tabled a further question on 23 October asking the Attorney-General what action the DPP had taken in respect of the reference to Castrol between 7 November last year, when the Foreign Secretary said that the matter was under investigation, and 12 June this year, when the present Attorney-General told me that the Government would not do anything at all. The Attorney-General answered!
Between 7 November 1978 and 12 June 1979 the Director of Public Prosecutions was concentrating his investigations on the detailed allegations made in the main body of the Bingham report."—[Official Report, 23 October 1979; Vol. 972, c. 136.]
What were the civil servants and the DPP doing fighting the orders of the then Foreign Secretary, given the information to the House of Commons last year that

the reference to Castrol would be investigated and, in fact, was being investigated? It is clear that at some time between 7 November last year and 12 June this year Government policy on the matter changed.
I do not want to get involved in a personal slanging match with anyone in the House of Commons, but on this occasion I am prepared to do so because I want to speak for only a few minutes and to make just one central point. Some of my hon. Friends wish to raise issues concerning other companies. It may well be unfair. As some of my hon. Friends have said in this Chamber and elsewhere, the mere fact that certain directors of Castrol Ltd. are related to present members of the Cabinet may have no significance whatsoever. That is probably so. [Interruption.] It is not a smear simply to look at the commitment that was given by the then Foreign Secretary as to what the DPP was doing and then to look at the answers that the Attorney-General has given. It is the conclusion of a reasonable person, without malice, that there has been an interference with the operation of the DPP between November 1978 and June this year.
What will be the effect? Will the Government use this legislation to say subsequently " Bingham—into the dustbin. It does not matter any more. It will be inconvenient to pursue any of the companies or individuals. Therefore, we let the matter lie"? I do not think that we should let the matter lie. What we need to know tonight is the Government's intention regarding companies that may be prosecuted under sanctions rules that existed before the passage of the legislation that is before us.
That is a legitimate question for the Committee to ask, because after today we shall probably have very little opportunity to raise issues concerning sanctions since the Government will seek to bury the Bingham report as far and as deep as they possibly can. I make no apology for raising this matter now, because it cannot be raised elsewhere.

Mr. Ivor Stanbrook: It is perfectly true, as the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal Party said, that we have regularly agonised about sanctions over the past 14 years. But it may be for that reason that he and


certain other hon. Members on the Opposition Benches have been blinded to the fact that the situation has changed radically since we last renewed section 2 sanctions.
The six principles have been fulfilled. There have been free and fair elections. We are now in the process of achieving a situation in which a constitution has been approved and the appointment of a Governor with full powers has been approved. There is, therefore, virtually a renunciation of UDI. In those circumstances, I believe that it would be inappropriate to renew section 2 sanctions and that the Government are absolutely right.

Mr. Buchan: I found that an extraordinary statement. It was an ex cathedra statement with no proof whatsoever. No agreement has been reached yet. One of the unfortunate things is that the bringing forward of the Bill while negotiations are still going on may have even helped to endanger that.
Half of the difficulties in which the Government find themselves arise because of the Prime Minister's statement a few months ago that she would not get the sanctions order through the House of Commons. That was quite untrue. As the hon. Member for Woolwich, West (Mr. Bottomley) said, she would have got it through the House of Commons, if she had had the courage to put it forward, because of support from Labour Members and the small parties.
The other half of the Government's difficulties arise because of the Prime Minister's action in bringing forward the Bill. The Bill has done two things. First, it has precipitated us into the negotiations. Secondly, at the same time, it has endangered some of the negotiations because of the statements that we are now getting from the Treasury Bench. As the debate has proceeded, I have become more, not less, anxious. I think that even at this late hour we could have the single statement on sanctions. It is important that some of us should express our anxieties on the situation.
I do not want to reopen old wounds. I have already mentioned the Prime Minister's silly statement of a few months ago. We all know that, together with the timing of the Bill, the Government have

been faced with their own zealous scouts below the Gangway. It is a pity but it is a fact of life.
Unfortunately, we are not alone on this issue any more than Southern Rhodesia is on its own in the whole of the African context. Other people are involved. I read with no great pleasure the report of the Security Council committee that was established in pursuance of the appropriate resolution connected with sanctions on Rhodesia and the sanction order. It states that the
Committee had learned with distress that the United Kingdom Government contemplated the non-renewal of some sanctions".
it goes on to say that the
Committee expressed grave concern that the measures contemplated by the United Kingdom Government would amount to unilateral action by that Government with regard to the sanctions established by the Security Council against the illegal regime in Southern Rhodesia. Committee emphasised that only the Security Council, which instituted the sanctions in the first place, had a right to lift them.
By rushing forward the Bill and removing sanctions we are putting this country in a difficult situation, and some of us have to try to rescue the good name of our country when that happens. We have defended legality for the past 14 or 15 years against some of the frenzied Right-wingers on the Government side. Even at the eleventh hour, they are defending illegality. Indeed, we have heard attacks upon the one effective force that is opposed to illegality in Southern Rhodesia—the Patriotic Front.
The Security Council goes on to state:
All member States should therefore continue to respect and apply strictly the provisions of all the relevant Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia until all the aims and objectives set out in resolution 253 have been completely achieved.
We certainly have not reached that situation. It is worth reading on, because it is useful to have it for the record:
Its concern was all the greater because the member State involved, the United Kingdom, carries the dual responsibility of administering power of rebel territory and of a permanent member of the Security Council primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security.
Our action is seen in certain circumstances as a dereliction not only of our own duty but of our duty in the international context. We must rescue the House of Commons from the shame that the Government and some of their zealots


below the Gangway have brought upon us.
Let us narrow the situation down to the African context. The Commonwealth Committee on Southern Africa reminded us of this aspect. We have heard much about the six principles being accepted. It is not true that they have been endorsed. We have heard much about the Lusaka agreement which it is claimed they are fulfilling. That is not true. The Commonwealth Committee makes it clear that—
in all appropriate ways the Lusaka agreement"—
I wish that I had had this in my possession earlier today—
envisaged a lasting settlement in Zimbabwe only through agreement between all the parties to the conflict".
This is the assessment and interpretation of the Lusaka agreement by the appropriate Commonwealth Committee, and that was being denied earlier in the debate.
The committee then goes on to sanctions and states that the Lusaka agreement—
specifically envisaged the lifting of sanctions only in the context of the implementation of such a settlement".
We have not yet proceeded to such a settlement. Therefore, why are sanctions being lifted now? Is it in order to ease a partial solution to the Lancaster House conference? Is it in line with what the Lord Privy Seal has been saying today—namely, that if there is no agreement the Government may take unilateral action by imposing their concept of a settlement for a return to legality in Rhodesia?
1.15 am
Finally, if I may narrow the argument even further and refer to the front-line Presidents, it will be remembered that President Kaunda was with us in this country last weekend. He said that the decision on sanctions was unfortunate and that the timing was not correct. We know why it was not correct. He also said that it was a miscalculation which could have the effect of leaving the door open for other countries to open trade with Rhodesia in other fields.
I do not wish to follow the points made by my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Rooker), who mentioned companies referred to in the

Bingham report, but I would find it even more shameful if that kind of thing were to be buried in the general euphoria of some hon. Members below the Gangway should these things go wrong. We must reject paragraph 1 (b). It may be that the Opposition Front Bench will also consider rejecting the clause, which is tied up with the security aspect. The two things together are quite intolerable, and I make no apology for detaining the Committee in order to say so.

Mr. Hooley: The issue of sanctions goes to the heart of the debate in two senses. First, we would not be having the debate on the Bill if it were not for the political cowardice of the Prime Minister, who was not prepared to come to the House and stand up for this country's obligations under the sanctions order. This is well established, because the only debate required this week was a debate on the sanctions order.
It has been made perfectly clear that, had an agreement been reached at Lancaster House—as we hope it will be—the Government could have obtained all their enabling powers in a brief debate, in a couple of hours, with the full help of the Opposition. There would have been no difficulty at all about that. The manoeuvre that we have been going through over the past few days arises solely and simply from the fact that the Prime Minister was not prepared to exercise discipline if she possesses any over her own party and to require that the sanctions order be laid and debated, as it should have been, this week. That is the first point, and it lies behind the whole debate.
The second aspect is in many senses much more important, because it concerns our obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. It is quite absurd to argue that this country can in any way terminate sanctions. What we can do is to refuse to shoulder our obligations under the mandatory sanctions resolution of the Security Council. It has been pointed out that those sanctions were imposed by the Security Council. They were imposed strictly in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
This country has no unilateral power to terminate, modify or in any way change that sanctions resolution. What we can do, to our own disgrace, is to throw aside


our own responsibility in respect of that resolution. We can denounce it, saying that we are not concerned with honouring our special obligation, as a permanent member of the Security Council and as a founder member of the United Nations, to abide by a mandatory sanctions order of the Security Council. This was, I believe, the only time in the history of the United Nations that a complete across-the-board sanctions resolution was passed by the Security Council, yet here we are trying to pretend that we can ignore or disregard part of that resolution.
The sanctions issue is of fundamental importance because it is part of the whole concept of law and order under the Charter. It was the sanctions issue that destroyed the League of Nations. Failure on the part of this country, which is still influential and important within the United Nations, to honour to the full its obligations and to observe the sanctions laid down by the Security Council—sanctions for which we ourselves asked—can only result in a diminution of the prestige and authority of the Security Council. I am surprised that the Government, who posture so frequently on the principle of law and order, should be taking so cavalier an attitude to the issue of international law and order, represented by the sanctions issue.
The Leader of the Liberal Party has pointed out correctly that the matter can be put right simply tonight by the acceptance of the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands). The amendment, which would restore the position completely under the enabling Bill, is simple and straightforward and consists of two lines. It is offered to the Committee and to the Government by the Opposition. The Government have a free and fair chance to accept the amendment. There is no need for further debate and no need to bring forward a further sanctions order.
The acceptance of this simple amendment would put the matter right, restore the position, restore our obligations under the United Nations Charter and maintain an honourable situation for the House of Commons and the Government. I am sure that, on this basis, my hon. Friends will press the amendment. I hope that it will be supported by those who are seriously concerned with the principle of

law and order in the international context as well as mouthing about it at home.

Mr. Dobson: I should like to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Rooker) in seeking from the Lord Privy Seal an undertaking that nothing in the Bill or any consequential legislation flowing from it will grant any indemnity or amnesty to anyone who has been breaking sanctions up to today. It seems clear to me, as it ought to seem clear to anyone who has read the Bingham report, that BP and Shell broke the law of this country consistently for more than a decade in supplying oil and petroleum products to Southern Rhodesia. It is also clear that Government officials and some Ministers in this country acted in collusion with those oil companies in assisting them either to supply the oil or to cover up the fact that they were supplying it.
The Bingham report was referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions on a date early in September 1978, which I believe to be 5 September, but it is not clear in any record. Since that date, a number of hon. Members of the previous Parliament and a number of hon. Members of the Parliament that has been assembled since the May election have asked questions of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and the Attorney-General about the progress of the investigation of the Director of Public Prosecutions into the Bingham report. We should remember that the Director of Public Prosecutions had the advantage over most hon. Members in that he saw, and had referred to him, the secret and even more damaging part of the investigation that has not been made public.
When my hon. Friend the Member for Perry Barr asked what the DPP was doing in relation to the inquiry into Castro], he was told as he informed the House, by the Attorney-General—[An HON. MEMBER: "Repetition."]—I intend to continue my speech, whatever hon. Members may say—that:
Between 7 November 1978 and 12 June 1979 the Director of Public Prosecutions was concentrating his investigations on the detailed allegations made in the main body of the Bingham report."—[Official Report, 23 October 1979; Vol. 972, c. 136.]
The Director of Public Prosecutions seems to take a devil of a long time when he is considering the main body of the


Bingham report. For a year and two months—14 months for those Conservative Members who cannot count—the Director of Public Prosecutions has been considering what is clear evidence, to anyone who has read the Bingham report, of law-breaking by companies, by British companies or companies based in Britain.
It is a disgrace to this country that the Director of Public Prosecutions has not proceeded more quickly with that investigation. It would be an even bigger disgrace—a disgrace as big as the Government's collusion with sanctions busting—if this rushed piece of legislation, to which we gave a Second Reading on Thursday and which we are considering today, were to be used to bail out the BP and Shell directors and their friends who helped them simply because the DPP had managed to spin out his investigations. It would suggest to people who are already dissatisfied with the actions of the Director over a number of public scandals that there had been direct political interference in the DPP's office.
The Opposition look forward to receiving an assurance from the Lord Privy Seal that nothing that is passed tonight and nothing consequent upon it will grant an indemnity or amnesty to anyone who has been breaking sanctions.

Sir Ian Gilmour: I am sure that the Committee will depore the remarks of the hon. Member for Holborn and St. Pancras, South (Mr. Dobson) about the Director of Public Prosecutions [HON. MEMBERS: "Hear, hear."] Equally I do not think that the Committee will expect me to comment on the affairs of a particular company mentioned by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Perry Barr (Mr. Rooker). But the matter of the Bingham report in general is one for my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General. I understand that counsel has now submitted his advice to the DPP. In due course a decision will be taken, and my right hon. and learned Friend will make an announcement to the House.
The hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil (Mr. Rowlands) and the Leader of the Liberal Party kept harking back to 1965. But, as my hon. Friend the Member for Orpington (Mr. Stanbrook) pointed out, the position is very different today. In Rhodesia, there is an African Prime

Minister and a predominantly African Government elected by an African majority. Very few members of the present Government had anything to do with the illegal declaration of independence. Moreover, Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues have agreed to take the actions which will bring the rebellion to an end.
I must remind the Opposition that sanctions were put on for a specific reason, and that was to end the rebellion. The Bishop and the Salisbury delegation have agreed to take the measures to bring that rebellion to an end. It is in those circumstances, not in the circumstances of 1965, that Her Majesty's Government can see no justification for the positive action of renewing section 2 of the 1965 Act.
The hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil said that we should not worry about giving anyone a slap in the face. I disagree with him. I do not believe that that is a sensible way to negotiate.

Mr. Rowlands: I said that we should neither slap anyone on the back nor slap him in the face.

Sir I. Gilmour: I agree. But, in our view, to have imposed sanctions would have been to slap the Bishop's delegation in the face when it has shown complete good faith in the negotiations since the Lusaka accord.
When we reached that decision and announced it, we stressed that our action would not mean the lifting of the great majority of sanctions. The hon. Member for Merthyr Tydfil said that this made nonsense of all the debates on sanctions since 1965. I think that it does, and it is a sobering thought that most of the debates on sanctions since 1965 have been nonsense as matters have turned out.

Mr. Rowlands: Disgraceful.

Sir I. Gilmour: It will be a matter of considerable interest to historians how everyone seems to have got most of it wrong.
The lifting of section 2 has very little effect on sanctions. In view of all that has been said and in view of all the controversy over 15 years, I agree that this is remarkable. But it happens to be true.
The great majority of sanctions will continue until there is a return to legality in Rhodesia, and this will happen when a British Governor arrives in Salisbury and his authority is accepted. The situation which led to the imposition of sanctions will be terminated, and the Government will take the appropriate action. My hon. Friend the Member for Woolwich, West (Mr. Bottomley) asked whether we could reimpose the sanctions under section 2 that have been lifted. The Bill gives us the power to do that in clause 3(1)(b)(i).
1.30 am
The Committee will surely agree that it would be nonsensical to suggest that sanctions should be continued against Rhodesia after the return to legality. That is, however, suggested in amendment No. 58. In such circumstances we should be applying sanctions against ourselves. That is an absurdity. Once the rebellion ends, there will be no need to apply sanctions. We would expect other Governments to lift sanctions at that point, too. The settlement for which we are working fully meets the essential criterion of majority rule.

In short, in deciding not to renew section 2 the Government have struck a balance. We have recognised the progress that has been made rather than harping on the past and 1965. The amendment would, in effect, say to Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues that even though they had had nothing to do with UDI, even though they had held elections and accepted everything that the British Government had proposed, the full rigour of sanctions would be renewed. That is a course of action that the Government will not take. I do not believe that there is any support for it in the country. That is why the Government cannot support the amendments.

Mr. Rowlands: Successive Governments and Parliaments, in spite of the Lord Privy Seal's curious remarks about sanctions, have maintained the principle that sanctions should not be lifted before a return to legality. There has been no return to legality, and, therefore, sanctions should be retained. That is why we shall press our amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made:—

The Committee divided: Ayes 228, Noes. 297.

Division No. 103]
AYES
[1.34 am


Adams, Allen
Cowans, Harry
Flannery, Martin


Allaun, Frank
Cox, Tom (Wandsworth, Tooting)
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)


Anderson, Donald
Crowther, J. S.
Ford, Ben


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Cryer, Bob
Forrester, John


Armstrong, Rt Hon Ernest
Cunliffe, Lawrence
Foster, Derek


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Cunningham, George (Islington S)
Fraser, John (Lambeth, Norwood)


Ashton, Joe
Cunningham, Dr John (Whitehaven)
Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald


Atkinson, Norman (H'gey, Tott'ham)
Dalyell, Tam
Freud, Clement


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Davidson, Arthur
Garrett, John (Norwich S)


Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (Heywood)
Davies, Rt Hon Denzil (Llanelli)
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)


Beith, A. J.
Davies, E. Hudson (Caerphilly)
George, Bruce


Benn, Rt Hon Anthony Wedgwood
Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Davis, Clinton, (Hackney Central)
Golding, John


Bidwell, Sydney
Davis, Terry (B'rm'ham, Stechford)
Grant, George (Morpeth)


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Deaklns, Eric
Grant, John (Islington C)


Boothroyd, Miss Betty
Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)


Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur (M'brough)
Dempsey, James
Hardy, Peter


Bradley, Tom
Dewar, Donald
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Dixon, Donald
Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith


Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)
Dobson, Frank
Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy


Brown, Ron (Edinburgh, Leith)
Dormand, Jack
Haynes, Frank


Buchan, Norman
Douglas, Dick
Healey, Rt Hon Denis


Callaghan, Rt Hon. J. (Cardiff SE)
Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Heffer, Eric S.


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Dubs, Alfred
Hogg, Norman (E Dunbartonshire)


Campbell, Ian
Duffy, A. E. P.
Holland, Stuart (L'beth, Vauxhall)


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Dunn, James A. (Liverpool, Kirkdale)
Home Robertson, John


Canavan, Dennis
Dunnett, Jack
Homewood, William


Cant, R. B.
Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth
Hooley, Frank


Carmichael, Neil
Eadle, Alex
Howell, Rt Hon Denis (B'ham, Sm H)


Cartwrlght, John
Eastham, Ken
Howells, Geraint


Clark, David (South Shields)
Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
Huckfield, Les


Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
Ellis, Raymond (NE Derbyshire)
Hughes, Roy (Newport)


Cohen, Stanley
Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
Janner, Hon Greville


Coleman, Donald
English, Michael
Jay, Rt Hon Douglas


Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
John, Brynmor


Conlan, Bernard
Evans, John (Newton)
Johnson, James (Hull west)


Cook, Robin F.
Field, Frank
Jones, Rt Hon Alec (Rhondda)




Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)
Skinner, Dennis


Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Morris, Rt Hon Charles (Openshaw)
Soley, Clive


Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Morris, Rt Hon John (Aberavon)
Spearing, Nigel


Kerr, Russell
Morton, Barry
Spriggs, Leslie


Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Moyle, Rt Hon Roland
Stallard, A. W.


Kinnock, Neil
Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick
Steel, Rt Hon David


Lambie, David
Newens, Stanley
Stoddart, David


Lamborn, Harry
Oakes, Rt Hon Gordon
Stott, Roger


Lamond, James
O'Halloran, Michael
Strang, Gavin


Leadbitter, Ted
O'Neill, Martin
Straw, Jack


Leighton, Ronald
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton West)


Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Palmer, Arthur
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Litherland, Robert
Park, George
Thomas, Mike (Newcastle East)


Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Parry, Robert
Thomas, Dr Roger (Carmarthen)


Lyon, Alexander (York)
Pendry, Tom
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)


McCartney, Hugh
Penhaligon, David
Tilley, John


McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)
Torney, Tom


McGuire, Michael (Ince)
Prescott, John
Varley, Rt Hon Eric G.


McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Price, Christopher (Lewisham West)
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)


McKelvey, William
Race, Reg
Walker, Rt Hon Harold (Doncaster)


MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds South)
Weetch, Ken


Maclennan, Robert
Richardson, Miss Jo
Wellbeloved, James


McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, Central)
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)
Welsh, Michael


McNally, Thomas
Roberts, Ernest (Hackney North)
White, Frank R. (Bury &amp; Radcliffe)


McNamara, Kevin
Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)
White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)


McWilliam, John
Robertson, George
Whitlock, William


Magee, Bryan
Robinson, Geoffrey (Coventry NW)
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Marks, Kenneth
Rooker, J. W.
Williams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)


Marshall, David (Gl'sgow, Shettles'n)
Roper, John
Wilson, Rt Hon Sir Harold (Huyton)


Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)
Wilson, William (Coventry SE)


Marshall, Jim (Leicester South)
Rowlands, Ted
Winnick, David


Martin, Michael (Gl'gow, Springb'rn)
Ryman, John
Woolmer, Kenneth


Mason, Rt Hon Roy
Sever, John
Wrigglesworth, Ian


Maxton, John
Sheerman, Barry
Wright, Sheila


Maynard, Miss Joan
Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert (A'ton-u-L)
Young, David (Bolton East)


Meacher, Michael
Shore, Rt Hon Peter (Step and Pop)



Mlkardo, Ian
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES:


Millan, Rt Hon Bruce
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)
Mr. James Tinn and


Miller, Dr M. S. (East Kilbride)
Silverman, Julius
Mr. Ted Graham.


Mitchell, Austin (Grimsby)






NOES


Adley, Robert
Buck, Antony
Farr, John


Aitken, Jonathan
Budgen, Nick
Fell, Anthony


Alexander, Richard
Bulmer, Esmond
Fenner, Mrs Peggy


Alison, Michael
Burden, F. A.
Finsberg, Geoffrey


Ancram, Michael
Butcher, John
Fisher, Sir Nigel


Arnold, Tom
Butler, Hon Adam
Fletcher, Alexander (Edinburgh N)


Aspinwall, Jack
Cadbury, Jocelyn
Fookes, Miss Janet


Atkins, Robert (Preston North)
Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Forman, Nigel


Atkinson, David (B'mouth, East)
Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Fraser, Rt Hon H. (Stafford &amp; St)


Baker, Nicholas (North Dorset)
Carlisle, Rt Hon Mark (Runcorn)
Fraser, Peter (South Angus)


Banks, Robert
Chalker, Mrs. Lynda
Fry, Peter


Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Channon, Paul
Gardiner, George (Reigate)


Bell, Ronald
Chapman, Sydney
Gardner, Edward (South Fylde)


Bendall, Vivian
Churchill, W. S.
Garel-Jones, Tristan


Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Clark, Dr William (Croydon South)
Gilmour, Rt Hon Sir Ian


Benyon, Thomas (Abingdon)
Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Goodhart, Philip


Benyon, W. (Buckingham)
Cockeram, Eric
Goodhew, Victor


Berry, Hon Anthony
Colvin, Michael
Goodlad, Alastair


Best, Keith
Cope, John
Gow, Ian


Bevan, David Gilroy
Cormack, Patrick
Gower, Sir Raymond


Biffen, Rt Hon John
Corrie, John
Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)


Biggs-Davlson, John
Costain, A. P.
Gray, Hamish


Blackburn, John
Cranborne, Viscount
Greenway, Harry


Blaker, Peter
Critchley, Julian
Grieve, Percy


Body, Richard
Crouch, David
Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St Edmunds)


Bonsor, Sir Nicholas
Dickens, Geoffrey
Griffiths, Peter (Portsmouth N)


Boscawen, Hon Robert
Dorrell, Stephen
Grist, Ian


Bottomley, Peter (Woolwich West)
Dover, Denshore
Grylls, Michael


Bowden, Andrew
du Cann, Rt Hon Edward
Gummer, John Selwyn


Boyson, Dr Rhodes
Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Hamilton, Hon Archie (Eps'm&amp;Ew'll)


Braine, Sir Bernard
Durant, Tony
Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)


Bright, Graham
Dykes, Hugh
Hampson, Dr Keith


Brinton, Tim

Eden, Rt Hon Sir John


Britten, Leon

Hannam, John


Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher
Edwards, Rt Hon N. (Pembroke)
Haselhurst, Alan


Brooke, Hon Peter
Eggar, Timothy
Hastings, Stephen


Brotherton, Michael
Elliott, Sir William
Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael


Brown, Michael (Brigg &amp; Sc'thorpe)
Emery, Peter
Hawkins, Paul


Browne, John (Winchester)
Eyre, Reginald
Hawksley, Warren


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Fairbairn, Nicholas
Hayhoe, Barney


Bryan, Sir Paul
Faith, Mrs Sheila
Heddle, John







Henderson, Barry
Miller, Hal (Bromsgrove &amp; Redditch)
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael
Mills, Iain (Meriden)
Shepherd, Richard(Aldridge-Br'hills)


Hicks, Robert
Mills, Peter (West Devon)
Shersby, Michael


Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Miscampbell, Norman
Silvester, Fred


Hill, James
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)
Sims, Roger


Holland, Philip (Carlton)
Moate, Roger
Skeet, T. H. H.


Hooson, Tom
Monro, Hector
Speed, Keith


Howell, Rt Hon David (Guildford)
Montgomery, Fergus
Speller, Tony


Howell, Ralph (North Norfolk)
Moore, John
Spence, John


Hunt, David (Wirral)
Morgan, Geraint
Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)


Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Morris, Michael (Northampton, Sth)
Sproat, Iain


Hurd, Hon Douglas
Morrison, Hon Charles (Devizes)
Squire, Robin


Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)
Morrison, Hon Peter (City of Chester)
Stainton, Keith


Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick
Mudd, David
Stanbrook, Ivor


Jessel, Toby
Murphy, Christopher
Stanley, John


Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Myles, David
Steen, Anthony


Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Neale, Gerrard
Stevens, Martin


Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Needham, Richard
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Kaberry, Sir Donald
Nelson, Anthony
Stewart, John (East Renfrewshire)


Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Neubert, Michael
Stokes, John


King, Rt Hon Tom
Newton, Tony
Stradling Thomas, J.


Kitson, Sir Timolhy
Nott, Rt Hon John
Tapsell, Peter


Knox, David
Onslow, Cranley
Taylor, Robert (Croydon NW)


Lamont, Norman
Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs Sally
Tebbit, Norman


Lang, Ian
Osborn, John
Temple-Morris, Peter


Langford-Holt, Sir John
Page, John (Harrow, West)
Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs Margaret


Latham, Michael
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)
Thomas, Rt Hon Peter (Hendon S)


Lawrence, Ivan
Paisley, Rev Ian
Thompson, Donald


Lawson, Nigel
Parkinson, Cecil
Thorne, Neil (Ilford South)


Lee, John
Parris, Matthew
Thornton, Malcolm


Le Marchant, Spencer
Patten, Christopher (Bath)
Townend, John (Bridllngton)


Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Patten, John (Oxford)
Townsend, cyril D. (Bexleyheath)


Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
Pattie, Geoffrey
Trippier, David


Lloyd, Ian (Havant &amp; Waterloo)
Pawsey, James
Trotter, Neville


Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)
Percival, Sir Ian
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Loveridge, John
Pink, R. Bonner
Vaughan, Dr Gerard


Luce, Richard
Pollock, Alexander
Viggers, Peter


Lyell, Nicholas
Porter, George
Waddingion, David


McAdden, Sir Stephen
Price, David (Eastleigh)
Waldegrave, Hon William


McCrindle, Robert
Prior, Rt Hon James
Wall, Patrick


Macfarlane, Neil
Proctor, K. Harvey
Waller, Gary


MacGregor, John
Raison, Timothy
Ward, John


MacKay, John (Argyll)
Rathbone, Tim
Warren, Kenneth


McNair-Wllson, Michael (Newbury)
Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)
Watson, John


McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Rees-Davies, w. R.
Wells, John (Maidstone)


McQuarrie, Albert
Rhodes James, Robert
Wells, Bowen (Herl'rd &amp; Stevenaqe)


Madel, David
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon
Wheeler, John


Major, John
Ridley, Hon Nicholas
Whitney, Raymond


Marland, Paul
Rifkind, Malcolm
Wickenden, Keith


Marlow, Tony
Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey
Wiggin, Jerry


Marshall, Michael (Arundel)
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)
Wilkinson, John


Mates, Michael
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)
Williams, Delwyn (Montgomery)


Mather, Carol
Robinson, Peter (Belfast East)
Winterton, Nicholas


Maude, Rt Hon Angus
Rost, Peter
Wolfson, Mark


Mawby, Ray
Royle, Sir Anthony
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Mawhinney, Dr Brian
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy
Younger, Rt Hon George


Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon Norman



Mayhew, Patrick
Scott, Nicholas
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Mellor, David
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)
Lord James Douglas-Hamilton and


Meyer, Sir Anthony
Shelton, William (Streatham)
Mr. John Wakeham

Question accordingly negatived.

Clauses 3 and 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause No. 1

DURATION

'(1) This Act shall continue in force for the period of six months beginning with the date of the passing of this Act and shall then expire unless it is continued in force in accordance with subsection (2) of this section.

(2) Her Majesty may from time to time by Order in Council provide that this Act shall continue in force for a period of one year beyond the date on which it would otherwise expire; but no recommendation shall be made to Her Majesty in Council to make an Order

under this subsection unless a draft of the Order has been laid before Parliament and approved by resolution of each House of Parliament.'.—[Mr. Spearing.]

Brought up, and read the First time.

Mr. Spearing: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
As the debate on the Bill draws to a close, it is appropriate that we should discuss a clause concerning the rights of the House and therefore of the electors of this country. I do not anticipate that we shall divide on the new clause, but if the Government resist it, it could be negatived by voice.
There has been a debate in the House each year on Rhodesia. The Government have been able to give account of their actions and there has been a general review of the situation. The debates have not always been fruitful and, as the Lord Privy Seal has just said, some have been nonsense but they have at least been a help. There has, perhaps, been little movement to report and therefore little progress made. There will, however, be a great deal of movement with the Bill before us—and the Government Front Bench has promised that that movement will be quick. It may be that over the days and months ahead the House will wish to return to this issue.
Under the wide and extensive powers contained in the Bill there will be opportunity to debate how section 3 orders are being used and the purposes to which they are being put. The Bill, however, is essentially transitional. As it tells us in the long title, it is paving the way for another Act which will give fully responsible status to a new republic of Zimbabwe.
We have expressed great anxiety about the Bill's success. The balance of interest is extremely delicate. The last debate but one demonstrated doubt about the security forces being used and the result that that will have. It is possible that we shall be confronted with a procession of section 3 orders. In the Bill the use of that section is not foreseen for a long time.
Section 3 orders will give great powers to the Governor, and it may, unfortunately, be necessary for the Government to govern Rhodesia through a succession of these orders. I presume that the Government do not wish to see section 3 orders used for more than six or seven months at the most. However, if their plans do not have the desired result, the Government will be operating under statute in a framework entirely ill-suited for the purpose. In those circumstances, it would be for the Government to come back with an adjusted Bill, perhaps containing new procedures, so that the House could keep a proper track of what was happening. If the Government accept the new clause, that will be possible, because the Act will have to be renewed every six months.
If the Government resist this new clause I suggest that they will be shown not to have faith in their own solution. In that respect they will be seen to be inconsistent. I hope that, out of prudence, and because of their faith in their preferred solution—which we do not accept but one to which they are yoking the Committee and country—the Government will accept the clause.

Mr. Luce: As the hon. Member for Newham, South (Mr. Spearing) has said, the purpose of the new clause is to limit the life of the measure to six months, unless extended for a further year by Order in Council, which would have to be laid in draft. The burden of my argument against the clause is that much of the purpose of this Bill will have been achieved within a six-month period.
The objective of this measure, as we have said on Second Reading and in Committee, is to proceed at a far more rapid pace. We have had plenty of opportunity of debating the pros and cons of proceeding at that speed. Much of what we seek to do will have been achieved within the six-month time scale. The independence constitution will have been made. After independence the Government will cease to have any further power to operate clause 1 or 2, relating to the provisions for the constitution and the interim arrangements. For the same reason, the Government will cease to have power to operate under clause 3(1)(a), which makes provision for the Governor to function during the interim period.
Even after independence it will be necessary to retain as law provisions made under clauses 1 and 3(1)(b) to provide for transitional matters. In some respects these are normal features of the steps leading to independence which have been taken by other countries. Such matters include financial arrangements and the expiry of certain orders. As an example, I cite provisions for the orderly discharge of debt liabilities. There is a number of measures which will need to remain in force after independence.
The necessity for much of this legislation will have disappeared within the period envisaged in the clause. Only a small technical area will remain. I have given an example of this. The Government feel that it would impose an unnecessary burden on Parliament to have


to renew the measure every half year to deal with these technical issues. For these reasons I oppose the clause.

Question put and negatived.

Bill reported, without amendment.

Sir Ian Gilmour: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
We regret the inconvenience that the House has suffered, but we are most grateful to the Opposition for keeping their promise—not that we expected that they would not.
One of the results of the suddenness of the procedure is that not a great deal has happened between Second Reading and Third Reading. Therefore, I imagine that the House will not expect me to give an extended elaboration of the provisions of the Bill.
The Bill could not have been introduced until the Government's proposals for the interim period had been tabled and considered in conference. Thereafter we needed to proceed with despatch, because we must have the powers to implement a settlement quickly. We have made no attempt to conceal that the Bill grants very broad powers. These will be needed if we are to exercise our considerable responsibilities.
I repeat that the Government's aim is a settlement in which all parties will take part. We fully agree that that is the only way to end the war. Of course, we recognise that it will require difficult decisions by the Patriotic Front, but no more difficult, I think, than those that the Salisbury delegation has already taken. We hope deeply, as I am sure the whole House does, that those decisions will be taken very shortly. Thereafter, the Bill will enable the Government to proceed. I therefore commend it to the House.

Mr. Shore: On any normal Bill, Third Reading is separated from Second Reading by some period of time, a point that the Lord Privy Seal himself made, by amendments made in Committee, and by the development of thought that arises out of debate. But this is not a normal Bill. Indeed, it is highly abnormal. Between its presentation and publication and Second Reading we had 24 hours. Between Second Reading and Third Reading

we have had—after much effort on our part—two parliamentary days and a weekend. Needless to say, not one amendment has been accepted.
I do not believe that in our two-day debate one convincing argument has been advanced as to why the House has been treated in so peremptory a way and why it was thought necessary to get the Bill on to the statute book by 16 November—except, of course, to appease the Conservative Party's own Rhodesia lobby. Even that act of appeasement on sanctions could easily have been separated from the enabling Bill.
The effect outside their own party of what the Government have done has been, as we warned it would be, harmful. It has been damaging to our international reputation and damaging to the achievement of our main objective, which is agreement at Lancaster House. We said on Wednesday that it was bound to raise suspicions, and it has. Our efforts to allay suspicions, by obtaining categorical statements from the Government that without agreement the Bill would not be used, have been foolishly refused and frustrated.
We said that the Bill would drain dry the virtually empty wells of good will among the participants in the conference, and I fear that that is the case. We said that it would put us all, Government and Opposition, in the great difficulty of being forced to discuss the questions still unresolved, and still being debated, at the conference, something that hitherto we had deliberately refrained from doing.
The Government have made a major blunder. It is my profound hope that they can now retrieve the position. But I have no hesitation in calling on my right hon and hon. Friends to vote against giving this misconceived and mischievous Bill a Third Reading now.

2 am

Mr. Newens: When I first heard last week that the Government were introducing the Bill I considered that it was most untimely. None of the remarks made from the Government Benches has convinced me otherwise. It is obvious that the Bill is intended to prepare the way for presenting the Patriotic Front with an ultimatum. We have seen developments in that direction since the Bill was presented.
Those of us who opposed the idea of forcing the Bill through all its stages last week have not had our initial fears allayed by one argument that has been advanced. The Government have stoutly resisted all the attempts made by the Opposition to reduce the likelihood that the Bill will pave the way for a one-sided agreement with the Muzorewa regime. The Lord Privy Seal did not bother to answer our arguments on the first amendment. The right hon. Gentleman did not answer the questions that were put to him. He was not prepared to answer the Committee, and it was clear that the Government were prepared to promulgate the constitution without the full agreement of the other parties.
On subsequent amendments the Government resisted the attempts to lengthen the period for the election. They resisted the attempts to limit the use of the Salisbury regime's security forces. The Government have refused to retain sanctions. They are using their majority to push the Bill through regardless of all the arguments.
I hope that right hon. and hon. Members will think carefully. The Bill could produce some unpleasant consequences. It could lead to the continuation of the civil war. It could place Britain in breach of its international agreements. It could do considerable damage to Britain's reputation throughout the world.
The Bill obviously meets with the approval of the Right wing of the Conservative Party. We should remember that UDI met with the approval of many Conservative Members, and we know where that idea took us. Every since the Duke of Wellington opposed the abolition of the rotten borough system the Tory Party has not been short of a regiment of Rip Van Winkles. The profession of many Tories seems to be to sleep through change. Those who are always prepared to come forward with a solution to today's problems that is 20 years out of date may now be offering a solution that will lead to long-term repercussions.
I am sorry to see the hon. Member for Cambridge (Mr. Rhodes James) regarding the issue as a joke as I know that the hon. Gentleman is a serious historian. We should recognise that in the past such

decisions have led to long-term consequences involving great bloodshed. We should not lightly take a decision this evening. Nothing that has happened today has allayed my fears, nor those of many of my hon. Friends. All who want to see peace achieved in Rhodesia—that includes hon. Members on both sides of the House—must hope that the Bill does not wreck that prospect. Many of us feel that there is a serious possibility that it will. The Bill is entirely premature. It should never have been introduced before agreement had been reached with all the parties. In these circumstances, it is entirely right that Labour Members should vote against the Third Reading.

Mr. Peter Bottomley: I want to make one point, namely, that the Lancaster House proposals will bring majority rule to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia far earlier than any other proposals put forward at any time since the 1961 constitution. The 1961 proposals would have brought majority rule probably within about 15 years.
The "Tiger" and "Fearless" arrangements would probably have delayed majority rule until the end of this century. The 1971 proposals would probably have delayed it until the thirtieth year of the next century.
It is well worth paying a tribute to all the parties at the Lancaster House conference in that they have reached agreement on a constitution which will bring majority rule to Zimbabwe in all our lifetimes, we hope without the sacrifice of the lives of many others who now live in that country.

Miss Joan Lestor: When the debate began, we were assured by the Conservative Front Bench that the Government were on the eve of an agreement with the Patriotic Front on the question of the interim period. Nothing that has emerged throughout the debate has produced any evidence at all that that agreement is imminent. In fact, what has emerged up until now is that the Government are no nearer an agreement for an interim period than when they first brought the Bill to the House.
When the Lusaka conference took place doubts were expressed about the diffi-


culty of getting an agreement on the interim period because of the difficulties that were foreseen. In fact, so much was that the case that when the Lancaster House conference opened—[Interruption.] It is a great pity that members of the Government Front Bench cannot listen to what is being said on a historic occasion which may well spell war in southern Africa. When the discussions opened at Lancaster House, there was so much concern about the interim period that the Patriotic Front wanted to discuss those arrangements prior to discussing the constitution. But it gave way on the argument, and the constitution was discussed first.
The position at which we have arrived is that, despite what Labour Members have tried to do by way of amendment, the Bill will undoubtedly be passed with the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues in effect saying "Although we cannot say what we will do if agreement on the interim period and other matters is not reached, we hope and trust that we will be able to do the right thing". In other words, they are saying to the Patriotic Front and others "Give us this enabling Bill. Trust us. We shall not let you down". That is a grave responsibility which the Government are taking on. It is a grave responsibility that has emanated from Lancaster House.
All I can say is that I hope that the right hon. Gentleman and his colleagues are aware of what they have done in the past two or three days. If there is any departure from the agreement that was drawn up at the Lusaka conference, on their heads be it.

Mr. Michael Brotherton: On a point of order, Mr. Deputy Speaker. Is it in order for the hon. Lady to propose sedition in this House?

Miss Lestor: Did the hon. Gentleman say seduction?

Mr. Alexander W. Lyon: Conservative Members have had their fun at our expense on this Third Reading, but I hope that the full enormity of what may be contained in the Bill, and its implications, never comes home to them. It is of the utmost seriousness that the Lord Privy Seal, in a speech which a good many Conservative Members may not have heard, indicated that if the Lancaster House negotiations did not reach agreement the Government might be prepared to use the powers in the Bill to go ahead. That implies that they may try to use those powers to legitimise a Muzorewa Government elected in an election in which the Patriotic Front did not participate. If that were the result of tonight's work it would lead to the direst consequences, not only for southern Africa but for this country's involvement. A civil war has been going on in Rhodesia for over 10 years. We might be brought into the fighting. In that event, perhaps the consequences of the fighting would extend beyond the borders of Rhodesia.
Many Opposition Members doubt the wisdom of the Bill at this stage. They would have preferred to wait for an agreement. Our view was backed by President Kaunda in his statement to the press before he left this country. It was supported by the Security Council committee on sanctions and the Commonwealth Secretariat. I hope that Government supporters are right in their general pleasure that the Bill will be passed, that there will be an agreement and that all our fears are groundless. But if our fears are justified, I suspect that the Government will have to laugh on the other side of their face before many months are spent.

Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time:—

The House divided: Ayes 296, Noes 229.

Division No. 104
AYES
[2.12 am


Adley, Robert
Banks, Robert
Biggs-Davison, John


Aitken, Jonathan
Beaumont-Dark, Anthony
Blackburn, John


Alexander, Richard
Bell, Ronald
Blaker, Peter


Alison, Michael
Bendall, Vivian
Body, Richard


Ancram, Michael
Bennett, Sir Frederic (Torbay)
Bonsor, Sir Nicholas


Arnold, Tom
Benyon, Thomas (Abingdon)
Boscawen, Hon Robert


Aspinwall, Jack
Benyon, W. (Buckingham)
Bottomley, Peter (Woolwich West)


Atkins, Robert (Preston North)
Best, Keith
Bowden, Andrew


Atkinson, David (B'mouth, East)
Bevan, David Gilroy
Boyson, Dr Rhodes


Baker, Nicholas (North Dorset)
Biffen, Rt Hon John
Braine, Sir Bernard




Bright, Graham
Haselhurst, Alan
Nelson, Anthony


Brinton, Tim
Hastings, Stephen
Neubert, Michael


Brittan, Leon
Havers, Rt Hon Sir Michael
Newton, Tony


Brocklebank-Fowler, Christopher
Hawkins, Paul
Nott, Rt Hon John


Brooke, Hon Peter
Hawksley, Warren
Onslow, Cranley


Brotherton, Michael
Hayhoe, Barney
Oppenheim, Rt Hon Mrs Sally


Brown, Michael (Brlgg &amp; Sc'thorpe)
Heddle, John
Osborn, John


Browne, John (Winchester)
Henderson, Barry
Page, John (Harrow, West)


Bruce-Gardyne, John
Heseltine, Rt Hon Michael
Page, Rt Hon R. Graham (Crosby)


Bryan, Sir Paul
Hicks, Robert
Paisley, Rev Ian


Buck, Antony
Higgins, Rt Hon Terence L.
Parkinson, Cecil


Budgen, Nick
Hill, James
Parris, Matthew


Bulmer, Esmond
Holland, Philip (Carlton)
Patten, Christopher (Bath)


Burden, F. A.
Hooson, Tom
Patten, John (Oxford)


Butcher, John
Howell, Rt Hon David (Guildford)
Pattle, Geoffrey


Butler, Hon Adam
Howell, Ralph (North Norfolk)
Pawsey, James


Cadbury, Jocelyn
Hunt, David (Wirral)
Percival, Sir Ian


Carlisle, John (Luton West)
Hunt, John (Ravensbourne)
Pink, R. Bonner


Carlisle, Kenneth (Lincoln)
Hurd, Hon Douglas
Pollock, Alexander


Carlisle, Rt Hon Mark (Runcorn)
Irving, Charles (Cheltenham)
Porter, George


Chalker, Mrs. Lynda
Jenkin, Rt Hon Patrick
Price, David (Eastleigh)


Channon, Paul
Jessel, Toby
Prior, Rt Hon James


Chapman, Sydney
Johnson Smith, Geoffrey
Proctor, K. Harvey


Churchill, W. S.
Jopling, Rt Hon Michael
Raison, Timothy


Clark, Dr William (Croydon South)
Joseph, Rt Hon Sir Keith
Rathbone, Tim


Clarke, Kenneth (Rushcliffe)
Kaberry, Sir Donald
Rees, Peter (Dover and Deal)


Cockeram, Eric
Kellett-Bowman, Mrs Elaine
Rees-Davies, W. R.


Colvin, Michael
King, Rt Hon Tom
Rhodes James, Robert


Cope, John
Kitson, Sir Timothy
Rhys Williams, Sir Brandon


Cormack, Patrick
Knox, David
Ridley, Hon Nicholas


Corrie, John
Lamont, Norman
Rifkind, Malcolm


Costain, A. P.
Lang, Ian
Rippon, Rt Hon Geoffrey


Cranborne, Viscount
Langford-Holt, Sir John
Roberts, Michael (Cardiff NW)


Critchley, Julian
Latham, Michael
Roberts, Wyn (Conway)


Crouch, David
Lawrence, Ivan
Robinson, Peter (Belfast East)


Dickens, Geoffrey
Lawson, Nigel
Rost, Peter


Dorrell, Stephen
Lee, John
Royle, Sir Anthony


Douglas-Hamilton, Lord James
Lester, Jim (Beeston)
Sainsbury, Hon Timothy


Dover, Denshore
Lewis, Kenneth (Rutland)
St. John-Stevas, Rt Hon Norman


du Cann, Rt Hon Edward
Lloyd, Ian (Havant &amp; Waterloo)
Scott, Nicholas


Dunn, Robert (Dartford)
Lloyd, Peter (Fareham)
Shaw, Giles (Pudsey)


Durant, Tony
Loveridge, John
Shelton, William (Strealham)


Dykes, Hugh
Luce, Richard
Shepherd, Colin (Hereford)


Eden, Rt Hon Sir John
Lyell, Nicholas
Shepherd, Richard (Aldridge-Br'hills)


Edwards, Rt Hon N. (Pembroke)
McAdden, Sir Stephen
Shersby, Michael


Eggar, Timothy
McCrindle, Robert
Silvester, Fred


Elliott, Sir William
Macfarlane, Neil
Sims, Roger


Emery, Peter
MacGregor, John
Skeet, T. H. H.


Eyre, Reginald
MacKay, John (Argyll)
Speed, Keith


Fairbairn, Nicholas
McNair-Wilson, Michael (Newbury)
Speller, Tony


Faith, Mrs Sheila
McNair-Wilson, Patrick (New Forest)
Spence, John


Farr, John
McQuarrie, Albert
Spicer, Jim (West Dorset)


Fell, Anthony
Madel, David
Sproat, Iain


Fenner, Mrs Peggy
Major, John
Squire, Robin


Finsberg, Geoffrey
Marland, Paul
Stainton, Keith


Fisher, Sir Nigel
Marlow, Tony
Stanbrook, Ivor


Fletcher, Alexander (Edinburgh N)
Marshall, Michael (Arundel)
Stanley, John


Fookes, Miss Janet
Mates, Michael
Steen, Anthony


Forman, Nigel
Mather, Carol
Stevens, Martin


Fraser, Rt Hon H. (Stafford &amp; St)
Maude, Rt Hon Angus
Stewart, Ian (Hitchin)


Fraser, Peter (South Angus)
Mawby, Ray
Stewart, John (East Renfrewshire)


Fry, Peter
Mawhinney, Dr Brian
Stokes, John


Gardiner, George (Relgate)
Maxwell-Hyslop, Robin
Stradling Thomas, J.


Gardner, Edward (South Fylde)
Mayhew, Patrick
Tapsell, Peter


Garel-Jones, Tristan
Mellor, David
Taylor, Robert (Croydon NW)


Gilmour, Rt Hon Sir Ian
Meyer, Sir Anthony
Tebbit, Norman


Goodhart, Philip
Miller, Hal (Bromsgrove &amp; Redditch)
Temple-Morris, Peter


Goodhew, Victor
Mills, Iain (Meriden)
Thatcher, Rt Hon Mrs Margaret


Goodlad, Alastair
Mills, Peter (West Devon)
Thompson, Donald


Gow, Ian
Miscampbell, Norman
Thorne, Nell (Ilford South)


Gower, Sir Raymond
Mitchell, David (Basingstoke)
Thornton, Malcolm


Grant, Anthony (Harrow C)
Moate, Roger
Townend, John (Brldlington)


Gray, Hamish
Monro, Hector
Townsend, Cyril D. (Bexleyheath)


Greenway, Harry
Montgomery, Fergus
Trippier, David


Grieve, Percy
Moore, John
Trotter, Neville


Griffiths, Eldon (Bury St Edmunds)
Morgan, Geraint
van Straubenzee, W. R.


Griffiths, Peter (Portsmouth N)
Morris, Michael (Northampton, Sth)
Vaughan, Dr Gerard


Grist, Ian
Morrison, Hon Charles (Devizes)
Viggers, Peter


Grylls, Michael
Morrison, Hon Peter (City of Chester)
Waddington, David


Gumrner, John Selwyn
Mudd, David
Wakeham, John


Hamilton, Hon Archie (Eps'm&amp;Ew'll)
Murphy, Christopher
Waldegrave, Hon William


Hamilton, Michael (Salisbury)
Myles, David
Wall, Patrick


Hampson, Dr Keith
Neale, Gerrard
Waller, Gary


Hannam, John
Needham, Richard
Ward, John







Warren, Kenneth
Wickenden, Keith
Young, Sir George (Acton)


Watson, John
Wiggin, Jerry
Younger, Rt Hon George


Wells, John (Maldstone)
Wilkinson, John



Wells, Bowen (Hert'rd &amp; Stev'nage)
Williams, Delwyn (Montgomery)
TELLERS FOR THE AYES


Wheeler, John
Winterton, Nicholas
Mr. Spencer Le Marchant an[...]


Whitney, Raymond
Wolfson, Mark
Mr. Anthony Berry




NOES


Adams, Allen
Flannery, Martin
Mikardo, Ian


Allaun, Frank
Fletcher, Ted (Darlington)
Millan, Rt Hon Bruce


Anderson, Donald
Ford, Ben
Miller, Dr M. S. (East Kilbride)


Archer, Rt Hon Peter
Forrester, John
Mitchell, R. C. (Soton, Itchen)


Armstrong, Rt Hon Ernest
Foster, Derek
Morris, Rt Hon Charles (Openshaw)


Ashley, Rt Hon Jack
Fraser, John (Lambeth, Norwood)
Morris, Rt Hon John (Aberavon)


Ashton, Joe
Freeson, Rt Hon Reginald
Moyle, Rt Hon Roland


Atkinson, Norman (H'gey, Tott'ham)
Freud, Clement
Mulley, Rt Hon Frederick


Barnett, Guy (Greenwich)
Garrett, John (Norwich S)
Newens, Stanley


Barnett, Rt Hon Joel (Heywood)
Garrett, W. E. (Wallsend)
Oakes. Rt Hon Gordon


Belth, A. J.
George, Bruce
O'Halloran, Michael


Benn, Rt Hon Anthony Wedgwood
Gilbert, Rt Hon Dr John
O'Neill, Martin


Bennett, Andrew (Stockport N)
Golding, John
Orme, Rt Hon Stanley


Bidwell, Sydney
Graham, Ted
Owen, Rt Hon Dr David


Booth, Rt Hon Albert
Grant, George (Morpeth)
Palmer, Arthur


Boolhroyd, Miss Betty
Grant, John (Islington C)
Park, George


Bottomley, Rt Hon Arthur (M'brough)
Hamilton, James (Bothwell)
Parry, Robert


Bradley, Tom
Hardy, Peter
Pendry, Tom


Brown, Hugh D. (Provan)
Harrison, Rt Hon Walter
Penhaligon, David


Brown, Robert C. (Newcastle W)
Hart, Rt Hon Dame Judith
Powell, Rt Hon J. Enoch (S Down)


Brown, Ron (Edinburgh, Leith)
Hattersley, Rt Hon Roy
Powell, Raymond (Ogmore)


Buchan, Norman
Haynes, Frank
Prescott, John


Callaghan, Rt Hon. J. (Cardiff SE)
Healey, Rt Hon Denis
Price, Christopher (Lewisham West)


Callaghan, Jim (Middleton &amp; P)
Heffer, Eric S.
Race, Reg


Campbell, Ian
Hogg, Norman (E Dunbartonshire)
Rees, Rt Hon Merlyn (Leeds [...])


Campbell-Savours, Dale
Holland, Stuart (L'beth, Vauxhall)
Richardson, Miss Jo


Canavan, Dennis
Home Robertson, John
Roberts, Allan (Bootle)


Cant, R. B.
Homewood, William
Roberts, Ernest (Hackney North)


Carmlchael, Nell
Hooley, Frank
Roberts, Gwilym (Cannock)


Cartwright, John
Howoll, Rt Hon Denis (B'ham, Sm H)
Robertson, George


Clark, David (South Shields)
Howells, Geraint
Robinson, Geoffrey (Coventry NW)


Cocks, Rt Hon Michael (Bristol S)
Huckfield, Les
Rooker, J. W.


Cohen, Stanley
Hughes, Roy (Newport)
Roper, John


Coleman, Donald
Janner, Hon Greville
Ross, Ernest (Dundee West)


Concannon, Rt Hon J. D.
John, Brynmor
Ross, Wm. (Londonderry)


Conlan, Bernard
Johnson, James (Hull West)
Rowlands, Ted


Cook, Robin F.
Jones, Rt Hon Alec (Rhondda)
Ryman, John


Cowans, Harry
Jones, Barry (East Flint)
Sever, John


Cox, Tom (Wandsworth, Tooting)
Jones, Dan (Burnley)
Sheerman, Barry

Crowther, J. S.
Kaufman, Rt Hon Gerald
Sheldon, Rt Hon Robert (A'ton-u-L)


Cryer, Bob
Kerr, Russell
Shore, Rt Hon Peter (Step and Pop)


Cunliffe, Lawrence
Kilroy-Silk, Robert
Silkin, Rt Hon John (Deptford)


Cunningham, George (Islington S)
Kinnock, Neil
Silkin, Rt Hon S. C. (Dulwich)


Cunningham, Dr John (Whitehaven)
Lamble, David
Silverman, Julius


Dalyell, Tam
Lamborn, Harry
Skinner, Dennis


Davidson, Arthur
Lamond, James
Soley, Clive


Davies, Rt Hon Denzll (Lianelli)
Leadbitter, Ted
Spearing, Nigel


Davies, E. Hudson (Caerphilly)
Leighton, Ronald
Spriggs, Leslie


Davies, Ifor (Gower)
Lestor, Miss Joan (Eton &amp; Slough)
Stallard, A. W.


Davis, Clinton, (Hackney Central)
Lewis, Ron (Carlisle)
Steel, Rt Hon David


Davis, Terry (B'rm'ham, Stechford)
Litherland, Robert
Stoddart, David


Deakins, Eric
Lofthouse, Geoffrey
Stott, Roger


Dean, Joseph (Leeds West)
Lyon, Alexander (York)
Strang, Gavin


Dempsey, James
McCartney, Hugh
Straw, Jack


Dewar, Donald
McDonald, Dr Oonagh
Summerskill, Hon Dr Shirley


Dixon, Donald
McGuire, Michael (Ince)
Taylor, Mrs Ann (Bolton West)


Dobson, Frank
McKay, Allen (Penistone)
Thomas, Jeffrey (Abertillery)


Dormand, Jack
McKelvey, William
Thomas, Mike (Newcastle East)


Douglas, Dick
MacKenzie, Rt Hon Gregor
Thomas, Dr Roger (Carmarthen)


Douglas-Mann, Bruce
Maclennan, Robert
Thorne, Stan (Preston South)


Dubs, Allred
McMillan, Tom (Glasgow, Central)
Tilley, John


Duffy, A. E. P.
McNally, Thomas
Tinn, James


Dunn, James A. (Liverpool, Kirkdale)
McNamara, Kevin
Torney, Tom


Dunnett, Jack
McWilliam, John
Varley, Rt Hon Eric G.


Dunwoody, Mrs. Gwyneth
Magee, Bryan
Wainwright, Edwin (Dearne Valley)


Eadie, Alex
Marks, Kenneth
Walker, Rt Hon Harold (Doncaster)


Eastham, Ken
Marshall, David (Gl'sgow, Shettles'n)
Weetch, Ken


Edwards, Robert (Wolv SE)
Marshall, Dr Edmund (Goole)
Wellbeloved, James

Ellis, Raymond (NE Derbyshire)
Marshall, Jim (Leicester South)
Welsh, Michael


Ellis, Tom (Wrexham)
Martin, Michael (Gl'gow, Springb'rn)
White, Frank R. (Bury &amp; Radcliffe)


English, Michael
Mason, Rt Hon Roy
White, James (Glasgow, Pollok)


Evans, Ioan (Aberdare)
Maxton, John
Whitlock, William


Evans, John (Newton)
Maynard, Miss Joan
Willey, Rt Hon Frederick


Field, Frank
Meacher, Michael
Williams, Rt Hon Alan (Swansea W)







Wilson, Rt Hon Sir Harold (Huyton)
Wrigglesworth, Ian
TELLERS FOR THE NOES:


Wilson, William (Coventry SE)
Wright, Sheila
Mr. Austin Mitchell and


Winnick, David
Young, David (Bolton East)
Mr. George Morton


Woolmer, Kenneth

Question accordingly agreed to.

Bill read the Third time and passed.

MOUNT VERNON HOSPITAL, NORTHWOOD

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—[Mr. Newton.]

Mr. John Wilkinson: In the debate on London on Friday 2 November my hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge (Mr. Shersby) and I expressed grave concern about the way that the Hillingdon area health authority appears to be run. We drew the attention of the House then, as we do now, to the proposed closure of the accident and emergency unit at Mount Vernon hospital between 8 pm and 8 am. As evidence of our argument I quote my hon. Friend's speech:
it does not appear … that the authority is taking seriously enough the job of reducing its administrative costs, and, for reasons that are difficult to recognise, it is concentrating upon hitting the interests of patients."—[Official Report, 2 November 1979; Vol. 972, c. 1694–95.]
I shall develop further some of the statistical and factual arguments in my remarks.
In my judgment and in the judgment of my hon. Friends the Members for Uxbridge, Watford (Mr. Garel-Jones) and Harrow., West (Mr. Page), whom I see here tonight, in the judgment of the overwhelming majority of my constituents who have written to me, and above all in the judgment of the medical staff who work at the hospital, the required budgetary savings could be achieved by rigorous administrative economies rather than cuts in vital clinical services, if the determination to put patients' interests first existed on the part of the area health authority.
There is an intensity of feeling over this issue that I have not encountered in over four years in this House. You will recall, Mr. Deputy Speaker, that previously I represented a Bradford constituency, and Bradfordians are not short

on local pride or prone to mince words when their interests are jeopardised.
No fewer than 30,000 local residents, not just from my own constituency but from Uxbridge, Watford, Harrow and South-West Hertfordshire, signed a petition against the proposed closure of the accident and emergency unit at Mount Vernon at night. It was taken to No. 10 Downing Street on 2 November. The petition was motivated:
purely by the desire to save the night-time casualty facilities at Mount Vernon Hospital … and has no connection with any political party, union or other association.
Naturally, feeling is most intense within the hospital itself. The medical staff, with justification, feel that drastic cuts in clinical services of the kind proposed by the area health authority would prejudice the calibre, capability and standing of the hospital as a whole.
The medical staff committee, on 11 October 1979, wrote to the chairman and members of the Hillingdon area health authority, following the authority's decision on 2 October to close the Mount Vernon casualty department at night. The committee expressed the hope:
that you wish to re-explore alternative methods of saving money at Mount Vernon, with the assistance of consultant medical staff.
The medical staff had produced what I called in this House on 2 November "carefully researched proposals" for administrative economies which would have obviated the need to close the casualty department at night, but which would still have enabled the area health authority to achieve the budgetary savings required by the Government's cash limits.
These proposals received only superficial attention from the area health authority. I shall quote what the consultants thought about this. They said:
We can only suppose that members of the area health authority were not aware that the alternatives were practical propositions costed by the same heads of departments who provided the figures for the Administrators' costing exercise".
That judgment was typical of the generosity of spirit of professional medical men whose concern is the care of patients and who do not look for political motivation in decisions. I say this because when the area management team poured


cold water—as it did, in its report to the area health authority of 23 October—on the administrative savings proposed by the medical staff, the area medical team showed that it was exercising entirely selective judgment, because its own proposed economies, biased as they were towards cuts in clinical services at Mount Vernon, had been costed by the same medical experts in the hospital.
What has been noteworthy has been the widespread public acceptance of the need on the part of the Government to demand economies from the National Health Service. Those constituents who have been in touch with me, with literally one or two exceptions, have backed wholeheartedly the Minister for Health's call at the Conservative Party conference for cuts in waste, extravagance and bureaucratic administrative costs rather than in services to patients.
I was not exaggerating when I claimed in the House on 2 November:
The local residents are not criticising the Government's desire to effect economies. Their criticism is directed at what they regard as an over-large bureaucracy and extravagant administrative expenses"—[Official Report, 2 November 1979; Vol. 972, c. 1687].
My postbag confirms that I was not exaggerating. One nurse writes:
It is ludicrous that wards and casualty departments are the first to be closed down when administrative headquarters are flourishing and are situated in this area in the most expensively rated districts, Eastcote High Street and Ruislip High Street, and when the buildings occupying them cover the costs needed to cover the cuts requested. The rental of these premises alone is many thousands of pounds.
The figure is over £90,000 a year and has to be set against the £8,300 to be saved by the closure of the casualty department at night in this financial year and £23,500 in the next financial year.

Mr. Tristan Garel-Jones: I am interested to hear the comments that my hon. Friend has received from his constituents. Is he aware that the Mount Vernon hospital is held in high esteem in my constituency? I have received a number of written representations from people who not only work at that hospital but receive medical care there. Many people are concerned that if this casualty service is closed, urgent emergency casualties at night will be taken to the Watford Peace Memorial hospital which

is already considerably overstretched. Once someone has received emergency treatment in a hospital, he tends to continue at that hospital as an out-patient. I hope that my hon. Friend will bear in mind that the Mount Vernon hospital enjoys a high reputation for plastic surgery. Urgent cases, brought to the Watford Peace Memorial hospital, are frequently referred to the Mount Vernon hospital because that is the place where the best treatment can be obtained. The services and facilities at the Watford Peace Memorial hospital are not available two weekends out of every four and an emergency case would probably have to travel a considerable distance to receive care.

Mr. Wilkinson: I am grateful to my hon. Friend, particularly for the last point that he made. A private citizen bringing a casualty to that hospital by car would not necessarily know that. The ambulance service would be informed. Although there are vacant premises in Uxbridge cottage hospital and Harefield hospital the area management team has refused to follow up the medical staff committee's recommendation that at least Cromwell House be vacated and the administrative staff moved to these vacant premises in the hospitals.
Another constituent who works at Mount Vernon writes:
As an employee of the authority, I find their attitude to patients indefensible. I work in the Health Service because I care for people who are sick. If cuts are to be made, there are plenty of useless sacred cows that could be removed without any detrimental effects to the service. We all know how to reduce spending but there is not much leadership in the management. They seem to go for the easy life.
Something is clearly wrong. Twenty-two junior doctors do not write, without good cause, to the area administrator, as they did on 10 October:
to censure your management of this area.
They forcefully regretted that:
You have dismissed the alternative financial savings proposed by the hospital consultant staff and we cannot accept that the alternatives have been fully considered.
Nor can I. The area has not disputed that at least £26,850 must be saved from Mount Vernon's budget this year and £83,720 next year to meet the 2 per cent. overall cut in area expenditure demanded by Government cash limits. The medical staff suggests the closure of the staff


health department at Mount Vernon. There is already one such department in existence at Harefield hospital, down the road. This would save £1,500 this year and £15,000 next year. Although the people who use it—the medical staff—advocate its closure, the administrators two miles away know better:
The AMO is currently reviewing the staff health service in the area",
writes the area management team:
and it may be possible after further discussion and consultation with the staff organisations to make some modest savings in this service. The area management team could not, however, support the abolition of this service, which is regarded as essential for staff welfare.
The medical staff suggest that natural wastage and a reduction in the number of secretaries be used to effect economics—£12,750 this year and £28,750 next year. This was based on last year's turnover for secretaries and is not, as the AMT suggests in its response, some figment of its imagination. Savings in the dispensing of drugs have been considered, as proposed by the medical staff. Some have been implemented, but further suggestions, for example, the dispensing of not more than a week's supply of take-home drugs for out-patients, are being discussed currently.
Even the proposed savings on photocopying of the medical staff received a classically obtuse response which was revealing about the authority's whole attitude. It said:
The AMT had considered the alternative proposals put forward by the medical staff committee before completing the recommendations for economies approved by the AHA on 2 October. The proposals were, however, received as the final package was being put together to be sent out to members, and in the time available the only item considered feasible for inclusion was a saving of photocopying for which a sum of £1,000 was included
On further reflection it found that to be wrong and it now says that up to £6,000 could in extreme circumstances be saved on photocopying.
There are so many examples of this kind which make me believe that the area chairman was utterly wrong to ignore the anxiety of staff and local residents and, at the emergency meeting, to cast his vote twice—once to resolve the tied vote—in favour of closure.
In this kind of situation, his response should not have been one dictated by rule books and political attitudes. His duty was to make every effort imaginable to maintain clinical services, even if drastic administrative savings were required. It is reprehensible for area health authorities to seek to flout cash limits, but it is equally wrong for a chairman, by his own words and actions, to appear to act more in the political style expected of a former deputy leader of a local authority, which he is, than as the supposedly non-partisan custodian of the health and medical care of the community.
At the conclusion of my remarks on 2 November, I asked for a review. I am grateful that my hon. Friend the Minister of State intervened last week, and I am pleased that the moratorium on closure until tomorrow night has occurred. But in view of the fact that this hospital serves an area which includes the premier NATO headquarters in this country, the premier naval headquarters, RAF Northolt with its VIP movements, and Heathrow airport from which an emergency at night, perhaps involving a jumbo jet, cannot be ruled out, it is totally wrong to close this kind of facility, especially as the hospital also has a burns and plastic surgery unit.
Anything that my hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State can suggest to facilitate the kind of review which I have advocated would be greatly appreciated by local residents, medical staff and, I am sure, all the local Members of Parliament, including my hon. Friend the Member for Uxbridge.

Mr. Michael Shersby: rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker (Mr. Bryant Godman Irvine): Has the hon. Gentleman the permission of the hon. Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) and the Minister?

Mr. Shersby: I have, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
I wish to intervene briefly to support my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson). He has raised a matter which is of deep concern not only to the residents of Hillingdon


but to those of other towns nearby such as Harrow, Watford, and so on.
This is a matter which deserves a very full reply from the Minister. I hope that my hon. Friend will say whether the decision to close down—even on a temporary basis—an important accident department at a major hospital should be taken to save the comparatively trivial sum of £8,300 this year and £23,500 in a full year.
I hope that he will deal fully with these matters and will give an explanation which can be considered both by the regional and the area health authorities. I hope that those authorities will note that at 2.40 am my hon. Friends the Members for Harrow, West (Mr. Page), Watford (Mr. Garel-Jones), Ruislip-Northwood and I are in the House raising this matter on behalf of our constituents, whose servants we are.

Mr. John Page: rose—

Mr. Deputy Speaker: Does the hon. Member have the permission of the Minister to speak?

Mr. Page: I do, Mr. Deputy Speaker.
On behalf of my constituents in Harrow, West, I wish to thank my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip-Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) for raising this vitally important matter tonight. It is of real concern to my constituents. It was disgraceful that the area chairman on this occasion cast his vote twice to save money at the "sharp end" of patient care in the hospital concerned.
If the casualty department at Mount Vernon hospital is closed, an essential part of the training of surgeons and registrars will be lost, and when that is lost the prestige of that hospital which enables it to gain staff of repute and dedication is likely also to be lost.
I beg my hon. Friend the Under-secretary to give a reprieve to the people of this part of London so that the department remains open, although, of course, we totally support the economies which will have to be made in other ways.

The Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security (Sir George Young): My hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip—Northwood (Mr. Wilkinson) has made an eloquent and powerful case on behalf of his constituents—as one would expect from an experienced parliamentarian—and on behalf of those who would be affected by the proposed temporary closure. He was well supported by my hon. Friends.
I understand their concern and that of those they represent. That concern was needlessly aggravated by the error in the official notice in the two local papers which said that the closure of the accident and emergency department at Mount Vernon would be permanent. The chairman of Hillingdon area health authority has apologised to my hon. Friend the Member for Ruislip—Northwood and to my hon. Friend the Minister for Health for this mistake and has assured him that the authority has no intention of going back on its resolution to use its
best endeavours to find sufficient funds to reopen the Accident and Emergency Unit at Mount Vernon Hospital as soon as possible".
I am grateful to my hon. Friends for raising this subject, since it gives me the opportunity to explain the actions which many authorities, particularly in London, are having to take. I hope also that I shall be able to allay some of their anxieties.
My hon. Friends will know that it is our policy that all Government-financed bodies—and that includes health authorities—must stay within their budgets. In order to do that, each area health authority must take whatever action is necessary to keep its expenditure this year within the revenue allocated to it by the regional health authority, and to ensure that it is in a position to contain next year's expenditure within the allocation it might reasonably anticipate in that year.
While we expect that authorities will do everything they can to find ways of making the necessary economies without affecting patient services, we accept that that will not always be possible. My right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Social Services made this clear in this House on 17 July when he said:
some health authorities—this applies especially to those in London—are faced with the need to make real cuts this year so as to remain within their cash limits".—[Official Report, 17 July 1979; Vol. 970, c. 1435.]
The resource allocation working party has been a factor here. It should be


realised, however, that even when patient services are affected, this does not mean that services to patients will be totally withdrawn. In some cases the opportunity can be taken to reorganise services in order to treat the same number of patients for a lower cost. This can bring benefits not only in reducing costs now but in preparing for expansion to meet different needs when more money becomes available. I am glad to see that the Hillingdon area health authority had these points very much in mind in planning its present savings. It intends, for example, to economise by introducing Monday to Friday working in one ward to treat those patients who are expected to be in for only a few days. The authority has also made it clear that, if the economies achieve the desired result next year—and it is not yet possible to predict exactly what its financial situation will be then—it hopes to be able to make modest improvements perhaps by opening a closed cardiac ward at Harefield hospital and new geriatric beds at Hillingdon hospital.
Nevertheless, we recognise that some of the changes which have to be made affect patient services adversely. Where this happens, there is a requirement that local interests should be consulted and a procedure is laid down for doing this. Statutory Instrument 1973, No. 2217 which sets out in paragraph 20(1) the requirement that community health councils should be consulted does, however, contain a proviso that the requirement shall not apply to any proposal on which the area authority is satisfied that, in the interests of the Health Service, a decision has to be taken without allowing time for consultation.
In taking its decision on the economies which it thought necessary the Hillingdon area health authority invoked this proviso resolving that:
In the interest of the health service a decision had to be taken without allowing time for consultation".
When savings have to be made, the decision on how this should be done is a matter for the health authority concerned and I have obtained a certain amount of factual information from Hillingdon AHA which may help to put the matter into perspective.
Had no action been taken to reduce expenditure, the authority would have been about £650,000 overspent at the end

of this year. The swing which it has agreed to make, together with adjustments in the cash flow, should enable it to keep within its cash limits this year. Further savings will, however, be required next year to compensate for the adjustment in cash flow, if this is not to leave the authority in financial difficulties in 1980–81.
I well understand that local concern has arisen from the proposal to close the accident and emergency department between 8 pm and 8 am. Lest there should be any fear that patients who are already in the department at 8 pm might be sent away without treatment, I am assured that treatment will continue until everything necessary has been done for them.
I think it may be helpful if I indicate how many people are likely to be affected by this proposal. The figures available, which are from 7 pm to 8 am—an hour longer than the time during which the department will be closed—show that an average of about 19 cases enter the department each night. Of these, three are ambulance cases, the majority of them arranged admissions, who have in the past entered through casualty but will go direct to the wards when the department is closed.
The remaining 16 cases arrive independently and most of them by car since, as my hon. Friend will know, there are few houses within walking distance of the hospital. Of these cases, it is estimated that 30 per cent. are minor, which should properly have been dealt with by general practitioners. Although most of the remainder will be put to inconvenience because they may have to travel further to reach the neighbouring departments at Hillingdon, Northwick Park or Watford, the distances are not great and the additional time taken, at night when traffic is light, should not be long.
Reference has been made to the alternative proposals put forward by the Mount Vernon hospital medical committee and others and it has been suggested that these were possibilities. Some of the proposals had already been included in the economies agreed by the AHA. Some had been examined and, though attractive, could not be implemented quickly enough to have any impact this year, or much impact next year. Others are still being examined though some of them would not offer major savings. Others


were felt to be impractical for various reasons.
It seems to me that the alternatives were carefully examined and that time was given to the consideration of the savings. Discussion began at the authority's meeting on 18 September and continued at extraordinary meetings on 2 and 23 October. I understand that the latter meeting, which was concerned almost entirely with the accident and emergency department at Mount Vernon, went on for about four hours.
My hon. Friend referred to a number of other suggestions and perhaps I could deal with one of them. That is the possible transfer of administrative offices from Cromwell House and Keele House to hospital wards. There are some major difficulties. The ward accommodation is not necessarily suitable and would require conversion. That would cost money, as would the transfer itself.
The real problem is time. There must be time to carry out the conversion, for staff consultation and to find someone else to take over the leases which have 19 years to run. It is doubtful that there could be a real saving until well into the next financial year.
Criticism has been made of the authority in that insufficient economies have been made in administrative and other services. Considerable savings have been made in the past few years, particularly in clerical and administrative staff. In addition, since the authority is a single district area and does not have the extra tier of management, it started with low administrative costs and thus has less scope than others to make reductions.
This was recognised by those members of the authority who had strong reservations about the night-time closure of the accident and emergency department at Mount Vernon. In an attempt to reverse

the decision they proposed that the area management committee be instructed to submit alternative proposals as soon as possible to achieve the same amount of savings in clinical services at Mount Vernon hospital
The Government's overriding consideration is that the authority should keep within its cash limit. Members of that authority have the prime responsibility to decide that this is done in the best way.
The error in the announcement of the closure can be criticised—it is a careless mistake which should not be allowed to happen—but I am not convinced that the authority has acted improperly. I am arranging for a full report of this debate to be submitted at once to the chairman of the area health authority while the unit is still open. The Minister has been in touch with the chairman of the regional health authority, to whom I shall send a a copy of this debate, in view of that authority's interest. I understand that it may examine with the area authority the alternative proposals for staying within cash limits. The Minister is also seeing a deputation, led by my hon. Friends the Members for Harrow, West (Mr. Page) Uxbridge (Mr. Shersby) and Watford (Mr. Garel-Jones) on Wednesday. The chairman of the area health authority may wish to postpone closure until then.

Mr. John Page: May we be assured that the closure will not take place before Wednesday? I urge the Minister to insist that no closure takes place before the meeting.

Sir G. Young: I have gone as far as I can. I am bringing to the attention of the chairman of the health authority the remarks of my hon. Friends and me. I hope that he will take them into account.

Question put and agreed to.

Adjourned accordingly at seven minutes to Three o'clock am.